Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis by Clark, J.Morris
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1976
Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A
Framework for Constitutional Analysis
J.Morris Clark
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clark, J.Morris, "Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis" (1976). Minnesota Law
Review. 1526.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1526
Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures:
A Framework for Constitutional Analysis
J. Morris Clark*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 381
II. PUNITIVE LAWS AND REMEDIAL LAWS:
AN EXERCISE IN CONTRADICTION - 385
III. THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 397
A. "PET OFFsEs" Am "INFAMous PusmnuTs" __ 397
1. Fines and Forfeitures Labeled "Crmznal".
Constitutionally "Crmnal" or "Petty"9  397
2. "Infamous" Punzshments That Are Always
Constitutionally "Criminal" 401
B. POLICIES UNDERLYING THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DISTINCTION - 403
1. Why Should Not All "Severe" Punishments Be
Considered "Crhmnal' 403
2. Stigma: A Partial Explanation of Criminal
Puntshment 406
C. APPLYING THE CnL-CRnvmnAL DISTINCTION:THREE CASES 410
1. Forfeitures Not Labeled "Criminal" 410
2. Incarcerations for Civil Contempt 412
3. Disqualification from Public Employment 412
D. SuAn __Y 413
IV THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL
PUNISHMENT 414
A. Boyd v. United States: THE FIFm AaMENDM ANm
THE "QUAsI-CmmiNAL" LAW 414
B. SummARY ADjUDICATION: TAX OR PENALTY9 420
C. ENFORCEMN=T OF FORuIGN PENAL LAWS 421
D. Ex POST FACTO LAWS 424
E. OTnER CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF NONCRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT 426
F. SnM ARvn Y 427
* Associate Professor of Law, Umversity of Minnesota Law
School. I would like to express my gratitude to Carl Auerbach, Alan
Freeman, Leo Raskmd, and other members of the Minnesota faculty for
their most valuable comments and editorial help on earlier drafts of
this Article.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
V. PUNITIVE LAWS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION - 429
A. THE MEANING OF "PuNsmENT'" 429
B. POLICIES UNDERLYING DISTINCTIONS BASED ON
"PUNISM&ENT" 432
1. Procedural Safeguards 432
2. The Ex Post Facto Clause 434
3. Takings Without Just Compensation 434
4. The Tenth Amendment __ 435
5. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 435
C. IDENTIFYING PuNrTmV PuRPosE - 435
1. Punishment as a State of Mind: The Court's
Approach 436
2. Legislative "Motivation" and Legislative "Purpose" - 439
a. Statutory interpretation 440
b. Constitutional validity 441
3. "Motivation": The Improper Use of Legislative His-
tory or Other Speculative Evidence of Intent to
Invalidate a Statute 441
4. Inquiry into Legislative "Purpose" Under the Equal
Protection Clause and the First Amendment 444
5. Application of the First Amendment and Equal
Protection Tests to the Isaue of "Punishment" - _ 454
6. Applying the Test to Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez - 461
7. Identifying Punitive Laws for Constitutional Purposes 463
a. Punishment and taxation 463
b. Punishment and compensation 469
c. Punishment and regulation 475
(1) Forfeitures 475
(2) Denials or deprivations of personal rights
and privileges 481
(3) Expatriation and deportation 487
(4) Civil contempt 488
d. Punishment and treatment 489
VI. POSTSCRIPT: THE PROCEDURAL ATTRIBUTES OF
CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDINGS 491
A. THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL UNDER THE SEVENTH
AmENDMENT - 491
B. REMIssIoN AND MrITIGATION OF PENALTIES AND
FoRFEITUREs 494
C. DUE PROCESS HEARING REQUIREMIENTS IN PENALTY AND
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS 496
VII. CONCLUSION
[Vol. 60:379
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES
I. INTRODUCTION
Laws that provide for punishment but are civil rather than
criminal in form have sometimes been labeled "quasi-criminal"
by the Supreme Court.1 These laws, broadly speaking, provide
for civil money penalties, forfeitures of property,2 and the pun-
itive imposition of various disabilities, such as the loss of pro-
fessional license or public employment.
In determining the applicability of constitutional safeguards
in proceedings involving these sanctions, the Supreme Court has
treated particular laws as criminal in some contexts but civil in
others. For example, the Court has stated that forfeiture pro-
ceedings are sufficiently "criminal" that the property owner can
claim the protection of the fifth amendment's self-incrimination
clause.3 On the other hand, the Court has consistently held that
neither the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment 4 nor
the various criminal trial safeguards of the sixth amendment 5 ap-
ply in forfeiture cases.
The need for clarification in this area is becoming increas-
ingly urgent. The use of civilly labeled monetary penalties and
forfeitures has gained increasing attention recently as a means
of substituting streamlined administrative proceedings for the
more cumbersome judicial proceedings that typify the criminal
process.6 As the use of civil penalties increases, so must concern
for defining the constitutional rights of those who will be sub-
1. The term appears to have originated in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
2. Forfeiture proceedings have frequently been regarded as in rem,
and therefore not as penalties against the person. See, e.g., Various
Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931); J.W.
Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins's
Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878). The sense in which these
laws are properly regarded as punitive is discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 286-309 infra.
3. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
4. E.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232
(1972) (per curiam).
5. E.g., United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
6. The Administrative Conference of the United States has sug-
gested that increased use of civil penalties may lead to greater adminis-
trative efficiency and in some cases to a better rendition of due process,
since fewer cases will suffer from delay and forced settlement than in
the criminal process. Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 72-6: Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction, Dec. 14,
1972. The recommendation is based on H. Goldschmid, An Evaluation
of the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction
by Federal Administrative Agencies, Nov. 17, 1972, reprinted in 2 AD-
iNSTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF UNITED STATEs, RECOMIMENDATIONS AND RE-
PoRTs 896 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Goldschmid].
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jected to punishment by these ostensibly noncriminal methods.7
The Court has never developed a principled explanation of
why identical sanctions should trigger certain criminal constitu-
tional safeguards but not others. Sometimes it has declared that
certain constitutional safeguards, such as the self-incrimination
clause, are broader than others.8 At other times, apparently ig-
noring its distinction based on "breadth," the Court has asserted
that all laws that serve primarily to punish are criminal in na-
ture, presumably for all constitutional purposes.9 But using this
punitive-nonpunitive dichotomy, the Court has still managed to
achieve a selective application of constitutional safeguards; in
those cases where it has concluded that a particular constitu-
tional safeguard should not be applied, it has strained to show
that the civilly labeled sanctions in question are "remedial"
rather than punitive. In a series of contradictory opinions, the
Court has held the same sanction to be punitive for one constitu-
tional purpose but remedial for others.
This Article sets forth guidelines that may help to explain
and order the Court's holdings. To orient the reader, it may be
useful to summarize its thesis at the outset. The Article will
suggest that the Court's single distinction between punitive laws
that are criminal and remedial laws that are civil requires revi-
sion. The decisions in fact indicate two critical distinctions, not
one. First, the Court applies certain constitutional provisions
only to punishments that are "criminal" in a specially defined
sense, not to punishments that are "civil." Second, the Court
applies other constitutional safeguards to any punishment,
whether or not criminal, but not to "nonpunitive" laws.
The first portion of this Article deals with the distinction
between criminal punishment and civil punishment. In gen-
eral the Court has applied those constitutional provisions that
refer explicitly to criminal prosecutions sparingly-only to
cases that fit the Court's narrow concept of "criminal punish-
ment. The cases that establish this proposition involve the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment 0 and the various crim-
7. See Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for De-fendants in. Civil Penalty Cases, 59 Cong. L. REv. 478 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Charney]; Note, Forfeitures-Civil or Criminal?, 43 TEmp. L.Q.
191 (1970); Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages
Defendant, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 408 (1967).
8. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 n.3 (1938).
9. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537(1943).
10. The double jeopardy clause has been restricted to "criminal"
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inal trial safeguards of the sixth amendment. The only apparent
exception to this restrictive application of "criminal" safeguards
is the self-incrimination clause."
These holdings, if not the Court's language, suggest that
"criminal punishment" may be defined in terms of two categories.
One consists of severe sanctions that the Court considers "in-
famous" and therefore criminal for constitutional purposes,
whether or not so labeled by the legislature. Imprisonment for
a substantial duration constitutes the usual example. A second
category consists of less severe punishments, such as property for-
feitures, which are regarded as criminal for constitutional pur-
poses only if the legislature attaches a criminal label to the
proceeding. Other penalties, such as small money fines, ap-
parently fail to qualify as "criminal punishment" for purposes
of certain sixth amendment provisions even if they do carry a
legislatively imposed criminal label.
A second group of constitutional provisions and doctrines ap-
plies not only to this narrowly defined class of "criminal" punish-
ments, but also to any other sanction that can be called punitive.
Applicable to all punitive sanctions are the ex post facto clause,
the exception to the full faith and credit clause that concerns
enforcement of foreign penal laws, the due process rule that tax
penalties may not be assessed by summary adjudication, a cur-
rently uncertain rule that the fourth and fifth amendments com-
bined prevent compulsion of testimony in civil penalty cases, the
doctrine that punitive takings do not fall within the scope of the
fifth amendment's taking clause, and, finally, the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause itself.
The distinction the Article posits between criminal punish-
ment and noncriminal punishment, and between constitutional
provisions that apply only to the former and provisions that ap-
ply to both, serves purposes that are admittedly more descriptive
than normative. Because the Constitution makes certain provi-
sions applicable only to criminal prosecutions, the Court has
evolved a meaning for criminal punishment. This meaning can
more easily be described in formalistic and historical terms than
defended in terms of policy. Apart from a general notion that
procedural safeguards such as those embodied in the sixth
amendment should be reserved for more severe or stigmatic pun-
punishment despite the lack of an explicit textual reference to criminal
prosecutions. See J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 39 (1969).
11. Various explanations of this exception are explored below at
text accompanying notes 110-24 infra.
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ishments, no policy compels or underlies the Court's distinction
between criminal punishments and other punishments.
The Court's formalistic lines are, at least, more certain and
predictable than lines that might be produced by a policy-ori-
ented approach testing whether the punishment at stake in a par-
ticular case is "severe." Moreover the lines drawn do have some
general functional relevance, which this Article attempts to de-
scribe. For these reasons, plus the fact that the Court appears
to be clearly committed to its existing concept of criminal punish-
ment, the Article takes the basic outlines of the Court's holdings
as given and undertakes first and foremost to analyze them in
terms of their consistency and predictability as a tool of judicial
decision.
The second major distinction dealt with by the Article is that
between punishment and nonpunishment-a distinction that de-
termines the applicability of all the constitutional provisions that
have been mentioned, both those that apply to criminal and those
that apply to civil punishments.
The core concept of punishmen't is relatively simple and well
accepted. H.L.A. Hart and Herbert Packer have described it as
having a dominant purpose of retribution, meaning the desire
to hurt a law violator for no reason but revenge, or deterrence,
meaning the desire to influence his future conduct or that of
others who fear similar hurt.12
Notwithstanding general agreement about this core concept,
the Court's application of it to particular cases has proved to be
highly unpredictable and confusing. The source of this confusion
lies in the two general means by which the Court has sought
to uncover a "dominant" legislative purpose of retribution or de-
terrence. At times the Court has pointed to various objective
"indicators" of legislative purpose, such as whether the sanction
keys to conduct already labeled criminal, or whether the kind
of sanction involved has traditionally been used to punish. None
of these indicators, however, adequately explains or predicts the
Court's actual holdings. At other times the Court has sought
to determine dominant purpose by resorting to legislative history.
This second approach, however, is an unreliable method of analy-
sis which the Court has rejected in all other contexts requiring
a determination of legislative purpose as a basis for holding a
law constitutional or unconstitutional.
12. See H.L.A. HART, PUN'ISEMNT AND REsPONSIBmIY 4-5 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as H.L.A. HART]; H. PACKER, THE IMvITS OF Tm
CRUVnNAL SAxcrioN 31 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PAcKER]; text ac-
companying notes 161-62 infra.
[Vol. 60:379
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Accepting the constitutional role assigned to the idea of pun-
ishment, this Article attempts to offer a more satisfactory ap-
proach to the key issue in defining it-the problem of identifying
"dominant legislative purpose." The Article suggests first, that a
single method of analyzing punishment can serve to advance the
diverse policies underlying the various constitutional provisions
to which the concept is relevant. Second, it suggests that the
problem of finding a dominant purpose to punish can be analo-
gized directly to the problem of finding a dominant purpose to
discriminate invidiously against a given class or to burden a
"fundamental interest" under the equal protection clause or the
first amendment. That is, if the law places special burdens
specifically on a group of persons who have violated some legal
prohibition, then there should exist a presumption that the law is
punitive, absent convincing evidence of some other purpose. The
analysis of alternative purpose should focus on the overbreadth
or underbreadth of the legislation and on the presence or absence
of a less burdensome alternative.
This mode of analysis is admittedly rigorous and puts a seri-
ous burden on those seeking to defend a law as "nonpunitive."
The Article suggests, however, that the burden is an appropriate
one. To be sure, "punishment" itself is not an evil of the kind
associated with invidious discrimination. As a general rule, there
is nothing wrong with punishing a lawbreaker. Nonetheless, the
form and procedural regularity of that punishment, as reflected
by constitutional provisions such as the sixth amendment, the
self-incrimination clause, and the ex post facto clause, are im-
portant constitutional values. A rigorous test of purpose, one
that errs on the side of overprotecting those values, would not
be unduly disruptive. For the most part, it would merely require
that the government pursue its objectives with extra procedural
safeguards. Even if a rigorous test of purpose does not strike
exactly the right balance for all purposes, it may nevertheless
be the best of available answers to an extremely complex issue.
If, as this Article contends, the Court's present efforts to deal with
the issue of purpose have failed to produce consistent and pre-
dictable doctrinal tools in this area, an alternative approach that
offers something more workable should at least be given serious
consideration.
II. PUNITIVE LAWS AND REMEDIAL LAWS: AN
EXERCISE IN CONTRADICTION
The Supreme Court has indicated on numerous occasions that
1976]
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all laws that serve primarily to punish are criminal in nature.
The leading example of this approach is the 1886 case of Boyd
v. United States,14 where the Government sought to subpoena
the books and business records of a merchant who had allegedly
imported 35 cases of plate glass in violation of the customs laws,
thereby subjecting the goods to forfeiture. The owner asserted
a constitutional privilege against the disclosure of the books and
records, citing both the fourth and the fifth amendment. The
Court sustained the claim, reasoning that search and seizure of
books in order to bring a forfeiture serves essentially the same
purpose as forcing a man to testify against himself in a criminal
trial. The Court justified its holding as follows:
We are also clearly of the opinion that proceedings instituted for
the purposes of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by
reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil
in form, are in their nature criminal.... The information,
though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect
a criminal one .... As, therefore, suits for penalties and for-
feitures incurred by the commission of offences against the law,
are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within
the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and of that portion of
the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self . . .15
In recent years the Court has reiterated this language in sev-
eral forfeiture cases involving fourth and fifth amendment
claims, stating that the forfeiture is "criminal" or "quasi-crim-
inal" in nature and that the constitutional provisions in question
13. The Supreme Court cases are analyzed in the following pages.
Commentary that also makes this assumption includes Charney, supra
note 7, which asserts that penal laws, in the sense of laws that primarily
serve the purpose of retribution, are criminal. Id. at 509-14. See also
Note, Forfeitures--Civil or Criminal?, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 191 (1970). More-
over, writers of jurisprudential articles on criminal law seem generally
to assume that punishment is the exclusive hallmark of the criminal
process. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 12; H. PAciKER, supra note
12. But see Note, Statutory Penalties-A Legal Hybrid, 51 HARv. L. REv.
1092 (1938) (suggesting that certain penalties should be recognized as
neither civil nor criminal, but construed on an ad hoc basis); Note, Pun-
ishment: Its Meaning in Relation to Separation of Power and Substan-
tive Constitutional Restrictions and Its Use in the Lovett, Trop, Perez
and Speiser Cases, 34 IND. L.J. 231, 279-88 (1959) (arguing that many
sanctions that the Court has strained to label as compensatory or regula-
tory should be recognized as punitive and, by implication, criminal)
[hereinafter cited as Indiana Note].
14. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
15. Id. at 633-35.
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therefore apply. 6 The reason given for this conclusion has been
that the forfeitures in question were punitive.
In other contexts, however, the Court has held forfeiture pro-
ceedings to be neither criminal nor punitive. In a 1972 case in-
volving a claim of double jeopardy, where a forfeiture proceeding
was commenced after the initiation of a criminal prosecution, the
Court stated:
The ... forfeiture is intended to aid in the enforcement of tariff
regulations. It prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating
in the United States, and, by its monetary penalty, it provides
a reasonable form of liquidated damages for violation of the in-
spection provisions and serves to reimburse the Government for
investigation and enforcement expenses. In other contexts we
have recognized that such purposes characterize remedial rather
than punitive sanctions. 17
16. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693
(1965), the Court held that contraband seized in violation of the fourth
amendment could not be used as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding in-
volving the care used to transport the contraband. The Court again
stated:
[A] forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its ob-ject, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission
of an offense against the law .... That the forfeiture is clearly
a penalty for the criminal offense and can result in even greater
punishment than the criminal prosecution has in fact been recog-
nized by the Pennsylvania courts.
Id. at 700-01. Similarly, in United States v. United States Coin & Cur-
rency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971), the Court dealt with a fifth amendment claim
of privilege from filing incriminating tax documents in a suit to forfeit
money used in a bookmaking operation. The contention, essentially, was
that the requirement to register for the tax was a requirement of self-
incrimination, so that the underlying tax statute was void. The question
posed was whether this claim of privilege could be raised in a suit theo-
retically in rem against the property, not against the owner. The Court
held that the forfeiture statute in fact applied only in cases where the
owner was at fault, and hence amounted to a penal provision so that
the fifth amendment claim could be raised. The Court quoted Boyd with
approval and further stated:
From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no differ-
ence between a man who "forfeits" [money] because he has
used the money in illegal gambling activities and a man who
pays a "criminal fine" ... as a result of the same course of con-
duct. In both instances, money liability is predicated upon a
finding of the owner's wrongful conduct; in both cases, the Fifth
Amendment applies with equal force.
Id. at 718.
17. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237
(1972) (per curiam). The forfeiture in this case was of goods brought
into the country in violation of the tariff laws. Because such goods
might be classified as contraband, the Court's characterization of the for-
feiture as nonpunitive could arguably be explained by the need to keep
them out of circulation. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1965); text accompanying notes 298-302 infra.
However, three arguments militate conclusively against such an explana-
tion: (1) the gems were not "contraband per se" in the sense of being
19761
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In other opinions the Court has treated similar forfeitures as re-
medial and nonpunitive.18 Yet in response to a recent claim that
forfeiture of a rented yacht used to transport a small amount
of marijuana constituted a taking without just compensation
under the fifth amendment, the Court jumped back to the conclu-
sion that the forfeiture served "punitive and deterrent purposes"
and therefore did not fall within the taking clause.' 9
This ambivalence characterizes the Court's treatment of
money sanctions as well as forfeitures. In the 1922 case of Lipke
v. Lederer,20 the Court dealt with a double "tax" payable by any-
one who manufactured illegal beverages without paying the
normal tax. The Court held that the Internal Revenue Service
could not enforce such an assessment by distraint because the
law constituted a punishment or penalty:
Evidence of crime ... is essential to assessment under § 35. It
lacks all the ordinary characteristics of a tax, whose primary
function "is to provide for the support of the government" and
clearly involves the idea of punishment for infraction of the
law-the definite function of a penalty.2 1
Yet in the leading case of Helvering v. Mitchell,22 in 1938,
the Court held that imposition of a similar tax assessment after
a criminal prosecution did not constitute double jeopardy because
it was not punitive. The tax provision in Mitchell, like that in
Lipke, required one who had evaded taxes to pay not only the
amount due but also an additional amount (in this case 50 per-
cent of the alleged deficiency) collectible in a civil proceeding.23
dangerous or forbidden to the general public; (2) they constituted exactly
the same kind of property-goods imported in alleged violation of the
customs laws-as that involved in Boyd v. United States, where the for-
feiture was held criminal in nature; and (3) the Court did not purport
to distinguish Emerald from other cases on the "contraband per se" no-
tion.
18. Cases treating forfeitures as proceedings in rem maintain-
able without reference to the guilt or innocence of the owner were
collected by the Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-88 (1974). See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co.
v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins's Distillery v. United
States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 210 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
19. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974).
20. 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
21. Id. at 562. The Court further observed that the penalty was
"for crime." Id.
22. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
23. The penalty in Lipke consisted of 100 percent of the alleged de-
ficiency; that in Mitchell, 50 percent. The Court did not, however, rely
on this difference in amount as a basis for distinguishing the two cases.
[Vol. 60:379
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Nonetheless, the Court rejected the double jeopardy claim on the
ground that the second suit was essentially remedial rather than
punitive and thus civil rather than criminal.24  The Mitchell
Court acknowledged that the tax in Lipke had been a criminal
sanction and reaffirmed (in dictum) that "Congress may not pro-
vide civil procedure for the enforcement of punitive sanctions. '25
It declared that "[w]here the objective of the subsequent action
likewise is punishment, the acquittal is a bar, because to entertain
the second proceeding for punishment would subject the defend-
ant to double jeopardy."26 The difference from Lipke, according
to the Mitchell Court, lay in congressional intent as revealed by
the choice of civil rather than criminal procedure. This choice,
according to the Court, indicated that the Mitchell tax was
"remedial" rather than "punitive." Yet this conclusion defies the
Lipke holding that a civilly labeled "tax" can nonetheless consti-
tute a punitive and therefore criminal sanction. The Court thus
failed to explain its different treatment in Lipke and Mitchell
of laws that appear to have been essentially identical in function
and purpose.
Disparities also arise in cases involving monetary assess-
ments other than taxes. Where a civil money penalty was as-
sessed by the State of Wisconsin against an insurance company
doing business in the state without a license, the Supreme Court
held the imposition to constitute a penal law that the courts of
another jurisdiction need not enforce.2 7 Yet in United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess,28 where contractors who had submitted
fraudulent bids for a government contract pleaded double jeop-
ardy when a civil money penalty was assessed against them after
a criminal prosecution, the Court characterized the proceedings
as "civil, remedial actions brought primarily to protect the gov-
ernment from financial losses," 29 and analogized the fixed-sum
24. The Court stated:
Mitchell contends that this proceeding is barred under the doc-
trine of double jeopardy because the 50 per centum addition...
is not a tax, but a criminal penalty intended as punishment for
allegedly fraudulent acts. Unless this sanction was intended as
punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal, the
double jeopardy clause provided for the defendant in criminal
prosecutions is not applicable.
303 U.S. at 398-99.
25. Id. at 402 & n.6.
26. Id at 398 (citing Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630, 632
(1926)).
27. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
28. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
29. Id. at 548 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938)).
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penalties to liquidated, compensatory damages.3 °
The Court has applied the same punitive-remedial distinction
in a third category of cases. These cases involve denial or divesti-
ture of personal rights and privileges: citizenship, professional
licenses, government employment, and the like. Again, the re-
sults have been difficult to rationalize. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez31 the Court held that the removal of United States citi-
zenship from individuals who remained in foreign countries to
escape the draft constituted punishment-and hence, apparently
a fortiori, criminal punishment under the sixth amendment-be-
cause the legislative history indicated punitive intent. In two
much earlier cases involving the removal of professional licenses
from those who supported the Confederacy in the Civil War, the
Court had found a punitive intent under the ex post facto clause
without resorting to legislative history, because there existed no
rational explanation of the law apart from intent to punish.
32
On the other hand, the Court has declined to hold punitive,
and hence criminal, the deportation of certain aliens for violating
laws while in the United States,3 3 and has similarly declined to
hold punitive or criminal the cancellation of social security bene-
fits otherwise due to an alien deported because of membership
in the Communist Party.34 Dismissals from union office for rea-
sons of Communist Party affiliation or criminal offenses have
been held both punitive3 5 and nonpunitive3 6 under the bill of
attainder and ex post facto clauses. Although commentary has
struggled to extract a rule from these cases to explicate the
Court's punitive-remedial distinction, no coherent explanation
30. Id. at 551-52. See also Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 148, 151 (1956) ("Liquidated damages are a well-known remedy,
and in fact Congress has utilized this form of recovery in numerous sit-
uations.").
31. 372 U.S. 144 (1965).
32. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
33. Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carlson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957);
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); cf. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522(1954) (deportation of member of Communist Party).
34. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
35. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (disqualification
from union office of present or past Communist Party members held
punitive for purposes of the bill of attainder clause).
36. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (disqualification from
union office of ex-felons not punitive for purposes of.the bill of attainder
and ex post facto clauses). See also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189
(1898) (delicensure of doctor convicted of crime is regulatory, not puni-
tive in nature).
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has thus far emerged.3 7
This brief juxtaposition of cases is illustrative of the Court's
shifting and uncertain use of the distinctions between civil and
criminal laws and between remedial and punitive laws. More
than one academic critic has either given up hope of formulating
an explanation,88 or arrived at a definition that flies in the
face of venerable and apparently unshakeable precedent,39 or,
still further from established precedent, sought to deny the need
ever to hinge constitutional doctrine on a finding of punish-
ment.40
37. For an analysis of the Court's reliance on "punishment" in Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), and Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960), see Indiana Note, supra note 13; Comment, The Concept of Puni-
tive Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A New Look at Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. CHL L. REv. 290 (1965).
38. The perceptive Indiana Note, supra note 13, concludes that "one
cannot expect too much from a theory" and that "[e]ach of the many
attempts to provide a test for punishment has utility and solves the prob-
lem in certain instances, but it seems unavailing to generalize from them
to form a workable formula for future cases," and notes, "possibly the
conclusion is that there are no workable standards at all." Id. at 287-88
& n.237. Likewise Note, Statutory Penalties-A Legal Hybrid, 51 E-hAv.
L. REv. 1092 (1938), concludes that penalties should not be defined as
either civil or criminal, but should be recognized as a hybrid, to
be treated as either civil or criminal depending on which treatment
seems more desirable in the circumstances. "Predictability and uni-
formity will be missing if this principle is followed, but at present
the courts apparently are guided by it, for though in most cases the ac-
tions are treated as civil, whenever it seems desirable to give a defendant
added protection, the criminal rules of procedure are adopted." Id. at
1101.
39. Professor Charney suggests that whenever a deterring sanction
goes beyond what is strictly necessary to disable the actor from future
undesirable conduct, the sanction should be regarded as criminal for all
constitutional purposes. Charney, supra note 7, at 507-14. See Note,
Forfeitures-Civil or Criminal?, 43 TEmv. L.Q. 191 (1970), takes a sim-
ilarly Draconian view. Whatever the merits or demerits of this approach
in terms of outcome, the analysis is clearly irreconcilable with numerous
Supreme Court cases that reject the notion that forfeitures and civil
monetary penalties should be treated as criminal proceedings for all
purposes of constitutional procedure. It seems clear also that the Court
is not inclined to reverse this imposing body of precedent. See Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (8-1 decision
upholding forfeiture of yacht because of transportation of small amount
of marijuana, as to owner-lessor without knowledge of or participation
in the offense, on grounds that such forfeiture need not involve an affirm-
ative showing of guilt on the part of the property owner).
40. Justice Frankfurter reached this conclusion with regard to the
double jeopardy clause, arguing that the legislature can impose multiple
punishments for the same crime and that only the cruel and unusual
punishment clause should regulate the number of proceedings brought
to enforce them. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 553-
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In order to bring conceptual order to this area of the law,
one must temporarily disregard the Court's language and look
to the results of the cases. Although the Court in Helvering
v. Mitchell4' based its double jeopardy holding on the conclusion
that the tax in question was remedial rather than punitive, the
opinion was on much firmer ground when it observed in a foot-
note that "the cases have usually attempted to distinguish be-
tween the type of procedural [constitutional] rule involved
rather than the kind of sanction being enforced." 42
The Court's opinions suggest that it has separated the ap-
plicable constitutional provisions into two groups-one contain-
ing provisions that it has applied only to a narrowly defined
group of "criminal" sanctions, and the other, provisions that it
has applied to punitive sanctions whether or not "criminal."
With regard to the first group, the Court has refused in recent
years to apply either the double jeopardy clause43 or the criminal
trial guarantees of the sixth amendment" to forfeitures and
56 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But see note 49 infra. Professor
Ely similarly attempts to avoid the need for finding punishment
where the ex post facto and bill of attainder clauses, procedural due
process, and cruel and unusual punishment are concerned. Ely, Legisla-
tive and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1311-13 n.324 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ely]. The difficulties
that inhere in this approach are dealt with in note 155 infra.
41. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
42. Id. at 400 n.3. The complete footnote reads as follows:
The distinction here taken between sanctions that are remedial
and those that are punitive has not generally been specifically
enunciated. In determining whether particular rules of criminal
procedure are applicable to civil actions to enforce sanctions, the
cases have usually attempted to distinguish between the type
of procedural rule involved rather than the kind of sanction
being enforced. Thus Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 111-
112, holding that a verdict may be directed for the Government,
and United States v. Regan, 232 'U.S. 37, 50, holding that the
Government need not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt,
distinguished Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, and Lees v.
United States, 150 U.S. 476, holding that the defendant could not
be required to be a witness against himself on the ground that
"the guaranty in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
against compulsory self-incrimination . . .is of broader scope
than are the guarantees in Article III and the Sixth Amendment
governing trials in criminal prosecutions." 232 U.S. at 50. Com-
pare also Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398, 401.
43. See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S.
232 (1972) (per curiam) (forfeiture); :Rex Trailer Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 148 (1956) (money penalty); United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (money penalty); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391 (1938) (money penalty).
44. See, e.g., Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932)
(civil money penalty may be assessed before administrative official
rather than a court); Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v, Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320
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money penalties that are labeled "civil."45
(1909) (same); Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214 (1893) (same);
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909) (court may direct a verdict
in favor of the Government in a money penalty case); United States v.
Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896) (no sixth amendment right of confrontation
in forfeiture proceeding); cf. United States v. JB. Williams Co., 498 F.2d
414 (2d Cir. 1974) (no sixth amendment right of jury trial in civil money
cases).
45. The general statement that the Court has reserved the doublejeopardy clause and criminal trial guarantees for purely criminal cases
deserves some historical qualification. Several cases roughly contempo-
rary with Boyd v. United States did apply double jeopardy protections
in forfeiture and money penalty proceedings.
In United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603 (1881), a distiller paid
a fine to the United States upon a criminal fraud charge and in return
received a release from the "said indictments and prosecutions." The
United States then proceeded against the distiller's surety in a civil ac-
tion to collect a penal sum of $2800. The Court held that the civil pen-
alty was a "prosecution" within the terms of the settlement:
Admitting that the penalty may be recovered in a civil action,
as well as by a criminal prosecution, it is still as a punishment
for the infraction of the law. The term "penalty" involves the
idea of punishment, and its character is not changed by the mode
in which it is inflicted, whether by a civil action or a criminal
prosecution.... [The distiller] has been punished in the
amount paid upon the settlement for the offence with which he
was charged, and that should end the present action, according
to the principle on which a former acquittal or conviction may
be invoked to protect against a second punishment for the same
offence. To hold otherwise would be to sacrifice a great prin-
ciple to the mere form of procedure, and to render settlements
with the government delusive and useless.
Id. at 611.
In Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886), decided at approxi-
mately the same time as Boyd, the Court held that an acquittal on a
criminal charge of tax evasion precluded a subsequent suit to forfeit dis-
tillery apparatus and liquors. The Court observed that
all that is imposed by the statute, as a consequence of guilt, is
a punishment therefor. There could be no new trial of the crim-
inal prosecution after the acquittal in it; and a subsequent trial
of the civil suit amounts to substantially the same thing, with
a difference only in the consequences following a judgment ad-
verse to the claimant.
Id. at 443. See also United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931);
United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126 (8th Cir. 1893). The language of
these cases has subsequently been attacked as "uncritical," United States
ex tel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 555-56 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring), and the holdings have been clearly rejected by the cases cited
in note 43 supra.
In the criminal trial procedure context, the Court held as early as
1835 that the Government must prove its case in forfeiture proceedings
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. The Brig Burdett, 34 U.S.
(9 Pet.) 682, 691 (1835) ("No individual should be punished for a vio-
lation of law which inflicts a forfeiture of property, unless the offence
shall be established beyond reasonable doubt."). Subsequently, how-
ever, the Court has asserted that such proof was required not because
of the criminal nature of the sanction, as the Court's language had clearly
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Indeed, except for the self-incrimination clause,4 6 the Court
has declined to apply any constitutional provision that refers by
its terms to criminal prosecutions 47 to any money penalty or for-
feiture labeled "civil." Although the Court has never adequately
explained its restrictive view of the sixth amendment 48 and the
implied, but because the Government chose to prosecute the forfeiture
by means of information rather than by means of a civil action.
In Lilenthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237 (1877), the Court
conclusively held that the Government's burden of proof in a forfeiture
case is by preponderance of the evidence only. The Court stated:
Nor is there any thing in the case of United States v. The Brig
Burdett . . . that is in conflict with these several propositions.
Charges of the kind contained in an information ought to be sat-
isfactorily proved; and it is correct to say that if the scale of
evidence hangs in doubt, the verdict should be in favor of the
claimant, which is all that was there decided. Jurors in such
a case ought to be clearly satisfied that the allegations of the
information are true; and when they are so satisfied of the truth
of the charge, they may render a verdict for the government,
even though the proof falls short of what is required in a crim-
inal case ....
Id. at 272. This explanation of The Brig Burdett has been consistently
followed (with the qualification that "clear and convincing evidence" is
required) with regard to monetary penalties also. E.g., United States
v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
In Chaffee & Co. v. United States, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 516 (1874),
a monetary penalty case, the Court reversed a judgment where the trial
judge had instructed the jury that the defendant's silence could be used
to prove facts against him beyond a reasonable doubt, and held that the
Government must affirmatively prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. However, although the form of the proceeding is not described,
apparently all parties and the Court proceeded on the theory that the
Government had opted to treat the case as criminal. The opinion cites
with approval the early case of Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch.) 339 (1813), where it was held, per Marshall, C.J., that in a for-
feiture proceeding civilly commenced the burden of proof could be
placed on the claimant after the Government had shown probable cause.
46. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
47. The double jeopardy clause does not refer to "criminal prosecu-
tions," but forbids placing a person twice in jeopardy "of life or limb"
for the same offense. This language clearly refers only to prosecutions
that would be "criminal" by any measure, and arguably only to prosecu-
tion for capital offenses. However, the Court has not restricted the
clause to capital crimes but has extended it to prosecutions for all crimes.
See J. SIGLER, DOUB-LE JEOPAmY 39 (1969).
48. The Court's explanation of its refusal to apply the sixth amend-
ment to penalty and forfeiture cases is generally conclusory. The Court
has simply stated that "[t]he Sixth Amendment relates to a prosecution
of an accused person which is technically criminal in nature," United
States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896), without attempting to explain
why these protections should not be extended, as the protections of the
fourth and fifth amendments were extended by Boyd, to encompass
forfeiture and penalty proceedings. For those meager explanations that
do appear as to why the sixth amendment is narrower than the self-
incrimination clause, see Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 n.3
(1938) (quoted in note 42 supra); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 50
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double jeopardy clause,4 9 the explanation appears to lie in the
(1914) ("the guaranty in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
against compulsory self-incrimination . . .is of broader scope than are
the guaranties in Article III and the Sixth Amendment governing trials
in criminal prosecutions"). Cf. United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475
(1896). The Court in Zucker explained the difference in scope for for-
feiture purposes by citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892),
which held the fifth amendment privilege to be available in grand jury
proceedings because a future criminal prosecution might result-one
explanation of Boyd suggested at text accompanying notes 111-17 infra.
49. The Court has at various times offered somewhat lengthy ex-
planations why the double jeopardy clause does not apply to forfeitures
or other civil penalty proceedings. In every case, however, the argu-
ments reduce to the tautology that civil cases are not criminal.
One incomplete theory is that the related doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel are inapplicable because the government's failure
to prove a prior criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt does not pre-
clude a later finding for the government in a forfeiture action where the
standard of proof is by a preponderance only. See Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938):
The difference in degree of the burden of proof in criminal
and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of res audi-
cata. The acquittal was "merely . . .an adjudication that the
proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the accused." Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 302. It did
not determine that Mitchell had not willfully attempted to evade
the tax.
Collateral estoppel and res judicata are now considered an integral part
of the double jeopardy clause. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
This argument depends, however, on the prior assumption that the
forfeiture or penalty proceeding is not criminal in nature, so that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is unnecessary. Moreover, the collateral
estoppel argument does not address the true problem of double jeopardy,
for collateral estoppel would be irrelevant in a case where the govern-
ment obtained a conviction in the first proceeding.
A second theory advanced by the Court is that the two proceedings
do not involve the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, since the
penalty proceeding does not necessarily involve a showing of mens rea.
This argument is particularly plausible in forfeiture cases, where the
government's case does not rest upon any showing of criminality or even
of fault on the property owner's part. Consequently, the Court has as-
serted in forfeiture cases that the proceeding does not constitute a pen-
alty, since it is directed to the object and is independent of the behavior
of the owner. In related logic, the Court has also asserted that the two
proceedings therefore do not involve the same offense. See, e.g., Various
Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931); Dob-
bins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878). Similar reasoning
can be found in money penalty cases. See Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
Ultimately, however, this argument reduces to the familiar conten-
tion that the forfeiture or monetary penalty is not penal but remedial.
First, the argument fails to explain why double jeopardy should not
apply where the government first obtains a criminal conviction, then
brings an action for a forfeiture or money penalty. Second, it is
generally conceded that criminal penalties may be and are inflicted
in the absence of mens rea, as a kind of strict liability. Cf. United States
ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
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historical practice of extending given safeguards to certain kinds
of proceedings but not others.
The Court's second group of provisions consists of those con-
stitutional safeguards which, unlike the sixth amendment, do not
refer explicitly to criminal prosecutions. The Court considers the
ring). The question whether the government could bring successive
criminal actions based on the same occurrence and evidence, and differ-
entiated solely by the need or lack of need to prove wilfulness, intent,
or the like, seems clearly answerable in the negative. We are conse-
quently relegated once again to the question whether the second action
is criminal or not according to some other test of purpose or effect. If
the Court's test of wilfulness adds anything to this search, it is simply
an additional element of confusion, for lower courts have occasionally
stood the argument on its head and held that where the penalty or for-
feiture is conditioned on wilful conduct, it must therefore be criminal
in nature, see United States v. One 1967 Cadillac El Dorado, 453 F.2d
396 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding a bar to a forfeiture action since "the opera-
tive facts of both the criminal and the forfeiture proceedings are the
same"), an outcome that is generally irreconcilable with the Court's de-
cisions elsewhere. E.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (no
double jeopardy where money penalty, assessed after criminal charge
acquittal, was conditioned on willful conduct).
A third explanation for the distinction, though not one that has been
accepted by the Court, is one advanced by Justice Frankfurter in United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 555-56 (1943) (concurring
opinion). He argued that the double jeopardy clause does not prevent
Congress from prescribing multiple punishments for a given offense,
however penal and indeed criminal these punishments may be, and that
the only limitation placed upon their separate enforcement lies in the
cruel and unusual punishment clause. However, most commentators and
apparently the Court concur in the view that the purpose of the doublejeopardy clause is to alleviate precisely this kind of cruel and unusual
punishment-a series of prosecutions based on the same offense-
whether for purposes of harassment or otherwise. See J. SIGLER, DoUBLE
JEOPARDY 156 (1969) ("The specific purposes of the protection are the
avoidance of unnecessary harassment, the avoidance of social stigma, the
economy of time and money, and the interest in psychological secu-
rity."). See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530-31 (1975) (pointing
to "anxiety and insecurity" and "heavy personal strain" of prosecution
as relevant to double jeopardy protection).
Ineluctably, the Court's arguments return one to the tautology that
the double jeopardy clause applies only in criminal proceedings, and that
forfeiture cases and money penalty cases do not qualify as criminal.
Thus, in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
235-36 (1972) (per curiam) (footnote omitted), the Court stated:
If for no other reason, the forfeiture is not barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it in-
volves neither two criminal trials nor two criminal punishments.
"Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in
respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy
clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second
time to punish criminally, for the same offense." Helvering v.
Mitchell . . . at 399. See also United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). Forfeiture under § 1497 is a civil
sanction.
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ex post facto clause, for example, a "broader" constitutional pro-
vision, and therefore applies it without regard to the nature of
the punishment involved in a particular case.
The need to define punishment is thus an analytical problem
common to both groups of constitutional provisions. Isolating
the particular kind of punishment that the Court deems "crim-
inal" is a problem unique to the first group. By lookiing at the
kinds of cases in which the Court has been willing to apply the
double jeopardy clause and the sixth amendment's procedural
guarantees, one can formulate a working meaning for the term
"criminal punishment." The next section of this Article more
closely examines this meaning.
III. THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
A. "PE=Y OFFENSEs" AND "IINFmous PUNSMENmTs"
What then is the constitutional meaning of criminal punish-
ment, which appears to exclude money penalties and forfeitures
labeled "civil" but to include certain other sanctions? A general
answer can be sketched as follows. First, all punishments la-
beled "criminal" are generally criminal for constitutional pur-
poses. However, the jury trial and right-to-counsel provisions
of the sixth amendment, at least, do not apply to a class of sanc-
tions that constitute "petty offenses." Second, there are certain
"infamous" punishments that are always treated as criminal for
constitutional purposes, even if they do not bear a criminal label.
This categorization will best be regarded as an initial tool of clas-
sification, or sorting device, rather than as a precise template
for all constitutional applications. Use of this tool does not fore-
close principled differences in application from case to case, but
does serve to describe and predict the general flow of the Court's
decisions.
1. Fines and Forfeitures Labeled "Criminal":
Constitutionally "Criminal" or "Petty"?
As just mentioned, money penalties and forfeitures that are
not labeled "criminal" appear never to trigger the safeguards of
the sixth amendment or the double jeopardy clause. When a
"criminal" label is attached to these sanctions, however, it ap-
pears that in general these protections do apply. The Supreme
Court has said that a defendant threatened with a money fine
labeled "criminal" must be afforded the sixth amendment right
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to confront adverse witnesses and the right not to have a verdict
directed against him.50 The Court has also held that forfeiture
cases initiated by information rather than civil procedure must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.51 In addition to these ac-
tual statements, the various cases in which the Court has declined
to apply the double jeopardy clause to monetary sanctions and
forfeitures because they were "remedial" rather than "penal"
intimate that the Court would have applied the double
jeopardy clause had the proceedings been labeled "criminal."52'
On the other hand, there are two sixth amendment guaran-
tees that do not apply in all criminally labeled cases. The Court
has held that the right to jury trial does not obtain in cases
involving potential imprisonment of less than six months, 53 nor in
some cases involving a fine for criminal contempt.54 The Court
has, however, reserved the question whether a severe fine for con-
tempt might suffice to require jury trial.r5 Second, the Court
has strongly implied, but not held, that the right to counsel does
not apply in cases involving only small money fines. 5 The other
guarantees of the sixth amendment have apparently never been
litigated before the Court in a case involving a fine or forfeiture
labeled "criminal."
50. United States v. Stevenson, 215 U.S. 190 (1909); United States
v. Hepner, 213 U.S. 103 (1909); cf. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 45
(1914) (dictum) (right to confront adverse witnesses attaches in a for-
feiture proceeding labeled "criminal," citing Hepner). The Stevenson
Court stated in dictum that forfeiture and a money penalty of $1000 per
offense for assisting illegal immigration, if prosecuted criminally, would
constitute a misdemeanor proceeding in which the defendant could claim
a sixth amendment right to confrontation of adverse witnesses and could
also avoid a directed verdict against him.
51. United States v. The Brig Burdett, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 682, 691
(1835); cf. Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 272 (1877).
But see Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 242 (1846), where the
Court held that in a criminally commenced proceeding to forfeit goods
for customs violations, the burden of proof could be placed on the claim-
ant after a showing of probable cause. The apparent conflict between
these cases may perhaps be harmonized on the ground that Clifton was
a proceeding in rem. See text accompanying note 286 infra. At any rate,
Clifton may well have been overruled by Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), which held forfeitures to be criminal for purposes of the
self-incrimination clause even when not criminally labeled. Cf. Snyder
v. United States, 112 U.S. 216 (1884).
52. See cases cited in note 43 supra.
53. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
54. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-77 (1975).
55. Id. at 477.
56. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 (1972).
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The reasons for the "petty offense" exception to these two
sixth amendment rights are partly historical and partly func-
tional. Historically, in both English and colonial practice predat-
ing adoption of the Constitution, fines and short prison sentences
were meted out by judges sitting without juries.57 The Court
has adopted the view that the drafters of the Constitution did
not intend to change this practice despite their use of language
guaranteeing jury trial of "all crimes" in article III and of "all
criminal prosecutions" in the sixth amendment."8 Functionally,
it is clear that the introduction of jury trials and the right to
counsel into the most minor cases labeled "criminal" would
drastically increase the expense and difficulty of such proceed-
ings. Moreover, the Court has observed that the right of jury
trial is less essential to the fundamental fairness of a trial than
are certain other procedural safeguards. 59
These considerations suggest the method by which the Court
would determine as a matter of first impression whether fines
and forfeitures labeled "criminal" trigger other guarantees of the
sixth amendment, such as the right to speedy and public trial,
57. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REv. 917, 922-33
(1926). Frankfurter and Corcoran further state that "[t]here was no
unifying consideration as to the type of criminal offense subjected to
summary trial" and that "[tihe controlling factor seems less the intrinsic
gravity of the offense, judged by its danger to the community, than the
desire for a swift and convenient remedy." Id. at 927. Colonial practice
in the jury trial area demonstrates the same very loose distinction
between serious and petty offenses. See id. at 934-65.
58. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). In acknowledg-
ing the existence of petty offenses that are not constitutionally "crim-
inal," the Court in Baldwin acceded to the Frankfurter-Corcoran view
of jury trial. Frankfurter and Corcoran argued that the language of ar-
ticle I and the sixth amendment merely embodied, and did not change,
the existing practice of using enhanced procedural safeguards only in
cases not deemed "petty." So viewed, these constitutional provisions do
not reach "acts ... which [do] not offend too deeply the moral purposes
of the community, which [are] not too close to society's danger, and
[are] stigmatized by punishment relatively light." Frankfurter & Cor-
coran, supra note 57, at 980-81. Critics of this historical analysis of con-
stitutional purpose argue that the language of article Il and the sixth
amendment was intended to eliminate the distinction between petty and
serious offenses, at least in cases that involve imprisonment as opposed
to property fines. Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. Cnr. L.
RPv. 245 (1959); see Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 72 (1904)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (constitutional references to crimes and prosecu-
tions bring all criminally labeled money fines within the right to jury
trial, regardless whether imprisonment might also result).
59. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-37 (1972).
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subpoena power, and notice of charges. The Court has indicated
that the considerations relevant to its decision include the histori-
cal practice of English and colonial courts with regard to a par-
ticular procedural right, the current consensus if any among the
states, the current federal practice, the need for the protection
in order to ensure fairness to the defendant, and, finally, the
needs of the state in terms of cost and efficiency. 0 Although
the Court has shown some willingness to judge whether an of-
fense is "petty" for a given constitutional purpose, such as jury
trial, by referring to the notoriety of the offense,61 it has more
recently regarded the severity of the penalty as controlling. -02
The complexity of a decision based on all the above factors
makes application of the "petty offense" classification difficult
to predict in advance. However, because the Court has generally
based its decisions on bright lines such as the length of a given
imprisonment, such decisions are at least easy to follow once they
are made. Moreover, the Court's reliance on history, current
practice, and policy permits a reasoned explanation of the varia-
tions in standard from one constitutional provision to another
and from one kind of sentence to another.
60. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1970). The Court, acknowledging the diffi-
culties inherent in drawing lines on the basis of logic between serious
offenses and penalties and nonserious ones, has weighed the governmental
interest in efficient summary proceedings against the individual's interest
in enhanced procedural safeguards. The Court has chosen to look to the
federal legislative definition of "petty" offenses for the relevant constitu-
tional purpose and to the prevailing legislative practice in the nation re-
garding the correlation between existence of the safeguard and serious-
ness of the penalty. In holding that the right of jury trial extends to
potential prison sentences of six months or more, the Court observed:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us with the only
objective criterion by which a line could ever be drawn-on the basis of
the possible penalty alone-between offenses that are and that are not
regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." Id. In hold-
ing that the right to assistance of coumel and other sixth amendment
rights extend not only to penalties of six months' imprisonment but to
all cases involving the risk of any imprisonment, the Court pointed to
the lack of any evidence that these rights had historically been denied in
such cases. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30 (1972). The Court also
noted the greater need for these protections, as opposed to the need forjury trial, in order to ensure fundamental fairness. Id. at 31-37.
61. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 640 (1888) (conspiracy is not a
petty offense where punished by one month's imprisonment in default
of $25 fine).
62. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 'U.S. 25 (1972); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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2. "Infamous" Punishments That Are Always Constitutionally
"Criminal"
The second generalization that can be drawn concerning
criminal punishment is that the threat of significant imprison-
ment or other "infamous" punishment, even without the criminal
label, is sufficient to trigger all constitutional safeguards ap-
plicable to criminal cases.6 3 The cases that make this point are,
admittedly, few. Those in which the Court has applied criminal
trial safeguards to cases involving juveniles are instructive, but
they explicitly recognize that "the juvenile court proceeding has
not yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecution,' within the mean-
ing and reach of the Sixth Amendment" 6" Rather, they rely
on the due process clause to establish the procedures constitu-
tionally required.65
There are a limited number of other cases, however, in which
the Court has applied the sixth amendment to proceedings that
were not labeled criminal. In a number of early cases the Court
held that, for purposes of the fifth amendment guarantee that
infamous crimes must be prosecuted only upon grand jury indict-
ment, an infamous crime is one that entails an infamous punish-
ment.66 In Wong Wing v. United States67 the Court extended
these holdings to rule that infliction of an infamous punishment
also entitles the defendant to sixth amendment protections for
criminal prosecutions.
The Court has not explicitly applied this infamous-punish-
ment theory in any ostensibly civil case since Wong Wing, yet
there seems no reason to doubt that the principle remains valid.
Although the Court did not allude to it, the infamous-punishment
theory perhaps explains the otherwise difficult case of Kennedy
63. Imprisonments that are not considered punitive, such as civil
commitment, do not, of course, fit this category. See text accompanying
notes 331-32 infra.
64. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).
65. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy clause ap-
plies to criminal trial following juvenile proceeding); McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (jury trial not constitutionally required);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt
required); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (self-incrimination clause
applies).
66. See Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1886); Ex parte Wil-
son, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
67. 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (imprisonment at hard labor for violation
of immigration laws held "infamous" punishment despite lack of criminal
label).
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v. Mendoza-Martinez,68 where four members of the Court stated
that a statute which removed citizenship from draft evaders re-
maining outside the United States was punitive and hence crim-
inal, so that sixth amendment safeguards applied. The fifth
member of the majority, Justice Brennan, concurred on the
ground that Congress lacks power to impose loss of citizenship
as punishment.
The position of the plurality, that the expatriation at bar
was criminal because punitive, is consistent with the simple puni-
tive-equals-criminal formula used in a number of the Court's
other decisions concerning sixth amendment safeguards. 69 In all
of those other decisions, however, the Court strained to hold evi-
dently punitive laws to be nonpunitive in order to avoid apply-
ing criminal safeguards. The strain indicates that the Court was
not really prepared to apply the sixth amendment to sanctions
merely because they were punitive in a commonsense sort of way,
but was looking for something more. The Mendoza-Martinez
plurality evidently found that something more in the fact that
expatriation constituted infamous punishment while the sanc-
tions of forfeiture or money penalty involved in the other cases,
however punitive, were not infamous. Four members of the
Court, three of whom sat in Mendoza-Martinez, had previously
concurred in the view that expatriation of a native-born citizen
for evasion of military service constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.70  So viewed, the statute would be unconstitutional
under the eighth amendment quite apart from the sixth. But
with respect to the sixth amendment, surely a cruel and unusual
punishment of this nature could also be classified as an infamous
punishment within the meaning of Wong Wing, and hence crim-
inal.
This view does not of course automatically turn Mendoza-
Martinez into an easy case. It does not obviate the need to de-
termine, as a prelude to concluding that the punishment was in-
famous, whether the expatriation constituted punishment, an is-
sue which divided the Court in that and previous cases. 71 Nor
does it save the Court from the involved questions of dispropor-
tion, historical disuse, and community standards that surround
68. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
69. See note 44 supra.
70. Justices Warren, Black, Douglas, and Whittaker in Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Justice Whittaker had retired when Men-
doza-Martinez was decided.
71. See generally Indiana Note, supra note 13, at 288-96.
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the resolution of eighth amendment issues.7 2 What this view of
the case does, however, is explain why the Court held this partic-
ular punishment to be criminal when other sanctions, held to
be punitive in other contexts, have been held not to be punitive
in the context of the sixth amendment. This explanation, in
other words, frees us to distinguish not between laws that are
punitive and those that are remedial for sixth amendment pur-
poses, but rather between those penal laws that involve infamous
punishments and those that do not.
The list of punishments that the Court has designated "in-
famous" is not a long one. The Court has observed in dictum
that, in addition to imprisonment at hard labor, disqualification
to hold public office may be infamous, 73 as may be whipping,
standing in the pillory, and branding.74 Moreover, imprisonment
qualifies even if not at hard labor.7 5 It is true on the one hand
that most of these punishments are not imposed without prior
criminal process; 76 on the other hand, the brevity of the list sug-
gests the paucity of cases in which the Court will consider an
ostensibly civil punishment to be truly criminal. Except for the
forfeiture in Boyd, a subject discussed shortly,77 the Court has
uniformly declined to consider either forfeitures or money penal-
ties to be criminal or infamous unless the proceeding in which
they are assessed bears a criminal label imposed by the legisla-
ture.78
B. POLICIES UNDERLYING THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DISTINCTION
1. Why Should Not Al "Severe" Punishments Be Considered
"Criminal'?
The foregoing description obviously does not eliminate the
ambiguity in the meaning of "criminal punishment." The Court
72. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
73. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426 (1885) (citing United States
v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884)).
74. Id. at 428.
75. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1886).
76. Disqualification to hold public office is often imposed without
criminal process, but the Court has frequently held the purpose of the
disqualification not to be punitive. See text accompanying notes 310-
24 infra. Where the disqualification has been held punitive, the Court
has never had to face the question whether the disqualification is also
criminal for purposes of the sixth amendment.
77. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see text accompany-
ing notes 110-24 infra.
78. See notes 43-48 supra.
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must still determine which penalties labeled "civil" constitute
"infamous" punishment and which penalties labeled "criminal"
constitute "petty" punishment for purposes of given safeguards.
But recognition that the Court is treating only certain kinds of
punishment as "criminal" for constitutional purposes allows one
at least to describe what is actually being done. This, in turn,
allows one to focus the inquiry on "why."
The description of criminal punishment given here does not
yield a readily apparent rationale for the classification. Some
writers have criticized the Court's failure to extend criminal safe-
guards not only to infamous punishments but to all punishment
which is not de minimus-not only imprisonment but also sub-
stantial fines and forfeitures which are not criminally labeled. 79
Such penalties can produce greater burdens than usually result
from criminal prosecutions arising out of the same offense.
For example, the civil forfeiture of a yacht because a lessee
used it without the owner's knowledge or consent to trans-
port a small quantity of marijuana certainly far exceeds any pos-
sible criminal sentence the owner might have faced, even under
a statute imposing strict criminal liability.80 Likewise, the loss
of a professional license may cause considerably more severe con-
sequences than a short jail sentence. Good arguments can there-
fore be made that "if the purpose of the [sixth amendment] safe-
'guards is to protect persons from mistaken imposition of grave
sanctions, consistency ought to require that protection be af-
forded whenever a person is threatened with a grave sanc-
tion."8
There is force to this argument, and the fact that the Court
has not sought to achieve such a consistency suggests that the
Court does not consider the severity of a sanction determinant
of whether the sanction is constitutionally "criminal." Its rea-
sons for refusing to equate "severe" and "criminal" appear partly
historical and partly functional. Historically, it seems clear that
English and colonial practice assessed severe money penalties,
as well as forfeitures labeled "civil," without the use of crim-
79. See generally Chamey, supra note 12; Comment, The Concept
of Punitive Legislation and the Sixth Amnendment: A New Look at Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. Cn. L. REv. 290, 292 (1965).
80. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974).
81. Comment, supra note 79, at 292. The Comment goes on to ob-
serve, however, that "the purpose of the safeguards gives content to, but
is also limited by, the [sixth amendment] phrase 'criminal prosecu-
tion."' Id.
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inal procedure.8 2 Functionally, in order to change this practice
under the Constitution, the Court would either have to require
criminal procedure in even the most minor civil penalty and for-
feiture cases, or else embark on the difficult task of determining
whether a given penalty as applied to a given defendant is suffi-
ciently severe to warrant a given constitutional safeguard.
Both of these alternatives are problematic. The first alter-
native would clearly involve expensive and cumbersome proce-
dures in cases where fundamental fairness does not require them.
Civil procedure is not, after all, a stranger to considerations of
fairness. We have generally not found any problem of fairness
in the fact that court proceedings, and still more informal pro-
cedure in administrative proceedings and arbitrations, determine
the financial life or death of persons and institutions on a regular
basis. Often the judgments include punitive damages.8 3 More-
over, in cases involving civil punishment which is not highly se-
vere the government has legitimate interests in saving judi-
cial time and energy by using procedures less complicated than
those compelled by the sixth amendment, and in imposing
penalties through an administrative agency whose continual in-
volvement with a given body of law permits a more coherent
yet more flexible scheme of law enforcement than judicial pro-
ceedings can provide.8 4 By the same token, of course, many
sanctions labeled "criminal" could be fairly tried by more ex-
peditious procedures. The fact that they are not tried by those
procedures reflects more the compulsion of constitutional lan-
guage requiring given procedures in "criminal" cases than it
does the dictates of policy. In the absence of any convincing
policy, there should be no need to extend criminal procedures
beyond those cases where historical practice and constitutional
language so require.
The second approach the Court might adopt in determining
whether a sanction is sufficiently severe to be considered "crimi-
nal" would be to analyze the impact of the sanction on a case-
by-case basis. However, it would be very difficult to determine
the precise measure of severity embodied in a particular civil
82. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
680-83 (1974).
83. Yet these private suits for punitive damages do not entail spe-
cial safeguards analogous to those in the sixth amendment. See note
283 infra.
84. See generally Goldschmid, supra note 6, at 30-34.
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punishment on a particular occasion. 5 Whereas a six-month
prison sentence would be a hardship for anyone, a penalty of
$1000 might or might not be severe depending on the financial
status of the defendant.8 6 Forfeitures likewise vary signifi-
cantly in their severity depending on the value of the property
in question. Moreover, the degree of severity required for a pun-
ishment labeled "civil" to be deemed criminal might depend, as
with "petty offenses," on the particular sixth amendment right
in question. This fact would add yet another layer of complexity
to the determination. Distinguishing "severe" from "nonsevere"
penalties on a case-by-case basis, therefore, would seem to involve
the Court in a most difficult decision-making process, one which
the Court might understandably want to avoid.
2. Stigma: A Partial Explanation of Criminal Punishment
The Court's criminal-civil distinction cannot be justified
solely in terms of the severity of the sanction primarily because
severity fails to explain the Court's reliance on the legislative
criminal label as a trigger for constitutional protections. This
reliance can instead be explained, at least partially, by the notion
of stigma. Professor Henry Hart has observed that "[w] hat dis-
tinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction.., is the judgment
of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its
imposition.18 7  The Court has, consistently with this theory,
85. Although the Court may have to decide when a criminally
labeled fine is or is not petty for purposes of jury trial or right to counsel,
see Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (:975), such questions arise rarely
because legislatures seldom impose severe "criminal" fines without af-
fording constitutional safeguards. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
By contrast, there are many "severe" money penalties labeled "civil"
which do not involve criminal safeguards. If the Court were to consider
whether the severity of such sanctions makes them criminal, it would
confront a line-drawing problem much more frequently than it now does
with regard to money fines labeled "criminal."
86. Cf. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-77 (1975) ($10,000 fine
against a union for criminal contempt held to constitute a petty sanction
for purposes of sixth amendment right to jury trial).
87. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONEmP. PROB.
401, 404 (1958). Herbert Packer, supra note 12, at 25, 131, 274-75, 335
also hints at a distinction between punishment and criminal punishment,
suggesting, as does Hart, that criminal punishment consists of the stig-
matization that accompanies the criminal label. He also suggests that
criminality may be indicated by the severity of the punishment. Id. at
131. This notion is attacked in Griffiths, Book Review, 79 YALE L.J. 1388,
1414-17 (1970). Even Griffiths, however, recognizes the condemnatory
or "exiling" nature of criminal adjudication as a hallmark of existing
criminal punishment, if not of the necessary, intrinsic nature of criminal
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pointed to stigma as a primary reason for holding that due
process requires juvenile proceedings to meet certain procedural
requirements normally applicable to adult criminal proceedings. 88
The criminal label undoubtedly does communicate a message
of moral condemnation. Most people probably associate the
criminal label with the intentional commission of wrongful acts,
despite the modern proliferation of strict liability crimes. More-
over, most people probably attach moral significance to such acts
and judge the character of the convicted person accordingly. For
this reason the criminal label degrades to some extent the social
status of the offender and sets him apart from the rest of society.
Indeed, the status of criminality has been described as "exile"
or "banishment" from society.8 9
Conversely, one can explain in terms of stigma the Court's
refusal to treat civil penalties and forfeitures as criminal punish-
ment. Such penalties create no "criminal record" and the public
is less likely to be aware of their imposition. And even if mem-
bers of the public were aware, they might well assume in the
absence of any criminally labeled conviction that no intentional,
serious wrong had been committed. One might conceptualize the
difference between civilly and criminally labeled penalties by
stating that most people see in civil penalties an element of deter-
rence, but not a very strong element of retribution or moral con-
demnation.
This explanation based on stigma serves to explain the criti-
cal nature of the criminal label in determining whether "crimi-
nal" punishment exists for constitutional purposes. On the other
hand, one may question both whether the criminal label is an
accurate guide to stigma in all cases, and whether stigma itself
is so important a consideration that it should override all others
in determining criminal punishment.
law. Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 385-
86 (1970).
88. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967), the Court observed that
the term "delinquent" has "come to involve only slightly less stigma than
the term 'criminal' applied to adults." Implicit in this observation is the
related argument that a finding against the defendant generally connotes
commission of an act that would be criminal but for the age of the de-
fendant. The fact that this congruence between criminal offense and de-
linquency label is more frequent than the congruence between criminal
offense and money penalty or forfeiture may suggest a difference in the
stigma that attaches. See also id. at 36; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
367 (1970).
89. Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 378-
79 (1970).
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With regard to the first of these points, there may be cases
of civil punishment that communicate a greater amount of stigma
than certain cases of punishment labeled criminal. A large civil
penalty imposed for intentional failure to comply with anti-pol-
lution laws, for example, may stigmatize the defendant consider-
ably more than would a small fine labeled "criminal" imposed
for a traffic offense. And as the use of civil penalties prolifer-
ates, the public may come to associate them with the commission
of serious, morally wrong acts in many cases.
Second, it may also seem anomalous to accord the good name
of a defendant more constitutional protection than his property-
especially in cases where the damage to his name is questionable
and cases where the severity of his property loss is extreme. A
property owner faced with a substantial civil fine or forfeiture
may find considerable truth in the old adage about the harms
caused by sticks and stones as opposed to names.
The Court's response to both of these arguments about the
criminal label and stigma would have to be partly historical but
largely pragmatic. Historically, the procedural safeguards em-
bodied in the fifth and sixth amendments were generally re-
served for the most serious offenses. These offenses generally
demonstrated three important features: a serious moral wrong,
a highly severe punishment, and a criminal label.90 On the
other hand, property fines and forfeitures were often imposed
by civil procedure which did not embody these procedural safe-
guards.91 However, over time, the category of serious crimes
has become more diffuse. Sentences for some offenses have
become less severe. It is at least arguable that the historical
dichotomy between, on the one hand, criminally labeled cases
which entail both highly immoral behavior and highly severe
punishments, and, on the other hand, civilly labeled cases which
entail neither, has now disappeared. And in any case, by refer-
ring to "all crimes" and "all criminal prosecutions," the Constitu-
tion arguably implies that at least some of its safeguards should
apply to cases which historically would have been treated as
misdemeanors and tried more summarily than serious crimes.
90. Frankfurter and Corcoran, supra note 57, indicate that the right
of jury trial at least was generally afforded except in instances "aptly
characterized as 'petty' violations," but that some cases tried without a
jury "bordered closely on serious felonies." Id. at 927. For illustration
of the seriousness of the punishment ensuing upon conviction of a serious
crime, see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARiEs* 376-89.
91. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 57, at 937 n.91, 983-1019.
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The Court's continued treatment of the criminal label, and
the stigma it conveys, as controlling of constitutional applications
may well reflect the prudential consideration that there exists
no other manageable yardstick by which to measure the type
of sanction deserving the safeguards of "criminal" procedure. The
problems associated with determining that meaning by reference
to the severity of the punishment were discussed earlier. Like-
wise, the Court might find it very difficult to determine which
offenses are so serious that any punishment based on their inten-
tional commission, even if labeled "civil", should trigger constitu-
tional safeguards.9 2  The proliferation of statutory offenses
would render any historical reference to common law impossible
in many cases.98 The Court thus would be left with only its
highly subjective judgment of whether a given offense is morally
reprehensible. And any attempt to measure stigma by some
combination of severity and nature of offense would be at least
equally subjective if not more so.94 By contrast, reliance on the
legislative criminal label is a relatively simple and certain
approach to applying constitutional safeguards. Indeed, the
Court may well have chosen to rely on the criminal label largely
by default: This standard is perhaps the only one which the
Court can apply in a predictable and consistent manner.
To be sure, the Court must still determine when a given
sanction labeled "criminal" is too innocuous or "petty" to trigger
a given constitutional safeguard, or, on the other hand, when
a given sanction labeled "civil" is so severe that it triggers con-
stitutional safeguards nonetheless. As a practical matter, how-
ever, such questions arise relatively infrequently. With regard
92. But see Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (conspiracy is not
a "petty offense," even though punished by sentence of $25 or 30 days
imprisonment).
93. Cf. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904) (conviction for
violating a provision of the Oleomargarine Act, with penalty of $50 per
offense, was a "petty offense" for purposes of jury trial).
94. The Court might attempt to solve this line-drawing problem by
applying standards developed in the context of the eighth amendment.
In given circumstances, money penalties or forfeitures might be held to
constitute infamous punishment even without a criminal label, on the
ground that they are disproportionate to the offense for which they are
imposed. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Yet it is hard
to argue that they are either historically obsolete or violative of commu-
nity standards. If money penalties or forfeitures are ever to be held
impermissible on grounds of severity, it is much more likely to be be-
cause there exists no fault whatsoever on the part of the person to whom
they are applied, so that they could be deemed arbitrary and violative
of due process. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 688-90 (1974).
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to petty offenses, the Court needs to determine whether an of-
fense is petty if there is a severe fine, labeled criminal, imposed
without constitutional safeguards. As a practical matter, how-
ever, legislatures seldom impose heavy fines without also provid-
ing for potential imprisonment and, therefore, constitutional
safeguards. The general exception to this rule, if one exists, in-
volves sanctions applicable primarily to corporations or unions.
The Court has been able to draw rather predictable, if arbitrary,
lines regarding length of imprisonment 5 and might well hold
similarly that all forfeitures labeled "criminal" trigger constitu-
tional safeguards. The difficult question of when a money fine
labeled "criminal" becomes sufficiently severe not to be petty
has been raised but not resolved.96
At the other end of the spectrum, legislatures seldom create
serious, "infamous" penalties without labeling them criminal.
The Court has had to decide very few cases where such punish-
ment is claimed to exist.97 Admittedly there are no firm guide-
lines that would dictate whether, as a matter of first impression,
a given punishment such as deprivation of citizenship should be
considered "infamous." Yet because such cases of first impres-
sion arise infrequently, and because the decision once made is
easily applied to future cases without regard to the circumstances
of the defendant, the Court's treatment of infamous punishment
creates no serious problems of uncertainty in the law.
C. APPLYING THE C=IL-CRmwAL DiSTINcTIoN: TmuE CASES
1. Forfeitures Not Labeled "Criminal"
Judicial analysis of legislative or executive intent might in
rare cases lead to the conclusion that property forfeitures
not criminally labeled are nonetheless infamous and hence
should be treated as criminal for constitutional purposes. There
is historical precedent for concluding in certain instances that
the legislature intended such forfeitures to serve as criminal pen-
alties.
95. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
96. Cf. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) ($10,000 fine on union
a petty sanction for purposes of sixth amendment right to jury trial, ab-
sent contrary expression of congressional intent). With regard to for-
feitures, on the other hand, the Court seems more willing to regard the
criminal label of the proceeding as dispositive for constitutional purposes
as well. Compare United States v. The Brig Burdett, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 682
(1835), with Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237 (1877).
See note 45 supra.
97. See cases cited in notes 66 and 67 supra.
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As the Court has occasionally observed, at common law a
felon was subject to the forfeiture of all or most of his property
The Court stated in The Palmyra,9" for example, that
[a~t the common law, in many cases of felonies, the party for-
feited his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did
not, strictly speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or at
least a consequence, of the judgment of conviction. It is plain
from this statement, that no right to the goods and chattels of
the felon could be acquired by the crown by the mere commis-
sion of the offence; but the right attached only by the conviction
of the offender. The necessary result was, that in every case
where the crown sought to recover such goods and chattels, it
was indispensable to establish its right by producing the record
of the judgment of conviction. In the contemplation of the com-
mon law, the offender's right was not devested [sic] until the
conviction. But this doctrine never was applied to seizures and
forfeitures, created by statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue
side of the Exchequer.99
From this doctrine perhaps grows the dictum expressed in
later cases that a money penalty or forfeiture may be criminal
in nature for double jeopardy purposes if it occurs "by reason
of" a criminal offense.100 Yet unless the statute classifies the
penalty or forfeiture as criminal, there is no way as a practical
matter to distinguish penalties occurring "by reason of" a crim-
inal offense from those civil penalties that, as The Palmyra recog-
nized, the legislature may establish independently of whatever
criminal penalty it chooses to provide. In the absence of a crim-
inal label, therefore, the courts are highly unlikely to conclude
that an ostensibly civil money penalty or forfeiture is anything
other than it purports to be.10 1 The only possible method of
distinction probably lies in the fact that at common law a felon's
entire estate was subject to forfeit. This fact may underlie the
Court's occasional observation that the grossly excessive nature
of a penalty may transform it from civil into criminal. 0 2  But
short of a statute forfeiting a person's entire estate per se, prob-
ably no amercement would be so construed.
98. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
99. Id. at 14.
100. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236
n.6 (1972) (per curiam); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34
(1886).
101. Indeed, the Court early in its history nearly precluded any such
finding, stating in The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1827), "But
the practice has been, and so this Court understand the law to be, that
the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by
any criminal proceeding in personam."
102. E.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
237 (1972) (per curiam).
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2. Incarcerations for Civil Contempt
In cases where civil contempt may result in incarceration the
Court has denied a right to jury trial on the ground that the
incarceration is "coercive" rather than punitive. 0 3 Even apart
from this ground, incarceration for civil contempt need not be
regarded as infamous. First, because the sanction can be avoided
immediately by compliance with the court order, it is in a sense
voluntary and therefore less severe from the defendant's point
of view than other punitive incarcerations. Alternatively, if one
looks to stigma as determinative, the incarceration does not imply
the status of "badness" that other punitive incarcerations do. By
making the imprisonment conditional, the court has declined to
"banish" or exile'0 the respondent from society in the way
that criminal incarcerations do. It is the act, not the individual,
that is burdened, and the condemnation of the individual that
inheres in the term "stigma" does not, therefore, attach. 0 5
3. Disqualification from Public Employment
Finally, disqualification from public employment has been
termed an infamous punishment,106 but the Court has never
confronted the question whether it is also criminal in nature. On
several occasions the Court has held such disqualifications to con-
stitute bills of attainder or ex post facto laws,'0 7 but, as will
103. For reasons set forth below, incarceration as a sanction for civil
contempt is not strictly punishment. See text accompanying notes
331-32 infra.
104. See Griffiths, supra note 89, at 378-79.
105. This distinction between condemnation of specific behavior and
condemnation of the person has its analogy in psychological literature,
and it seems reasonable to assume that the theory of stigmatization has
similar roots. This concept, and the psychological views that underlie
it, are explored by Griffiths. Id. at 371-76.
The case of incarceration pending a criminal trial (or pending a civil
trial in those jurisdictions that have retained the antiquated forms of
civil arrest) can be explained as a form of detention that does not consti-
tute punishment.
106. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426 (1885) (dictum) (citing Wad-
dell v. United States, 112 U.S. 76, 82 (1884)).
107. See United States v. Brown, 391 U.S. 437 (1965) (disqualifica-
tion of Communist Party members from union officership a bill of attain-
der); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (disqualification of
named individuals from government serdce a bill of attainder); Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867) (disbarment of attorneys who sup-
ported Confederacy a bill of attainder and ex post facto law); Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) (disqualification of clergymen
who had supported Confederacy a bill of attainder and ex post facto
law).
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be shown shortly, these determinations do not necessarily depend
on the penalty being criminal. Moreover, in a variety of contexts
the Court has found employment disqualifications not to be puni-
tive, so that a fortiori they were not criminal in those cases.'08
If it could be demonstrated, however, that such disqualifications
do constitute punishment (under the criteria developed later
in this Article'0 9) a municipal employee acquitted of a criminal
charge of bribery might well allege double jeopardy in a subse-
quent proceeding under a statute disqualifying from public em-
ployment anyone administratively found to have taken a bribe.
The Court's dictum that punishment involving such disqualifica-
tion is infamous should lead to the conclusion that such punish-
ments are criminal. As a practical matter, the loss of public
employment might seem less severe and hence less deserving of
enhanced constitutional protections than other penalties, such as
substantial forfeitures of property, which do not trigger such
safeguards. If there exists any defense for the Court's special
concern for bars to public employment, it presumably has to do
with the greater stigma resulting from the innuendo that a
person so barred is morally unfit.
D. SummARY
It can be seen that the double jeopardy clause and sixth
amendment safeguards have been applied solely to sanctions that
fit within a rather narrow concept of "criminal punishment."
One may further hypothesize that any other constitutional pro-
vision explicitly referring to "criminal prosecutions" would also
be so limited. The reasons for this limitation are clearly histor-
ical, rooted in constitutional decisionmaking, and unlikely to
change. The distinguishing feature of criminal punishment lies
not merely in the severity of the sanction itself but in the stigma
that accompanies the sanction. Accordingly, the Court has
declined to classify sanctions labeled "civil" as "criminal" for
constitutional purposes unless they amount to infamous punish-
ments, but has allowed the legislature more broadly to define
punishments through use of the criminal label.
As noted earlier, there is a second group of constitutional
provisions that the Court has applied to a seemingly much broad-
er class of sanctions-a class which; while it includes criminal
108. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); Hawker v. New
York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
109. See text accompanying notes 310-25 infra.
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punishments, also includes other sanctions that clearly would not
be classified as "criminal punishment" under the definition just
stated. We now turn to an examination of this second area, and
to the concept of "punishment" that appears to underlie it.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL
PUNISHIENT
A. Boyd v. United States: THE FiB'r AivmN mNT AND THm
"QuAsI-CRnmNAL" LAW
When Justice Bradley announced in Boyd that forfeiture
proceedings, "though they may be civil in form, are in their na-
ture criminal,"110 he introduced an unnecessary and dangerous
dictum into the law. For the forfeiture involved in Boyd, though
a penalty for reasons set forth below, definitely was not a crimi-
nal penalty in the sense we have just been discussing. The term
"quasi-criminal," which the Court coined to describe the proceed-
ing, has muddied legal waters ever since.
To recapitulate, Boyd raised the question whether books and
records relating to property the Government sought to forfeit
could be subpoenaed in the forfeiture proceeding. The Court
held the documents privileged from discovery on fourth and
fifth amendment grounds, even though discovery of evidence in
civil litigation does not normally constitute an unreasonable
search and seizure and the fifth amendment's self-incrimination
clause prevents the compulsion of testimony in criminal cases
only. It was to overcome these barriers that the Court held the
forfeiture proceeding to be essentially criminal in nature.
Boyd can be explained in at least three ways that permit
rejection of the rationale that forfeitures are criminal prosecu-
tions. First, the threat of forfeiture can be viewed as a means
of coercing Boyd to give testimony that could be used against
him in a subsequent criminal trial.111 At the time of the for-
feiture proceeding Boyd had apparently neither undergone crim-
inal prosecution nor been granted immunity. In recent years the
Court has established that potentially incriminating testimony
may not be coerced by the threatened revocation of a professional
110. 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886).
111. Cf. United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896) (explaining
Boyd by citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (holding
the fifth amendment privilege to be available in grand jury proceedings
because a future criminal prosecution might result)).
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license,1 12 loss of public employment,'" or loss of govern-
ment contracts, 114 and that immunity must be granted with
regard to such testimony before it may be required in civil pro-
ceedings conducted for the purpose of revoking a license or ter-
minating employment. 15 The Court has not indicated that
there is anything criminal about these delicensure or termination
proceedings; the relevant fact is that they serve in some sense
to discourage invocation of the constitutional privilege from com-
pelled self-incrimination." 6  Under these more recent deci-
112. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
113. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner, 392 U.S.
280 (1968). See also Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
114. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
115. Id. See also cases cited in note 113 supra.
116. The rationale for Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), and its
progeny is somewhat difficult to set forth, and no extended attempt to
do so will be made here. In general, the Court has held that the govern-
ment is entitled to obtain information otherwise protected by the fifth
amendment so long as it has some valid, noncoercive purpose for doing
so. Thus in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court upheld
auto accident reporting statutes not aimed narrowly at compelling in-
criminating testimony, but rather applicable to the general public and
serving a valid regulatory purpose, namely, the satisfaction of civil lia-
bilities arising from automobile accidents. The Court held determina-
tive the purpose of the statute, as illustrated by its target group, rather
than the possibility of self-incrimination resulting from a particular
report filed under the statute. The Court distinguished other cases where
the statute was directed at a "highly selective" group or one "inherently
suspect of criminal activities" such as Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965), Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Haynes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). 402 U.S. at 429-31. Similarly, the Court has held
that the federal government may require taxpayers to keep and produce
records under a general regulatory scheme such as the Price Control Act,
even though in specific instances the records might prove incriminating.
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). And it has upheld the re-
quirement that all taxpayers must at least file tax returns. United States
v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927). But see Garner v. United States, 44
U.S.L.W. 4323, 4328 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976) (gambler is privileged from list-
ing "occupation" on tax return, though question is not narrowly aimed
at illegal activity).
In Spevack and such subsequent cases as Gardner v. Broderick, 392
1..S. 273 (1968), and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973), the Court
has held invalid the compulsion of testimony in proceedings to disbar
attorneys, fire public employees, or terminate government contracts.
The rationale of these holdings is presumably twofold. First, the testi-
mony compelled in such proceedings is essentially coextensive with testi-
mony that would establish a crime. Hence the inquiry is arguably di-
rected at a "highly selective" group or individual "inherently suspect of
criminal activities" within the meaning of the Marchetti line of cases.
Second, the very failure to grant immunity before requiring testimony
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sions, it seems probable that the type of forfeiture proceeding
involved in Boyd would also be regarded as coercive for purposes
of self-incrimination and, for that reason alone, justify invoca-
tion of the privilege. One recent case in which the Court has
repeated the unfortunate "quasi-criminal" language of Boyd,
United States v. United States Coin & Currency,117 can be ex-
plained on the same ground.
Second, the subpoena in Boyd might have been held invalid
under the fourth amendment, quite apart from the fifth, on
grounds that no probable cause existed for its issuance. It is
now clear-though it perhaps was not in 1886-that the guaran-
tee against unreasonable searches and seizures applies in civil
as well as criminal proceedings.1 s Although it has been es-
tablished that subpoenas do not constitute searches or seizures
under the fourth amendment, 19 this rule did not prevail when
might indicate a purpose to compel self-incriminating testimony, regard-
less whether the inquiry was "narrowly focused" on illegal activity.
There are problems with this first analysis. One does not sense
that disbarment proceedings, unlike the various taxes on illegal activities
involved in Marchetti and its companion cases, have as their primary
purpose the discovery and prosecution of criminals. Indeed, disbarment
may occur for many reasons which do not involve the commission of
crimes. In this sense disbarment proceedings or termination of govern-
ment employment or contracts more strongly resemble California v.
Byers, where the reporting statute was not narrowly aimed at criminal
activities, than they do the Marchetti line of cases. Yet if the second
theory is adopted, that immunity must &lways be granted when the re-
sponse to a question would incriminate, Byers may be nearly overruled
by Gardner.
However, to the extent that Spevack and its progeny remain
good law despite the analytical difficulties just mentioned, it seems that
forfeitures and civil money penalties serve unconstitutionally to compel
self-incrimination. Frequently such penalties attack conduct that is also
criminal, and their primary purpose is to deter or revenge such conduct.
117. 401 U.S. 715 (1971). As in Boyd, the Court held that a forfeiture
proceeding was essentially criminal in nature. The question was
whether the Government could penalize the failure to pay gambling
taxes and to register as a gambler, where compliance with these laws
would necessarily have involved self-incrimination. The only relevance
of the criminal nature of the forfeiture -proceeding was to establish the
money owner's standing to assert the personal self-incrimination defense
in what was technically an in rem suit against the property rather than
an in personam proceeding against the owner. Standing could just as
well have been established by recognizing the coercive nature of the suit
with regard to testimony that could be used in a possible criminal prose-
cution in a future case, without commenting on whether the forfeiture
was also criminal in nature.
118. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
119. See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. "Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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Boyd was decided. To the extent that the statute in Boyd per-
mitted a subpoena to issue without a showing of probable cause
or to require the production of any and all business records re-
gardless of relevance, the fourth amendment view then held by
the Court might have condemned the procedure regardless of the
type of proceeding.
This second explanation of Boyd serves to distinguish a re-
cent Supreme Court case that reiterates the notion that forfei-
tures are criminal for fourth and fifth amendment purposes. In
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,120 the Court ruled
merely that the improper search and seizure of liquor from an
automobile justified exclusion of the evidence in a forfeiture
case-a ruling that makes perfect sense even if the forfeiture
proceeding is conceded to be noncriminal.
However, neither of these first two alternative explanations
of Boyd very well reflects the spirit of the opinion, which is
that it is unfair, and in some way unconstitutional, to compel
testimony in a forfeiture proceeding. Boyd does not advert
either to future criminal prosecution or to lack of probable cause
to seek the testimony.
A third explanation of Boyd may come closer to preserving
its spirit. Compulsion of testimony in a punitive (though non-
criminal) proceeding could be said to offend the constitutional
policy of fundamental fairness that underlies the self-incrimina-
tion clause, quite apart from the possibility of future prosecution.
Though the consequences of noncriminal punitive proceedings
are not infamous, nonetheless the state is seeking retribution for
legal transgressions. Consequently such proceedings raise some
of the same concerns that underlie the self-incrimination clause,
albeit in somewhat more attenuated form: the concern, for ex-
ample, that oppressive tactics will be used to secure testimony
and that such testimony will often prove unreliable.1
2 1
120. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). In Plymouth Sedan a vehicle owner ac-
cused of violating liquor laws claimed that the police had stopped and
searched his car without probable cause. Under Camara the lack of crim-
inality in the proceeding should not influence the availability of the
fourth amendment right or of the exclusionary rule. Cf. United States
v. Alcatex, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 129, 132 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Frankel, J.);
'"Boyd v. United States ... is designed to expand [the Fourth] Amend-
ment's protection of privacy and security ... What the Government
has unlawfully seized, it may well have no business keeping simply
because a proceeding is captioned 'civil.'"
121. These policies are described by the Court in Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), and may be summarized as four
in number: (1) The problem that self-condemnatory statements may be
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If the Court deems these policies persuasive, it could find
a constitutional source for them in cases like Boyd without classi-
fying the proceedings "criminal." Indeed, it seems clearly prefer-
able to avoid this result and with it the confusion of Boyd's
"quasi-criminal" classification. Instead, a home for the doctrine
could readily be found in the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, subject. to an explanation of the rea-
sons why fundamental fairness compels such a policy.
Alternatively, the Court could rely on the language in Boyd
indicating that the fourth amendment prevents the compulsion
of testimony in punitive though noncriminal cases. Such an ap-
plication of the fourth amendment, however, would differ signifi-
cantly from its usual function, which is not to create any absolute
privilege from discovery, but only to limit the circumstances and
methods of searches and seizures by requiring warrants and
showings of probable cause. Because the Boyd doctrine creates
nearly as great a bulge in the fourth amendment as it does in
the fifth, the preferable policy might be to rely on the due proc-
ess approach instead.
If the Court so desired, it could extend other fifth and sixth
amendment safeguards to encompass noncriminal punitive pro-
ceedings by relying on the due process clause. Such an approach
would at least enable the Court to explain its reasons for extend-
ing some guarantees but not others without summarily conclud-
ing that certain punitive proceedings are "criminal" in some con-
texts but not others.
In fact, however, the Court has avoided deciding whether it
will either accept this third construction of Boyd or adhere to the
notion that some civil penalties are "criminal" under the fifth
unreliable, either because of a kind of death-wish psychology in the per-
son interrogated or because that person fears wrongful charges of perjury
or contempt; (2) the need to adopt a prophylactic rule to avoid abusive
police practices during interrogation; (3) the notion that the individual
has a right to be let alone absent good cause for intrusion into his pri-
vacy, and that the availability of alternative methods for gathering evi-
dence of guilt negates any showing of good cause; and (4) the need to
preserve the adversarial, as opposed to inquisitorial, nature of the crim-
inal trial.
It seems true that the first two justifications decrease in importance
as the severity of the sanction (and presumably of the underlying of-
fense) decreases. Nonetheless, it is difficult to assert that they disappear
where noninfamous punishments are concerned. The third and fourth
justifications seem weak in any case, inasmuch as civil procedure nor-
mally provides discovery, and hence invades privacy, in the context of
an adversarial (albeit less adversarial) proceeding. Ultimately the de-
gree of adversariness desired and the extent to which privacy may be
sacrificed seem to depend on the first two concerns.
[Vol. 60:379
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES
amendment. Because the Court's more recent applications of
Boyd can be explained in terms of the first two, narrower expla-
nations set forth above, it is unclear whether the Court would
actually permit reliance on Boyd in a punitive but noncriminal
proceeding where no chance of future prosecution exists and
where there is probable cause for the inquiry. Justice Douglas,
however, has argued that a self-incrimination claim should be
available to a defendant in such circumstances. He suggests that
compelled testimony may not be used by the government to
deprive an individual of a job, labor union position, or passport
even though immunity from criminal prosecution was granted
before the testimony was compelled. 1 22 While Justice Douglas
bases his argument on the view that such proceedings are crim-
inal and hence within the protection of the fifth amendment, his
argument could equally be made on the view that such pro-
ceedings are punitive and hence within the due process clauses
for the purpose just discussed. Whether or not the proceedings
cited by Justice Douglas are in fact punitive, as opposed to regu-
latory, is a separate and difficult question addressed at a later
point in this Article.1
23
If the broad meaning of the Boyd case is to be preserved,
it should be done by that method which avoids Boyd's sim-
plistic language that forfeitures are criminal for purposes of the
fifth amendment though not elsewhere. A better way is to take
up the invitation of a footnote in Helvering v. Mitchell stating
that "'the guaranty in the Fifth Amendment .. . is of broader
scope than are the guaranties in Article III and the Sixth
Amendment.' "124 Functionally this is an assertion that the
policies underlying the self-incrimination clause, unlike those
of other guarantees, should be extended to noncriminal cases.
The trouble with Boyd is that the Court, armed with its facile
"quasi-criminal" label, did not feel the need to explain what those
policies are and why they differ. Perhaps the chief gain from
removing the "quasi-criminal" rationale would be to force the
122. In Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), the Court held
that a grand jury witness could be compelled to testify upon the grant
of immunity from future criminal prosecution. The Court did not pass
on the question whether a Boyd defense would be valid if such testimony
were used in subsequent proceedings to deprive the witness of a job,
labor union position, or passport. Justice Douglas, dissenting, urged that
such burdens constituted penalties within the meaning of Boyd, from
which Congress had not granted immunity, and that the witness should
thus be permitted not to testify at all. Id. at 440-43.
123. See text accompanying notes 310-25 infra.
124. 303 U.S. 391, 400 n.3 (1938) (quoting United States v. Regan,
232 U.S. 37, 50 (1914)). See also note 42 supra.
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Court to elaborate the rationale that is, in fact, its ground for
decision.
The critical conclusion in the interpretation of Boyd just of-
fered is therefore that the privilege there recognized should
rest on the ground that the proceeding in question was punitive
in purpose, not on whether it was civil or criminal. A number
of other constitutional privileges or guarantees whose applica-
tions are also often articulated on the basis of puzzling "criminal"
or "quasi-criminal" classifications fn fact rest on the same con-
cerns. We now turn to these other constitutional doctrines.
B. SummY ADJiICATION: TAX oR P=ALTY?
The Supreme Court has on several occasions distinguished
between taxes, which may be collected by distraint and assessed
without a prior administrative hearing, and penalties, which may
be assessed and collected only after a prior hearing. In Lipke
v. Lederer,1 25 the Court examined a double "tax" payable by
anyone who manufactured regulated beverages without paying
the basic tax. Sensibly enough, the Court held that the pur-
ported tax was actually a penalty amd that summary procedures
were impermissible. The language of the Court went further,
however, stating that the act constituted a penalty "for an al-
leged criminal act,' 12 6 and that "certainly we cannot conclude,
in the absence of language admitting of no other construction,
that Congress intended that penalties for crime should be en-
forced through the secret findings and summary action of execu-
tive officers.'- 27
This insinuation that the penalty itself was criminal in na-
ture was later made explicit in Helvering v. Mitchell,12 where
a taxpayer had been acquitted of tax evasion but was then sued
civilly for a penalty of 50 percent of the alleged deficiency. The
Court properly rejected the taxpayer's claim that the second pro-
ceeding placed him in double jeopardy. It did so, however, on
the ground that the sanction was essentially remedial and not
125. 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
126. Id. at 562. Also holding that a penalty cannot be imposed by
summary procedures is Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386 (1922).
The Court cited with approval the quoted language from Lipke and also
noted with approval the language of the complaint, which averred that
an alleged tax was in fact a penalty "for criminal violations of the law."
Id. at 392. See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524-25 (1958).
127. 259 U.S. at 562.
128. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
[Vol. 60:379
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES
punitive. The opinion characterized Lipce as involving a crimi-
nal sanction, as to which collection by distraint was unconstitu-
tional, and stated in further dictum that "Congress may not pro-
vide civil procedure for the enforcement of punitive sanc-
tions"'12 9 such as those involved in Lipke.
The suggestion that any sanction which serves a punitive
rather than a remedial purpose is "criminal" for all constitutional
purposes forced the Mitchell Court into an awkward corner. The
Court found itself unable to deny Mitchell's double jeopardy
claim without a very strained finding that his 50 percent penalty
was "nonpunitive," even though it was for all practical purposes
similar in function and apparent intent to the "punitive" 100 per-
cent penalty involved in Lipke. This convoluted piece of statu-
tory construction was quite unnecessary. The holding in Lipke
did not have to be justified under the constitutional guarantees
for criminal proceedings; the statutory procedures in that case
would have been deficient for lack of any preseizure hearing even
if the assessment had been a pure tax with no punitive aspects.18 0
But even ignoring this fact, it is reasonable to state that the
assessment of any penalty, whether or not criminal in nature,
should require an opportunity for a plenary hearing.18 '
Had the Mitchell Court construed Lipke in this fashion, the
Court would have been free to decide what it clearly wanted
to decide, namely, that the 50 percent surcharge, even though
clearly punitive, was not a "criminal punishment" in the narrow
sense in which those words are understood in the double jeop-
ardy clause and the sixth amendment. It was not "criminal" be-
cause it was neither an infamous punishment nor endowed with
the "criminal" label.
C. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN PENAL LAWS
The Supreme Court has had several occasions to construe
the comity rule that courts of one state need not enforce
the penal laws of another. The Court has often restated this
rule as one that is limited to laws "criminal or quasi-criminal"
in nature1 3 2 and then, to make sense of the rule, gone on to state
129. Id. at 402 n.6.
130. See, e.g., Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Turner
v. Wade, 254 U.S. 64 (1920); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127(1907). The Court in Lipke cited the Central of Ga. Ry. case for this
proposition; why the Court did not rest there remains a mystery.
131. See generally Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1267 (1975). See also text accompanying notes 248-49 infra.
132. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 676 (1892).
19761
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
that a law will fit this classification whenever "its purpose is
to punish an offence against the public justice of the state.' 33
Moreover, the Court has included within this definition both qui
tam actions by a private informer to recover a money penalty,
and personal disabilities such as a convict's loss of the right to
testify or the prohibition against remarriage by the guilty party
in a divorce. 13 4 Once again, some of these decisions fail to har-
monize with decisions in other areas. Qui tam actions for money
penalties (under the double jeopardy clause),13 for example,
have been held not criminal, and indeed not punitive.
This disharmony can be eliminated by recognizing that the
rule regarding enforcement of foreign penal laws applies to all
punitive laws, while the double jeopardy clause applies only
to punitive laws that are also "criminal." In the principal case
quoted above, Huntington v. Attrll,' 36 the Court held that the
rule regarding nonenforcement of foreign penal laws did not ap-
ply to a New York law making corporation directors personally
liable to creditors for corporate debts in case of fraud. The Court
could have avoided stating that the rule encompasses only crim-
inal laws, for the fact that the statute permitted compensation
to a private plaintiff distinguished it from laws, such as those
exacting forfeitures and money penalties, that are enforced by
the state and can be defined as punitive, as they are in this Arti-
cle.'3 7
The second leading case in this area, Wisconsin v. Pelican
Insurance Co., 138 did apply the foreign penal law rule to
a sanction that clearly was not criminal. There, in an original
jurisdiction action, the Court declined to enforce a qui tam judg-
ment of $8500 against a Louisiana corporation obtained by the
Insurance Commissioner in Wisconsin courts on behalf of the
State of Wisconsin, on the ground that the corporation had done
business in Wisconsin without registering. In holding the exac-
tion a penalty for purposes of the comity rule, the Court
observed:
The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences
133. Id. at 673-74.
134. Id. at 673.
135. See, e.g., United States ex Tel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537
(1943).
136. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
137. See note 283 infra.
138. 127 US. 265 (1888).
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for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the
State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation
of statutes for the protection of its revenue, or other municipal
laws, and to all judgments for such penalties.1 39
The case thus indicates that punitive laws generally, and not
merely criminal laws, fall within the meaning of the rule. The
Pelican Insurance Co. case thus properly permits the Court to
avoid both the conclusion that such laws are criminal in nature
and the need to hold them punitive for one purpose but remedial
for another.
It must be recognized, however, that policy considerations
might well point to restricting the foreign penal laws rule to
criminal punishments instead of extending it to punishments
generally. The forum state has good reason to avoid the expense
of imprisoning convicted criminals who have offended the law
elsewhere. 140 Likewise, there is good reason to avoid entrust-
ing the discretionary function of sentencing to a state whose own
citizens have not been offended by the defendant's conduct.
Neither would it be generally feasible to try the defendant in
one state and then send him to another state for sentencing and
imprisonment. Moreover, the criminal prosecution function
could not generally be performed either by a foreign lawyer or
by a private lawyer hired by the foreign plaintiff state, and it
would burden the forum state's prosecutor to have to handle
cases on behalf of other states. 41 And, of course, extradition
provides an alternative to the enforcement of foreign criminal
laws.
These arguments diminish in force when noncriminal punish-
ments such as money penalties and forfeitures are concerned. Ex-
cept perhaps for the problem of supervising forfeited property-
the cost of which could be taxed to the plaintiff foreign state--
enforcement of such sanctions involves no more expense or dis-
cretion than does ordinary civil litigation in which another state
is the plaintiff. For these reasons, the Court might do well to
reexamine the logic of its holdings and restrict the meaning of
"foreign penal laws" to criminal laws or even to criminal laws
involving the possibility of imprisonment.
139. Id. at 290.
140. See Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
Claims, 46 IIARv. L. REv. 193, 199 (1932).
141. A. vox Mnmuw & D. TRA TmAN, TnE LAW Or MurISTATE PROB-
LEMS 793 (1965).
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D. Ex POST FACTO LAWS
The Court has pursued an ambivalent course on the question
whether the ex post facto clause is limited to criminal punish-
ments or has some broader application. In Calder v. Bull,
142
its earliest encounter with the question, the Court stated per Jus-
tice Chase that the clause applies only to criminal punish-
ments. 143 This observation, however, has dubious precedential
value. In the first place, the statement is dictum, for the ques-
tion at bar was whether the reversal of a probate court
judgment by the Connecticut legislature (acting according to
long-standing tradition as a court of appeal) and the consequent
order of a new trial constituted an ex post facto law. The Court
was at pains to demonstrate that the clause did not invalidate
all legislative interferences with vested property rights, but only
those that constituted punishments. 144 Secondly, the Court ap-
pears to have used the terms "punishment" and "criminal punish-
ment" interchangeably, assuming that the two were coextensive.
The Court did not address the possibility that punitive but non-
criminal laws might violate the ex post facto clause. The as-
sumption that punishment and criminal punishment are coexten-
sive also characterizes Chief Justice Marshall's slightly later
142. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
143. Throughout, the opinion ten& to use punishment and criminal
punishment as interchangeable terms, on the apparent assumption (as
in Boyd v. United States) that all punishments are criminal in nature.
Thus, Justice Chase states as his exhaustive definition of ex post facto
laws:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime,
or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every
law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punish-
ment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th.
Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives
less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.
Id. at 390. Justice Iredell, concurring, likewise observed that "the true
construction of the prohibition extends to criminal, not to civil, cases."
Id. at 399.
144. For a general history of the debate concerning these rival inter-
pretations, see Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohi-
bition of Ex-Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. Cm. L. REv. 539 (1947). Professor
Crosskey points out that one of the Court's major concerns in deciding
Calder v. Bull was to indicate that a federal bankruptcy law, then pend-
ing before Congress, would not be unconstitutional if enacted. Id. at 560-
64. This fact may explain why the Court adopted an interpretation of
the clause that has not been borne out by the Court's later application
of the clause to penal laws generally.
[Vol. 60:379
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES
opinion in Fletcher v. Peck.145
Subsequently, the ex post facto clause has been applied to
a variety of laws which, though punitive, need not be called crim-
inal. In a series of cases the Court has held that some disquali-
fications from government or professional employment can be
punishment and therefore, when retroactively applied, ex
post facto laws.146 It can be argued that when such disqualifi-
cation is punishment, it is infamous punishment because of the
stigma it imparts and therefore constitutes a criminal sanc-
tion.147 Yet the logic of the ex post facto clause reaches beyond
infamous punishments to punishments generally. As has been
argued elsewhere, the principle vice of ex post facto legislation
is the unfairness of seeking revenge for voluntary actions that
were not forbidden at the time they were undertaken.148 Such
145. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Justice Marshall stated that an
ex post facto law is one
which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was
not punishable when it was committed. Such a law may inflict
penalties on the person, or may inflict pecuniary penalties which
swell the public treasury. The legislature is then prohibited
from passing a law by which a man's estate, or any part of it,
shall be seized for a crime which was not declared, by some pre-
vious law, to render him liable to that punishment. Why, then,
should violence be done to the natural meaning of words for the
purpose of leaving to the legislature the power of seizing, for
public use, the estate of an individual in the form of a law an-
nulli.g the title by which he holds the estate? The Court can
perceive no sufficient grounds for making this distinction. This
rescinding act would have the effect of an ex post facto law.
It forfeits the estate of Fletcher for a crime not committed by
himself, but by those from whom he purchased. This cannot
be effected in the form of an ex post facto law, or bill of attain-
der; why, then, is it allowable in the form of a law annulling
the original grant?
Id. at 138-39.
146. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (government
employees); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867) (attor-
neys); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) (clergymen).
147. See text accompanying note 63-78 supra.
148. This argument appears in Slawson, Constitutional and Legisla-
tive Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 216, 222
(1960). Unnecessarily, however, Slawson limits his argument to crim-
inal laws, with their consequent social condemnation. Logically, the ar-
gument should extend to any sanction that serves no purpose other than
to burden a conscious past choice to do an act not then prohibited. Cf.
L. FULLEn, THE MoR wTn OF LAW 51-65 (1964).
Additional policies underlying the ex post facto clause are suggested
in Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power, 73 MIcH. L. REV.
1491, 1501 (1975):
[I]n deciding whether a law is proscribed by the ex post facto
prohibition, a court should consider three factors: first, does the
law penalize activities in the absence of fair warning and frus-
trate reasonable reliance on existing laws; second, can the law
serve its ostensible purpose-for instance, does the law attempt
to regulate behavior through threats of unpleasant consequences
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unfairness, it is argued, outweighs the value of any deterrence
that also results from punishing such actions. And revenge, the
argument continues, is unfair when imposed without warning,
whether or not it bears the particular form and consequences we
label "criminal punishment." Any form of punishment, civil or
criminal, is equally unfair in these circumstances.
Despite these arguments, the Court has continued to reiter-
ate the old language providing that the ex post facto clause ap-
plies only to criminal punishments. 4 9 This uncareful language
serves only to obscure the true function of the clause, as well
as the essential difference between criminal and civil punish-
ments for other purposes to which that difference is relevant.
E. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF NoNCIINAL PUNISHMENT
The existence of punishment, but not necessarily of criminal
punishment, is relevant to several other constitutional provisions
and to numerous statutory references.150 Arguments that for-
where deterrence is no longer possible; and, finally, could the
law have been a consequence of legislative vindictiveness.
149. In Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), the Court rejected a
plea that a law deporting aliens for acts committed before its enactment
violated the ex post facto prohibition. In dictum, the opinion states that
"the ex post facto Clause applies only to prosecutions for crime." Id.
at 531 n.4. And in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 174-76
(1963), the plurality reasoned conversely that because expatriation had
been held by state courts to constitute ex post facto legislation for certain
purposes, expatriation must therefore constitute criminal punishment for
purposes of the sixth amendment.
150. In United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935), the Court
held that a federal "tax" of $1000 on retail liquor dealers who violated
state or local law was in fact not a tax but a "penalty" which, as an at-
tempt to enforce the eighteenth amendment, fell with that amendment's
repeal.
In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958),
the Court held that the taxpaying corporation could not deduct state
fines and penalties imposed for operation of overweight trucks as an or-
dinary business expense because such a deduction would frustrate state
policy by reducing the sting of a penalty. As in Lipke and Constantine,
the Court observed that the object of the legislation in question was to
forbid the acts upon which the sanction hinged, so that the sanction con-
stituted a penalty and not a tax.
In Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605 (1903), the Court deter-
mined that a levy of two percent for each one percent by which the true
value of imported goods exceeded their declared value was a penalty
within the meaning of a statute that gave the district court exclusive
jurisdiction over suits to recover penalties and forfeitures. The Court
observed that if an exaction is "enormously in excess of the greatest
amount of regular duty ever imposed upon an article of the same nature,
and it is imposed by reason of the [wrongful] action of the importer,
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feitures of property amount to taking without just compensation
under the fifth amendment have encountered the response that
forfeitures are punitive and hence outside the scope of the taking
clause.151 Various cases early in the twentieth century held
purported tax laws, not criminal in nature, to be punitive and
hence regulatory in violation of states' rights under the tenth
amendment.152  The cruel and unusual punishment clause has
been applied to punishments that did not purport to be criminal,
and the Court has not had to determine, in order to apply the
clause, whether an infamous punishment is criminal.15 3 And
finally, the due process clause has been held to prevent imposition
under a "vague" statute of a sanction which was punitive, though
arguably not criminal.' 5 4
F. SummARY
In each of the contexts discussed above, the Court, be-
ginning with Boyd, has applied the Constitution to laws that are
punitive but not criminal. These civil punishments contrast with
criminal punishments, which alone secure sixth amendment and
double jeopardy protections. In some instances the extension of
such facts clearly show it is a penalty in its intrinsic nature." Id. at 613.
In United States v. Nash, Ill F. 535 (W.D. Ky. 1901), a lower court
held that for purposes of district court jurisdiction the term "public of-
fense" included penalties as well as criminal proceedings, so that a suit
to collect the penalty was not within exclusive agency jurisdiction under
the statute in question.
151. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-
90 (1974); cf. United States v. One 1962 Ford Thunderbird, 232 F. Supp.
1019 (N.D. Ill. 1964). But see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960)
(retroactive deprivation of social security benefits held not to be puni-
tive, but also not violative of the taking clause because no vested prop-
erty rights existed in such benefits).
152. E.g., United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Bailey
v. Drexel Furn. Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
153. The Supreme Court has resorted to the due process clause in
order to forbid incarceration without treatment of allegedly mentally ill
but nondangerous persons. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
However, lower courts have relied in addition on the cruel and unusual
punishment clause. See cases cited in note 334 iwfra. See also Develop-
ments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally I1, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190, 1259-60 (1974) (suggesting that under Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962), even a civil sanction, if intended as punishment,
might fall under the eighth amendment).
154. In Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966), the Court
applied the void-for-vagueness rule to a procedure that allowed a jury
to assess costs against an acquitted criminal defendant and further per-
mitted the defendant to be jailed until the sum was paid or security
given.
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constitutional protections to noncriminal punishment is question-
able in view of both the language of the Constitution (particu-
larly in regard to self-incrimination) and social policy (with
regard to enforcement of foreign penal laws). But by describing
what the Court has done, even without defending its decisions,
one can open the door to a workable definition of punishment that
harmonizes the law to which that term is relevant. Moreover,
one can identify a general constitutional policy that can guide
and inform the meaning of the term "punishment" in most of
the areas in which it has been applied.
Before we turn to those matters, a postscript may be appro-
priate. It should be obvious that the existence of punishment
not only is essential to the various constitutional provisions just
described, but also underlies the meaning of the term "criminal"
itself. The point would hardly require mention but for the fact
that one leading constitutional law scholar has suggested in pass-
ing that determining whether laws are punitive can be avoided.
This argument, and the reasons why I find it untenable, appear
in the margin. 155
155. Ely, supra note 40, at 1311-13 n.324, argues that the need to find
punishment is not critical to constitutional decisionmaking. The reason
for his argument is the desire to avoid resting decisions on questions of
legislative motivation. As argued below, I think that the problems in-
herent in determining legislative psychology need not affect the deter-
mination of punishment, which can be made on more objective grounds.
And in any event, it is difficult to see how punishment can be dispensed
with as a constitutionally critical term.
In the first place, Ely limits his consideration to the bill of attainder,
ex post facto, cruel and unusual punishment, and procedural due process
requirements of the Constitution. He thus omits other areas where pun-
ishment is critical to constitutional decision: the Boyd fourth and fifth
amendment privilege, the rule against enforcement of foreign penal laws,
the taking clause of the fifth amendment, the meaning of "infamous
punishment," and the meaning of "criminal punishment" generally, to
make a partial list.
Second, I disagree that punishment can be dispensed with as a key
to the application of the provisions with which Ely does deal. Ely sug-
gests that the ex post facto clause, in combination with the bill of attain-
der clause, is designed only to ensure that the legislature does not usurp
the judicial function of applying the law to particular parties by passing
what purports to be legislation but in fact adjudicates existing rights.
This Ely refers to as "method retroactivity," borrowing the term from
Slawson, supra note 148, at 217-18. Yet Slawson explicitly notes that
"[a]ll ex-post-facto laws are method-retroactive' and defines the con-
stitutional role of method-retroactivity thus:[W ]hen the only justification for imposing liability is that a per-
son has chosen to conduct himself in a manner called wrong by
the law, imposition of the liability after choice is no longer pos-
sible removes the only justification for the liability and thereforedeprives the person of property without due process of law.
[Vol. 60:379
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES
V. PUNITIVE LAWS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
A. Tim MEANING OF "PumsHmmT"
The Court's discordant treatment of similar laws as punitive
in one constitutional context but not in another was illustrated
Id. at 224 (emphasis in original).
So viewed, method retroactivity and retroactive punishment are syn-
onymous. As argued below, when a law has no purpose other than to
burden conscious past choices for purposes of deterrence or revenge, it
is punitive. When there exists some other valid purpose that looks to
the future-regulation, taxation, compensation, treatment-then the law
is not punitive, and, in Slawson's terms, its retroactive application is not
"method-retroactive," however much it may interfere with vested rights
and expectations.
Consequently the meaning that Ely suggests for ex post facto punish-
ment---"the conditioning by the government of any serious deprivation
upon activity completed prior to the announcement of the condition,"
Ely, supra note 40, at 1312 n.324; see Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302,
319 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting)-is simply too general. As Slawson
recognizes, many laws that are not punitive and do not violate the ex
post facto clause turn upon past acts, constitute serious deprivations, and
thwart reasonable expectations. Changes in tax laws are one example.
It is only when the law's purpose relates solely to the past activity or
condition that the law violates the ex post facto clause. And this, in
turn, is because the law is punitive and because of the nature of the
legislature's purpose-or, if you will, motivation. (See text accompany-
ing notes 170-237 infra).
I do not quarrel with Ely in his statement that the requirement of
procedural due process in the civil sense does not disappear if a law is
not punitive. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). But to the
extent that Ely means to include in the term "procedural due process"
the rights guaranteed to criminal defendants by the sixth amendment,
I do not concur. If I am right in suggesting that cases such as Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), convey criminal safeguards
only because the sanction involved constitutes an infamous punishment,
then surely punishment must be defined. Ely would perhaps avoid this
difficulty by suggesting, as he does with regard to cruel and unusual
punishments, that the clause is meant to apply only to sanctions that
are "unreasonably (or 'unusually') out of proportion to the conduct
which triggered" them. Ely, supra note 40, at 1313 n.324. Yet consider
the case of Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), where the Court
held that an individual could not be incarcerated under a sex offenders
act without criminal trial procedures. Had the purpose of the act been
regarded by the Court as treatment and prevention, it is difficult to see
why the sanction would have been unreasonably or unusually dispropor-
tionate to the conduct causing it, any more than long-term civil commit-
ments of the mentally ill are unreasonable or unusual. It was only be-
cause the Court regarded the sanction as punitive that the procedural
rights of the sixth amendment attached.
I can agree with Ely in discussing the cruel and unusual punishment
clause that the disproportion of the offense to the conduct may very well
indicate that the law is arbitrary with regard to any purpose other than
punishment. What this suggests to me, however, is not that punishment
is an irrelevant term, but that its existence can be ascertained by means
more objective than legislative psychology.
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at the beginning of this Article. In large part this conflict has
arisen because the Court has failed to distinguish those constitu-
tional provisions that apply only to criminal laws from those that
apply to punitive laws in general.
But the conflict also results from the Court's failure to for-
mulate any clear notion of the meaning of punishment. Because
the application of numerous constitutional provisions turns on
the determination of punishment, it is critical to formulate some
workable meaning for that term. It may be that no one defini-
tion of punishment can serve the diverse policy considerations
that underlie each of the constitutional provisions in question.15 6
There are, however, certain common concerns and policies in each
of these constitutional areas that make a general concept of pun-
ishment basically workable. This "general concept" works no
more magic than does speaking of a general concept of "arbitrar-
iness" or "invidious discrimination" applicable to both the due
process and the equal protection clauses. The concept of punish-
ment, like those of arbitrariness or cliscrimination, is not so much
a definition as a mode of analysis.
The Supreme Court has used the terms "punishment" and
"penalty" to mean at least two different things. For purposes
of semantic clarity it is useful to distinguish these before pro-
ceeding further. The primary use here of the term punishment
is that defined by H.L.A. Hart and Herbert Packer: 157 the im-
position of burdens, for purposes of retribution or deterrence,
upon people who have violated legal norms.
The Court, however, also uses the term from time to time
in a "secondary" sense to describe burdens placed upon given
groups of people because of their exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected rights such as speech' 58 or interstate travel.159 These
156. Cf. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Profes-
sor Hart, 71 HtAlv. L. REV. 630, 662-63 (1958) (arguing that no word ever
has a "standard meaning" for purposes of statutory interpretation, and
that meaning can only be ascribed by reference to statutory purpose in
a given context).
157. See text accompanying notes 161-62 infra.
158. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("if
the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitu-
tionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms
would in effect be penalized and inhibited"); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23,
28 (1971) ("the First Amendment prohibits Ohio from penalizing an
applicant by denying him admission to the Bar solely because of his
membership in an organization"); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527
(1958) (purpose of loyalty oath requirements, as opposed to the instant
denial of tax exemption to members of subversive organizations, "was
[Vol. 60:379
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burdens are not true punishments in the "primary" sense for two
reasons. First, they do not involve violations of legal prohibi-
tions. Second, they are not always imposed because of past acts,
but sometimes burden only continuing acts and are removed
when such acts cease. A ban on union officeholding by current
members of given political parties is one example. Such a "pen-
alty" on political association is coercive only as a civil contempt
sanction is coercive, and differs from punishments imposed be-
cause of past misdeeds and without regard to forcing some imme-
diate change in behavior. Despite these differences, however,
there are clear similarities between the Court's analysis of the
two kinds of burdens: In both situations the Court must seek
to find a retributive or deterrent purpose in order to find that
a penalty exists.
The following discussion deals with the "primary" meaning of
punishment, which applies to violators of legal norms. Most of
the jurisprudential discussion of the meaning of punishment has
occurred in the context of criminal law and its purposes. The
definitions there formulated, however, apply equally to noncrimi-
nal punishment and provide a good starting point for discussion.
H.L.A. Hart, drawing largely on the work of Antony Flew,160
has defined punishment as follows:
i. It must involve pain or other consequences normally consid-
ered unpleasant.
ii. It must be for an offence against legal rules.
iii. It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence.
iv. It must be intentionally administered by human beings other
than the offender.
v. It must be imposed and administered by an authority consti-
tuted by a legal system against which the offence is com-
mitted.' 61
not to penalize political beliefs"); cf. United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437 (1915) (ban of Communist Party members from union offices
held a penalty upon such membership for purposes of the bill of attain-
der clause). See also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472-74
(1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192-
94 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
159. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258
(1974) (emphasis in original):
[T]hus Shapiro [v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)] and Dunn[v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)] stand for the proposition
that a classification which "operates to penalize those persons
. . who have exercised their constitutional right of interstate
migration" must be justified by a compelling state interest. Ore-
gon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) ....
160. Flew, The Justification of Punishment, PmLosoPHY 291 (1954).
161. HLL.A. HART, supra note 12, at 4-5.
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Improvements upon this definition have been offered and at-
tacked by other scholars. In order to distinguish punishment
from treatment, compensation, and regulation, Professor Herbert
Packer has suggested an additional criterion:
vi. It must be imposed for the dominant purpose of preventing
offenses against legal ruins or of exacting retribution from of-
fenders or both.102
It has been argued that Packer's addition is unnecessary be-
cause the requirements of deterrence and retribution are implicit
in Hart's requirement that the consequences be "for" the offense,
a requirement that would exclude alternative purposes such as
treatment, compensation, and regulation.163 Without joining in
this essentially semantic debate, we may assert, first, that both
Packer and Hart see in punishment a purposive element. Pun-
ishment is imposed solely because an offense occurred, and, at
least in Packer's view, for the "dominant" purpose of deterrence
or retribution or both.
Second, it should be observed hat Packer's view of deter-
rence, or the prevention of offenses against legal rules, does not
include the kind of incapacitation that takes place while a person
is disbarred or in jail, 16 4 but refers only to the dissuasion re-
sulting from fear of sanctions that occurs while one is free to vio-
late norms.
B. PoLIcIEs UNDERLYING DISTINCTIONS BASED
ON "PUNISHMENT"
1. Procedural Safeguards
What relevance, then, does this composite view of the mean-
ing of punishment have to constitutional law? Perhaps this
question can best be approached by considering first the proce-
dural safeguards of the Constitution that key to punishment,
criminal or civil: the fifth amendment double jeopardy and self-
incrimination clauses, the sixth amendment guarantees, and the
summary adjudication rule in tax penalty cases. The purposes
of these safeguards can be generally stated as to ensure so far as
possible that conviction will not be based on error, 65 to prevent
abuses and excesses against defendants (particularly with regard
162. H. PAcKER, supra note 12, at 31.
163. Griffiths, Book Review, 79 YAn L.J. 1388, 1406-13 (1970).
164. This sort of incapacitation has also been called "special deter-
rence." See J. ANDENAES, PUNISmWENT Am DETERRENCE 175-81 (1974).
165. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 062 (1970).
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to compelled testimony) that might result in emotionally charged
cases, and, related to the last, to avoid the use of repetitious
prosecution to harass, intimidate, or wrongfully convict defend-
ants.
Why do these criminal safeguards apply for example in cases
of punitive and (because infamous) criminal incarcerations but
not in cases of incarceration for treatment of mental illness or for
quarantine? Why, in other words, is the punitive nature of the
proceeding critical to the constitutional outcome in these in-
stances? The answer, I think, is that in cases of punishment the
defendant's-interest is greater and that of the state less compel-
ling than in other cases. Moreover, these differences relate di-
rectly to the purposes of retribution or deterrence that underlie
the concept of punishment.
For several reasons the defendant's interest in avoiding puni-
tive incarceration is greater than his interest in avoiding incar-
cerations for treatment or quarantine. First, at least in the case
of mental health treatment, the defendant may stand to benefit
in a way that retribution and deterrence cannot offer. Second,
because punitive incarceration includes elements of moral con-
demnation, the defendant is stigmatized in a way that does not
characterize the other incarcerations. And third, because of this
same element of moral condemnation, there may exist a greater
danger in punitive cases that unfair procedures will be used
against a defendant who is despised by the public and its officials.
The state's interest in winning a given case, on the other
hand, may be less strong in cases of punishment. The purpose
of punishment, as defined here, is not primarily to "prevent"
crime by keeping dangerous persons off the streets (as might
be the primary purpose of mental health commitment of danger-
ous persons), but rather the revenge of crime and deterrence
of future crime by reason of apprehension of the sanction. The
interest in retribution has to do with public perceptions of fair-
ness in the administration of justice, and although this interest
is essentially immeasurable, it could reasonably be perceived to
be secondary in importance to the need for additional caution
in obtaining convictions. Likewise, the interest in deterrence,
while again obviously important, is perhaps less immediately af-
fected by the outcome in the case of an individual defendant than
are the state interests involved in the quarantine and mental
health laws. If a class of persons who actually committed crimes
were nonetheless acquitted because the case was proved only by
a preponderance but not beyond a reasonable doubt, the impact
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upon future law observance by them and others in the commun-
ity might nonetheless be imperceptible or speculative. Appre-
hension of punishment may well vary more with the perceived
probability of arrest than with the perceived probability of con-
viction after arrest. By contrast, the improper dismissal of a pe-
tition for involuntary commitment or quarantine may more pre-
dictably result in immediate harm to the individual or the sur-
rounding community.
The fifth and sixth amendments can therefore be viewed as
expressing the judgment that the choice between society's and
the defendant's interest should be weighted in the latter's favor
where criminal punishment is involved. Moreover, this policy
of favoring the defendant can be viewed as a function of the
concept of punishment, which, in turn, embodies the goals of
retribution and deterrence. The same general concerns may
underlie the procedural safeguards that apply to civil punish-
ment also.
2. The Ex Post Facto Clause
Justifications for the critical use of "punishment" can also
be found in the ex post facto clause. Retribution is generally
viewed as fair, rather than arbitrary, when applied to voluntary,
knowingly wrongful conduct. 6 6 When an act was not illegal
at the time of its commission it could not have been known to
be wrong, and so our legal system judges retribution inappo-
site.167 Moreover, although sanctions might serve a deterrent
purpose even absent an opportunity to know the act was wrong,
the value of such deterrence may be viewed as outweighed by
the concern for fairness to the individual. By contrast, if pur-
poses of prevention, rehabilitation, or compensation motivate the
sanction, retroactive application scarcely seems arbitrary or un-
just, for fulfillment of those purposes does not necessarily depend
(as does retribution) on whether a wrong was knowingly com-
mitted.
3. Takings Without Just Compensation
With regard to the rule that punitive takings do not infringe
the fifth amendment stricture against taking property without
just compensation, the policy seems to be that where the govern-
166. See generally Slawson, supra note 148.
167. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 12, at 28-53 (dealing with excusing
conditions as opposed to general justifying aims of criminal punishment).
See also L. FuLLER, supra note 148, at 51-635.
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mental purpose is to secure the use of private property for the
state's use and benefit, the state should have to pay for that prop-
erty. Where the taking is intended to punish, payment would
render it painless and thus ineffectual. Consequently, the isola-
tion of retribution or deterrence as a dominant purpose, and the
conclusion that compensation is not one, appropriately serve the
policies of the fifth amendment.
4. The Tenth Amendment
The cases, now mostly outmoded, which held that federal
taxes designed primarily to punish rather than tax certain con-
duct violated states' rights under the tenth amendment 6 s rely
on a finding of penalty in either its primary or its secondary
sense. The basic question was whether the federal government
sought primarily to raise revenue, which was proper, or to exer-
cise the police power, which was not. The police power can be
exercised not only by the imposition of penalties on those who
violate state or federal prohibition, but also by the imposition
of coercive burdens not keyed to violations of law. Hence these
cases (discussed below) 16 9 turn on findings that the Congress
had sought to deter or coerce certain social conduct, whether or
not actually forbidden, by means of its tax law.
5. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
Finally, with regard to the cruel and unusual punishment
clause, the difference between torture by police or prison person-
nel and painful treatment by electric shock in a government
mental hospital apparently lies in the supposed benefits to the
mental patient, the relative immediacy of the state's goal in his
case, and his freedom from stigma.
These, then, are some of the justifications for the use in di-
verse contexts of "punishment" as a key concept in constitutional
adjudication. The remainder of this Article is concerned with
determining how a particular dominant purpose of retribution
or deterrence can be identified, as against other possible purposes,
such as regulation, taxation, rehabilitation, or compensation.
C. IDENTIFYNMG PUNITIVE PURPOSE
It is rather easy to agree with Hart and Packer that if a
given law served only the purposes of retribution and/or deter-
168. See note 246 infra and accompanying text.
169. See note 246 infra.
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rence, that law would be punitive. As a practical matter, how-
ever, few laws can be found which serve only the purposes of
retribution or deterrence. 170  Perhaps physical torture or pil-
lorying are examples. But even the death penalty serves to in-
capacitate dangerous criminals by removing them from society
and thus, under Packer's scheme, "preventing" crime as opposed
to "deterring" it. And incarceration serves not only to incapaci-
tate, but additionally, in theory at least, to rehabilitate.
Consequently, it becomes essential as a practical matter to
find some method by which courts can isolate a "dominant" pur-
pose from among various purposes that a given law, or sanction,
might be said to serve. I would suggest that there are essentially
two ways of going about this. The first is a method that the
Court seems to have adopted, namely, to employ legislative his-
tory to determine the purpose that was uppermost or dominant
in the group psyche of the legislature at the time the statute
was enacted. The second method consists of presuming from the
effects of a law, subject to rebuttal by reference to other effects,
that it is punitive if it demonstrates certain of the indicia of pun-
ishment. This method may perhaps be described as a search for
purpose pure and simple, eschewing the idea of "dominant" pur-
pose, with its overtones of inquiry into legislative history to de-
termine what individual legislators or officials actually had in
mind.
1. Punishment as -a State of Mind: The Court's Approach
The Court's most explicit treatment of the meaning of pun-
ishment appears in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,17'1 which
dealt with the question whether expatriation for draft evasion
constituted punishment, and if so whether such punishment was
constitutionally permissible. The Court listed seven tests, based
on the surface characteristics of statutes, which might serve as
indications of punitive purpose.17 2 After listing these factors,
however, the Court declined to apply them. Instead, it found
"conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal na-
170. Cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965):
It would be archaic to limit the definition of "punishment" to
"retribution." Punishment serves several purposes: retributive,
rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventive. One of the reasons
society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from
inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any
the less punishment.
171. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
172. See text accompanying note 223 infra.
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ture of a statute" in an "objective manifestation of congressional
purpose" contained in the legislative history of the enactment. 173
This same resort to legislative history also characterizes other
cases dealing with punishment. 74 Although in most other con-
texts the Court has criticized the use of legislative history as
a means of determining the constitutional validity of statutes, 75
the Court has stated that an "inquiry into whether the chal-
lenged statute contains the necessary element of punishment"
may be a situation "where the very nature of the constitutional
question requires an inquiry into legislative purpose" by resort
to legislative history. 76
This use of legislative history suggests that the Court views
legislative psychology or motive, in a sense described below, as
the basic ingredient of punishment itself, as alone determining
the "dominant purpose" which Packer describes. 77 This moti-
vational view of punishment doubtless coincides closely with our
own commonsense perceptions. Just as any dog, so it is said,
knows the difference between being kicked and stumbled over,17 8
we sense a sharp difference between being shoved in anger and
being shoved out of the way of an oncoming truck. Quite apart
173. 372 U.S. at 169.
174. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); cf. Helvering
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (where Court inferred legislative intent
not to punish from the fact that the legislature provided for civil proce-
dure).
175. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)(quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)) ("The deci-
sions of this Court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the
assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power
on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the
power to be exerted."); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)
("Judicial inquiries into Congressional motives are at best a hazardous
matter, and when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifesta-
tions it becomes a dubious affair indeed."); United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 326 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("presumed motive
cannot supplant expressed legislative judgment"). See also Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
176. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 n.30 (1968).
177. Legislative motive has been referred to as "the state of mind
of the legislators when they enacted the measure." Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rsv. 1065, 1092 (1969). It has also
been asserted, however, that motivation means the same thing as pur-
pose. Ely, supra note 40, at 1217-21. I view the term as suggesting not
so much a special kind of purpose, but a particular method in consti-
tutional adjudication of determining the purpose of a law-by reference
to legislative history or pure speculation-just as presumptions and
other means of statutory construction constitute more traditional meth-
ods of doing so. See text accompanying notes 180-93 infra.
178. O.W. HoLms, JR., TnE ComnwoN IAw 7 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
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from whether the shove was really necessary to our safety, we
react to the sincerity or mental state of the person who inflicts
the burden. It is his or her animus to which we react. Where
we sense an animus behind the irfliction of pain, even where
an alternate purpose may exist, we may become ambivalent in
our attitude, attempting to determine what the other person
"really meant." Whether or not punishment exists thus fre-
quently depends on the attitude, or the motivation or dominant
purpose, if you will, of the party who imposes the burden in ques-
tion.
This perception of the psychological nature of punishment
seems reasonable enough. However, the Court and commenta-
tors frequently criticize inquiries into legislative motivation on
grounds that such inquiries are both unseemly and inconclusive
in their results.179 Indeed, the Court's inquiries into the puni-
tive or remedial motivation of the various sanctions discussed
at the beginning of this Article are far from consistent. Some-
times these inquiries produce seemingly contradictory conclu-
sions about the motivation of similar-appearing sanctions. At
times the Court also appears uncertain as to the test by which
motivation should be determined. These difficulties partly arise
from the Court's confusion between punitive and criminal laws-
the confusion, described earlier in this Article, which has forced
the Court to strain to hold laws punitive for purposes of certain
constitutional provisions but remedial for purposes of others.
But the difficulties also result from the Court's apparent uncer-
tainty about when and how to inquire into legislative motive.
This Article takes the position that inquiries into punitive
motivation are appropriate, but that the search of legislative his-
tory employed in Mendoza-Martinez is the wrong way to go
about it. A better approach can be found by examining the
Court's decisions in other areas of the law.
The following sections elaborate this hypothesis. First, we
shall examine the distinction between "motivation," which courts
often decline to examine, and "purpose," which courts regularly
do examine. Next, the Article turns to areas of constitutional
adjudication in which courts do inquire into legislative purpose
using a method of analysis which avoids some of the pitfalls asso-
ciated with analysis of the legislative psyche by reference to leg-
islative history. The Article will then attempt to show that the
179. See notes 175 supra, 184 infra.
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method of analysis used in these last-mentioned areas can also
be applied to the issue of punitive purpose.
2. Legislative "Motivation" and Legislative "Purpose"
This discussion begins by suggesting that inquiries into "mo-
tivation," which the Court has condemned, and inquiries into
"purpose," which it has sustained, both aim at determining the
legislative "intent" or general goals of a statute. There is
no difference in kind between goals referred to as "motivation"
and those referred to as "purpose.' ' 80 Rather, the words can be
viewed as labels which signify whether or not the Court deems
180. A distinction has sometimes been drawn between legislative
"purpose," indicating the immediate meaning or application which the
legislature would wish a court to assign to an ambiguous statute, and
legislative "motivation," meaning the general objectives which justify
or explain why a particular interpretation is preferred. See, e.g., Hay-
man, The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation, and the Friendly Critics, 49
CALIF. L. Rnv. 104, 115-16 (1961). For example, if a city council con-
demns land on which a low-income housing development would have
been built, and instead creates a park, the "purpose" of the council's ac-
tion is to create a park. Cf. Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress Dev. Corp.,
22 Ill. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 850 (1961) (first appeal), 26 Ill. 2d 296, 186
N.E.2d 360 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 968 (1963). The "motivation"
here, according to the distinction just cited, might well have been to keep
low-income people out of the community, or perhaps some other objec-
tive.
Other writers have persuasively attacked this distinction, however.
In the first place, "purpose" is frequently used to refer to objectives more
generalized than the specific result illustrated above. See Jones, Statu-
tory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUm. L. REv. 957, 972 (1940)
("The phrase, 'legislative intention,' may be taken to signify the teleolog-
ical concept of legislative purpose, as well as the more immediate con-
cept of legislative meaning.") (emphasis in original). To use a different
example, in determining whether an airplane constitutes a "motor ve-
hicle" within the meaning of a statute, cf. McBoyle v. United States, 283
U.S. 25 (1931), it might be relevant to seek the legislative purpose not
merely in terms of whether key legislators believed airplanes to be in-
cluded, but also-since no one may ever have thought of airplanes at
all-in terms of the general objectives or "purpose" of the statute as well.
So viewed, the distinction between purpose and motivation rests at most
on degrees of generality, with " motivation" referring to somewhat more
general goals than "purpose."
Professor Ely, supra note 40, argues persuasively that this difference
in terms of generality is in fact insignificant. An individual legislator's
reasons for supporting given legislation are inevitably expressed in terms
of the ends that he wishes to see accomplished. Id. at 1217-21. There-
fore, when one speaks of the intent of the legislature as a corporate body,
one tends to express the reasons for the passage of given legislation (mo-
tivation) in terms of the goals or results that the legislature seeks to
accomplish (purpose). Thus the distinction tends to disappear for prac-
tical purposes. Cf. Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional
Adjudication, 83 HAnv. L. REv. 1887, 1887-88 n.1 (1970).
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it appropriate to inquire into the legislature's intent or goals.
This decision turns on the uses for which legislative intent is
sought and the way in which it is to be determined. 8 1
a. Statutory interpretation
Courts frequently use legislative intent to construe an am-
biguous statute. If, for example, a statute specifies that all motor
vehicles shall be licensed, the question may arise whether an air-
plane constitutes a "motor vehicle" for purposes of the statute. 8 2
The Court may then inquire whether the general goal or intent
of the legislature was to raise revenue, which arguably would
involve licensing airplanes, or to ensure traffic safety by regular
inspection and licensing of vehicles, which arguably would pre-
clude licensing airplanes.
Frequently the evidence of the legislature's intent is specu-
lative or even nonexistent. There may be no legislative history,
or the legislative history which does exist may be inconclusive.
Nonetheless, the courts have to reach some decision, and even
speculative evidence about legislative intent may help to tip
the court's decision in one direction or the other. The courts in
effect work in partnership with the legislature to achieve results
which are rational and desirable and which harmonize with the
goals that most legislators probably wished or would have wished
to be served. Consequently, there are no institutional conflicts
between courts and legislatures when courts base their decisions
in part upon speculative legislative history or guesses about what
the legislature desired to accomplish. Indeed, the partnership
exists even when courts fill obvious gaps in a statute by offering,
in the guise of finding legislative intent, their own judgments
about what results are desirable.
181. See generally MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754
(1966). It has been suggested elsewhere that legislative motivation re-
fers to the reasons why individual legislators voted for a given statute,
whereas purpose refers to the ends, determined by objective methods,
that the legislature seeks to achieve by given legislation. See A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGERoUs BRANCH 209-10 (1962); Developments in the Law
-Equal Protection, 82 HAuv. L. REv. 1065, 1091-92 (1969). This Article
takes a generally similar view, except to suggest that both "motivation"
and "purpose" refer to the end or goals which the legislature seeks to
achieve, and that analysis of "purpose" does this by inference from the
effects of legislation, whereas analysis of "motivation" does so by refer-
ence to legislative history or other, generally speculative, indications of
what legislators or officials actually thought as an historical matter.
182. Cf. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (dealing not
with licenses but with ijnterstate transportation of Stolen vehicles).
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b. Constitutional validity
Although courts are willing to rely on even a speculative
assessment of legislative purpose based on legislative history in
order to interpret a statute, such inquiries are generally con-
demned as a means to invalidate a statute. Courts are generally
bound by the presumption that statutes or regulations are con-
stitutional unless the opposite is demonstrated in some compel-
ling way. Although one legislative purpose may be more likely
than another, and therefore helpful for purposes of interpreta-
tion, courts are naturally reluctant to conclude, absent highly
persuasive evidence, that only one generalized purpose can rea-
sonably be said to underlie a given statute, so as to impeach
its constitutionality. When courts are asked to hold a statute
unconstitutional on the basis of inconclusive evidence of pur-
pose, they frequently refer to such speculative purpose as "moti-
vation."
3. "Motivation": The Improper Use of Legislative History or
Other Speculative Evidence of Intent to Invalidate a Statute
The reasons why legislative history constitutes only an im-
perfect indicator of general purpose, and the reasons why it
therefore does not normally serve as an adequate basis to invali-
date statutes or regulations have been well stated by the Su-
preme Court'88 and its critics, 8 4 and I reiterate them here only
by way of summary.
First, there may exist no single purpose at all, much less
a discoverable one, with regard to a given statute. The very idea
of intent or purpose is based on a model of the individual psyche
which is only approximated, more closely in some cases than
others, in group decisionmaking. The legislature has no psyche
except in the sense of a consensus of individuals, and this con-
sensus may or may not exist with regard to given legislation,
even among those who supported it. 8 5 Different legislators
may support a law for different reasons. Indeed, any given legis-
lator may simultaneously entertain two or more motives in vot-
ing for a bill. 86 And as Justice Frankfurter has indicated, the
183. See note 175 supra.
184. See Ely, supra note 40, at 1212-17; MacCallum, supra note 181.
But see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. Rnv. 95, 119-30.
185. See A. KocouRnK, Aw INTRODUCTION TO =an SCIENCE OF LAW 207
(1930); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. Rsv. 863, 870 (1930).
186. See Ely, supra note 40, at 1213-14.
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executive's motive for signing a bill into law may be entirely
different from that of the legislature in passing it-yet should
be no less relevant to the act's purpose.5 7 All this is not to
say, of course, that a recognizable consensus about the purpose
of legislation does not exist in many cases.1 8 8 Courts do and
must assume that laws are purposive and that certain effects
were intended by the legislature. 8 9 As a practical matter,
187. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324-27 (1946) (concurring
opinion).
188. In certain cases the majority of the legislature may very well
have had a given purpose or explanation for a statute in mind when they
voted for a law. Cf. Jones, supra note :[80, at 968-70; MacCallum, supra
note 181, at 784-85. I would suggest, however, that because legislative
intent is generally not judicially measurable, even if it is conceptually
definable in the first place, the explanation which a court calls the leg-
islative intent or purpose is an explanation arrived at by independent
judicial means and then attributed to the legislature.
189. Although this assertion invites a jurisprudential demonstration
which the scope of this Article does not afford, the outline of an argu-
ment can be sketched. I would start with the proposition that when the
application of legal rules to a specific fact situation is unclear, judges
normally repair to some general explanation of the goals of the statute
and then demonstrate why a given outcome in the case at bar would
or would not advance those goals. Cf. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HAv.
L. REV. 1057 (1975). Under this view, an explanation of the goals of
a given law is essential to its application to unclear cases.
Dworkin further suggests that in order for the explanation of goals,
and therefore the legal application, to be persuasive and politically ac-
ceptable, the choice of explanation by the judge needs to be defensible
in terms other than the judge's individual feelings or persuasions. Where
several possible explanations (or principles, as Dworkin terms them in
common-law adjudication) present themselves, the judge justifies his
choice among them by reference to the community's standards of politi-
cal morality. Cf. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 243-49
(1973). When the issue involves an interpretation of statutory law, the
judge justifies his choice of policies by stating the one that seems to him
most logical or persuasive and attributing that choice to the legislature.
One can see these judicial attributions of legal explanations to commu-
nity standards or to the legislature as genuflections to the "rules of adju-
dication and recognition" that convey to judges their authority in the
first place. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCErT OF LAW 77-96 (1961).
Hence, when a judge suggests an explanation of the goals of a given
law-the purpose of that law, if you will-he or she usually does not
only argue that his or her explanation is the most desirable one possible,
but also that the legislature, has at least by implication, chosen or in-
tended that explanation. Absent such an imputation of choice or intent
to the legislature, the court arguably violates the "rule of recognition,"
which authorizes it to declare "rights," and instead offers an undemo-
cratic, and essentially unauthorized, choice of goals. The argument that
this imputation is sometimes fictitious and arguably unnecessary does
not refute the fact that it regularly occurs. See Wellington, supra, at
262-64.
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however, any law that can serve more than one purpose may
have also been intended by various people (or any one of them)
to serve more than one purpose.
Second, even if a consensus did to some extent exist about
a given law's purpose, that consensus may as an historical matter
be difficult to ascertain. Determination of legislative intent by
reference to committee reports and floor debates necessarily de-
pends on the words of a few members of the legislature. In state
legislatures even this indication of legislative intent may be
lacking.
Third, if the Court does strike down a law on the basis of
legislative history which shows that it was passed for the wrong
reason, presumably there is nothing to prevent the legislature
from reenacting the same law with a "laundered" legislative his-
tory, thus rendering futile the court's action. 90
Fourth, the Court has declined to invalidate laws serving
useful purposes simply because they were passed for the wrong
reasons. To do so would be to invalidate useful laws in order
merely to chasten legislative immorality.' 9'
And finally, it has been suggested that it would be constitu-
tionally inappropriate for the Supreme Court to invalidate the
actions of the coordinate branches of government by cross-exam-
ining their motives and thereby demeaning their dignity.' 92
For these reasons courts are properly reluctant to rely on
legislative history as an indication of invalid purpose where the
statute also demonstrably furthers one or more valid goals. The
Supreme Court has likewise declined to invalidate legislation
where its effects, quite apart from legislative history, inconclu-
sively suggest both good and bad purposes. Again, the Court
In summary, statutory purpose can be equated with an explanation
of the general goals that the statute should be understood to serve. And
because the choice of explanations must itself be justified by reference
to rules authorizing the choice, the court attributes that choice, however
determined, to the legislature itself.
190. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) ("[Tlhere
is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because
of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is struck down for this
reason, rather than because of its facial content or effect, it would pre-
sumably be valid as soon as the legislature or other relevant governing
body repassed it for different reasons."); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
191. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CAL=. L. REv. 341, 360 (1949).
192. A, BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRAwcH 215 (1962).
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has condemned such speculation about intent based on effects as
inquiry into "motivation.'198
4. Inquiry into Legislative "Purpose" Under the Equal
Protection Clause and the First Amendment
Despite all of these problems with determining the legisla-
ture's general goals or intent by reference to legislative history
or other speculative sources, the Court routinely assesses these
goals under the rubric of "purpose" in determining claims of
equal protection violation. 94 The Court's decisions in the first
amendment area can likewise be viewed as turning on determina-
tions of purpose, and indeed, as shown below, the Court's opin-
ions frequently use that language.
Just as the meaning of punishment has to do with the sub-
ject's perception of a kind of animus on the part of the punisher,
so the meaning of invidious discrimination in the law of equal
protection involves a perception of animus and a corresponding
moral affront. As stated by Tussman and tenBroek,
It is difficult to see that anything else is involved in the discrim-
inatory legislative cases than questions of motivation. Hostility,
antagonism, prejudice-these surely can be predicated not of
laws but of men; they are attitudes, states of mind, feelings, and
they are qualities of law-makers, not of laws.195
Moreover, in dealing with equal protection claims, the term "pen-
alty" has been used to characterize an unconstitutional discrim-
ination against a given class.1 16 The Court also uses "penalty"
193. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); cf. United
States v. O'Brien, 391 US. 367, 383 (1968) (citing Arizona v. California,
283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)).
194. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1065, 1091-92 (1969).
195. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 191, at 358 (footnote omitted).
See also Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreward: On Pro-
tecting The Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV.
7, 49 (1969):
The peculiar evil of a relative deprivation (read "discrimination"
or "nonevenhandedness") is psychic or moral; it consists of an
affront; it is immediately injurious insofar as resented or taken
personally, and consequently injurious insofar as demoralizing.
196. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974) (Marshall, J.); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1174-75 (1969) (footnote omitted):
Unlike "intelligence" and "physical deformities," however,
"race," "lineage," and "poverty" are not in common experience
connected with lack of merit or performance.... [W]here it
seems highly implausible that a correlation exists, stricter re-
view is required to dispel the natural suspicion-buttressed by
reason and experience-that whenever that trait is used to single
out a group for unfavorable treatment, the state is applying pen-
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to characterize improper burdens placed on fundamental rights
such as those set forth in the first amendment.197
Yet the Court has structured its search for "purpose" in these
areas in a way which avoids ultimate reliance on legislative his-
tory and systematizes the search for legislative purpose.
With respect first of all to equal protection claims, it has
been stated that "the 'purpose' of a measure is generally only
a legal abstraction attributed to the statute by the courts; it de-
notes the permissible objective which the legislature might have
had in enacting the statute. Finding a statute's 'purpose' does
not usually involve inquiry into the legislators' 'motives.' "198
The courts determine "purpose" by deciding first whether a law
can be suspected more or less strongly of serving constitutionally
improper goals, and then by requiring the government to rebut
that evidence of impropriety with an adequate demonstration
that the law is necessary to the achievement of some proper gov-
ernmental purpose. Some indicia of improper purpose, such as
a racial classification contained in a statute, are so suspect that
the courts generally require a demonstration of "compelling"
state interest to rebut the inference of impropriety.199 Other
alties simply for the sake of penalties, with the accompanying
suggestion of imputed inferiority.
197. See note 158 supra.
198. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1065, 1091 (1969). It might be more accurate to say that purpose analy-
sis does draw conclusions about the legislature's corporate goals or 'mo-
tives," but does so without exploring the historical record to determine
the mind-set of particular legislators.
199. Classifications are suspect precisely because they are likely to
have resulted from animus or arbitrary bias. Classifications based on
race, alienage, or illegitimacy generally affect a group that has tradition-
ally been subjected to irrational hostility and disadvantage and has
lacked the political ability to counter that bias. See note 196 supra. See
also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Tussman & tenBroek,
supra note 191. By deeming such classifications suspect, the law effec-
tively incorporates the presumption that such laws are invidiously dis-
criminatory and requires the state to rebut that presumption by adducing
a compelling justification for the discrimination. No justification which
is not "compelling" will be accepted. If the interest is "compelling," the
state must show that the burden is necessary to serve that interest, and
does so in a direct fashion. If, for example, the state seeks to bar minor-
ity group members from public facilities and justifies that ban on
grounds that minority group members are violent and unruly, the state
would have to explain why it did not word its law to include all those
persons who are violent and unruly, regardless of minority status, and
only those persons who are violent and unruly, again regardless of mi-
nority status. See id. at 346-48; Developments in the Law-Equal Pro-
tection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1084-87 (1969).
This same process of presumption and rebuttal occurs not only
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
suggestions of an impermissible legislative or administrative pur-
pose, such as evidence of a disproportionately low number of
blacks on a jury panel, do not involve explicit statutory classifi-
cations. Such evidence of bad purpose may perhaps be rebutted
by the state with only a demonstration that some rational expla-
nation for the discrepancy exists, so that no racial classification
exists and the question of "compelling" interest is not reached.200
where suspect classifications appear but also where "fundamental inter-
ests" are involved. If it is shown that a law serves to impair the funda-
mental right to travel by denying nonemergency medical services to
newly arrived state residents, for example, then the state must demon-
strate that it has implemented its valid underlying purpose (providing
such medical services only to those who can pay for them, for example)
not only as to new arrivals but also as to long-time residents. Absent such
a demonstration, the law is discriminatory because it singles out for a
burden that vulnerable group of persons who have recently exercised
their fundamental right to enter the state. Cf. Memorial Hosp. v. Mar-
icopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HAuv. L. REv. 7, 40-47 (1969).
200. See Ely, supra note 40, at 1263-66. Professor Ely has suggested
a slightly different role for the term "motivation" than that in this Ar-
ticle. He points out that there are certain areas, such as selection of
individuals for jury service, where the government must exercise random
selection, and other areas, such as choice of school curricula, where the
government necessarily makes discretionary value judgments with re-
spect to which very few restraints are imposed. Id. at 1230-37. Where
a "motivation" to accomplish particular results can be "demonstrated"
in these areas, the government can be viewed as having voluntarily in-jected a rational choice into a normally irrational or discretionary area,
and the government must then defend its action in rational terms. Id.
at 1237-54.
However, at the beginning of his article, Ely states that legislative
motivation and legislative purpose are conceptually indistinguishable in
terms of the goals they describe. Id. at 1217-21. Some confusion may
result from this identification when Ely subsequently argues that a
"demonstration" of illicit motivation should then trigger judicial scrutiny
of the law to discover whether it serves some valid state interest. This
language seems to suggest that '"motivation" can sometimes be deter-
mined when "purpose" cannot. Yet Ely subsequently recognizes that
"alternative explanations [of legislative or administrative goals] will
often render impossible a responsible inference of illicit motivation." Id.
at 1267-69. If this is true, then motivation can be isolated no more easily
than purpose; it is simply another name for legislative goals. These
goals can be established as "purpose," or else they remain inchoate. And
it is hardly novel to state that when the goals of a statute or rule can
be isolated with some certainty as "purpose," the constitutionality of the
statute or rule must be judged in terms of that purpose.
It seems to me that Professor Ely's valid contribution might be
stated somewhat more intelligibly and simply in terms of traditional
purpose analysis. Ely appears to argue that some laws which do not
explicitly create a suspect classification, and do not explicitly burden a
fundamental interest, may nonetheless be suspected of serving an invalid
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In either case, the question whether the law serves a compelling
or otherwise valid state purpose may be tested by asking whether
the law is narrowly drafted and administered to serve the proper
purpose asserted, or whether, to the contrary, it is over- or under-
inclusive with regard to that purpose.20 1
Similar analysis takes place in the first amendment area.
Laws which clearly set out to penalize certain kinds of speech
(such as advocacy of overthrow of government, or libel) may
be justified only by a showing that the regulation is necessary
because the language in question generates a clear and immediate
danger that some substantial harm will result.20 2  But a ques-
tion also often arises whether the purpose of a given law actually
is to regulate or penalize expression, or whether the law serves
some other valid purpose, in which case the law need not be justi-
fied in the manner just cited. Various disabilities such as denial
of public employment 203 or union office 20 4 to communists, for
example, have been upheld or stricken depending upon the
purpose because of the way the law actually works. A jury selection
law, neutral on its face, which results in a disproportionately low number
of blacks on jury panels might constitute an example. Because the "sus-
picion" of improper legislative goals here is weaker than the "presump-
tion" of such which attends an explicit classification by race, the rebuttal
of the inference can also be by means less persuasive than the demon-
stration of a "compelling state interest." In the above example, the sus-
picion of improper purpose might be rebutted simply by showing that
the techniques of jury selection were reasonably fair and impartial, and
that more blacks than whites claimed exemption or were ineligible for
neutral reasons. Cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Failure
to make such a "reasonable," if not compelling, explanation would
invalidate the law. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Likewise, in the first amendment area, a law that prohibits the mutila-
tion or destruction of draft cards arouses some suspicion that this appar-
ently innocuous regulation may actually have been passed solely to pe-
nalize a popular and rebellious form of speech. United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968). Such suspicion, though relatively weak, should at
least, according to Ely, require the government to rebut it by demonstrat-
ing that the law serves some valid purpose, albeit not a compelling one.
This analysis seems to constitute an intelligent and useful improve-
ment upon the "two-tier" view of equal protection, see note 209 infra.
However, it might be semantically clearer to indicate that "motivation"
here is used to refer not to purpose, or even to a method of discovering
purpose by reference to legislative history, but rather to a suspicion of
"bad" purpose which requires some governmental demonstration of rea-
sonableness.
201. Cf. note 209 infra.
202. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964)
(libel); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (advocacy of over-
throw).
203. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
204. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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adequacy of the state's demonstration that the law serves some
valid purpose other than burdening expression. Where no ade-
quate interest exists, or where there exists some less burdensome
alternative, the regulation has been stricken as "overbroad. ' 20 5
Significantly, such overbroad regulations have also been referred
to from time to time as "penalties" on the exercise of free
speech.20 6 And in one case, United States v. Brown,20 7 an
overbroad ban upon union membership was explicitly held to
constitute punishment of Communist Party members for pur-
poses of the bill of attainder clause. Yet whether these cases
speak of the existence of some less burdensome alternative, or
of the deterrent, and therefore penal, purpose of the burden, or
of the deterrent effect of the burden (chill on first amendment
205. The term "overbreadth" has two uses, which I do not wish
to confuse. The use to which I do not refer is the doctrine that
certain laws that reach beyond their proper regulatory scope and there-
fore abridge first amendment rights will be stricken by the Court even
where the conduct or speech of the party raising the claim is not neces-
sarily privileged from regulation under a properly drawn law. See gen-
erally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAv. L.
Rnv. 844 (1970). This doctrine deals largely with questions of standing
to raise jus tertii.
Rather, my reference to overbreadth concerns the separate question
whether the law affects speech or association in a manner not justified
by a proper state purpose. As stated in Note, Less Drastic Means and
the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 469 (1969): "Any sensible con-
struction of the first amendment would forbid a legislature to go out
of its way to inhibit expression, either by design or accident, and the
choice of the harsher of equally effective means suggests that suppres-
sion of speech was the legislature's real purpose from the start." This
same logic obtains even where adoption of the less drastic alternative
does involve some costs. For example, a law prohibiting the employ-
ment of Communists in defense plants may be viewed as overbroad, and
hence as penalizing free speech, because the legitimate interest in pre-
venting sabotage or espionage could be achieved by the narrower and
less burdensome means of barring only active Communists from certain
sensitive positions or installations. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967). Likewise, the valid interest in preventing advocacy in the
public schools of overthrow of the government may be protected more
narrowly than by disqualifying any person with Communist affiliations
from teaching. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). On
the other hand, where no less burdensome alternative exists, the statute
will be upheld. See, e.g, United States Civil Serv. Corm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (Hatch Act adequately de-
fines political activities forbidden to federal employees because of danger
of politicization of civil service); Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) (bar examiners may legit-
imately ask whether applicants have belonged to subversive organiza-
tions as a prelude to questioning active membership and presence or
lack of good moral character).
206. See note 158 supra.
207. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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rights), the method of analysis remains constant: is some valid,
regulatory purpose served by the burden placed on a fundamen-
tal right, so that the burden is justified? If some less burden-
some alternative exists, then the regulation is overbroad, and
because the overbreadth serves no valid purpose, it can be
described as punitive of the exercise of free speech. 208
In summary, in the law of equal protection and first amend-
ment law alike, the less-burdensome-alternative test and the
rule against over- or under-inclusive laws both indicate a search
for animus or improper purpose with regard to specific groups
or interests. The possibility of animus or arbitrariness is indi-
cated by the very existence of a classification or a burden that
focuses on an ethnic group or on persons who have exercised a
"fundamental" and hence vulnerable right. This perception of
possibly improper purpose then frames the question hypothet-
ically addressed by the court to the legislature: if your intent is
not to discriminate against that group for invalid reasons, then
why did you not serve your alternate purpose as directly as pos-
sible, rather than in a way which unnecessarily burdens such
particular groups? Indeed, the very failure of the legislature to
serve valid purposes as directly as possible-that is, the over- or
under-inclusiveness of the law-may be the very factor which
creates a disproportionate burden on a protected group and causes
a court to initiate its investigation of purpose in the first place. 20
9
208. The question whether a fundamental right is affected and the
question whether a compelling state interest exists thus merge. As set
forth in Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Cate-
gorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. RaV.
1482 (1975), a law that prohibits flag desecration may not be viewed
in the first place as a law burdening freedom of speech unless its purpose
is shown to be the regulation of speech. And this demonstration, in turn,
may rely on a showing that the legislature declined to implement its
alternative justification (preventing the confusion of well-known sym-
bols) on a basis that would reach not only the flag, but also other sym-
bols. If such a law is viewed as under-inclusive with regard to its valid
justifying purpose, it may be seen as an attempt to penalize a particular
exercise of the right of free speech. Thus the question whether this is
a statute aimed at regulating speech depends on the analysis of a nar-
rowly served alternative purpose.
209. See note 208 supra. Although the Court has sometimes failed to
recognize the fact, the threshold question whether a suspect classification
exists itself depends on scrutiny of the law for alternative, valid pur-
poses. It is partly this lack of recognition (along with a restrictive choice
of suspect classes) which exposes the traditional "two-tier" equal pro-
tection standard to the accusation that the threshold question of strict or
minimal scrutiny necessarily determines the outcome of the case. Accord-
ing to critics of the traditional formula, strict scrutiny inevitably results
in condemnation of the challenged law, and minimal scrutiny always
upholds it. See, e.g., Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreward:
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This method of determining the intention of the legislature
by reference to rules and presumptions based on statutory effects
avoids the fallacy that a true legislative consensus can be reliably
known as an historical fact, whether by reference to legislative
history or other speculative evidence. Rather, the use of specu-
lative "motivational" evidence serves at most to create a sus-
picion of improper purpose and therefore to require the govern-
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAav. L. Rnv. 1, 8 (1972) ("The Warren
Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations evoked the
aggressive 'new' equal protection, with scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory
and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential 'old' equal protection
reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."
(footnote omitted)).
However, it can be argued that the Court's determination whether
to apply strict scrutiny itself depends on its analysis of the under-
or over-inclusiveness of the law with respect to a proper state pur-
pose. Thus in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court
may have overturned the statute less because the "privacy" interest out-
weighed any noncompelling interest of the state than because the only
possible reasons for denying contraceptives to married people, apart from
the suspicion of an invidious religious reason, were so tenuous that they
seem not to have been seriously argued.
Similarly, the determination of whether a law creates a suspect
classification or abridges a recognized protected interest-the precondi-
tion for the exercise of "strict scrutiny"--may depend on an initial exam-
ination of the law's under- or over-inclusiveness with respect to a proper,
alternative state purpose. In the equal protection area, a law that pur-
ports to regulate laundries for purposes of fire protection (usually a kind
of regulation not subject to strict scrutiny) may nonetheless be strictly
scrutinized if the law is enforced in a racially oriented manner that can-
not be explained in functional, nonracial terms. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886). Similarly, facially neutral voter-registration tests
may be strictly scrutinized if an initial scrutiny indicates that they are
applied only to blacks and are therefore under-inclusive by reference to
their alleged purpose. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). And in the
first amendment area, a facially neutral law that purports to regulate
public school students' dress but in fact regulates only clothing with
symbolic significance, such as armbands, clearly constitutes a regulation
of speech rather than conduct, by reason of its under-inclusiveness, so
that strict scrutiny attaches. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969).
This merging of the strict scrutiny of a statute with the suspect na-
ture of the classification which purportedly triggers that scrutiny ap-
pears to underlie Professor Ely's thesis regarding motivation, supra note
200. Briefly stated, some indications of possibly invidious legislative
purpose (such as a disproportionately low number of blacks on a jury
panel) raise some suspicion of invidious legislative purpose, but less sus-
picion than the literal presumption of bad purpose that a facially dis-
criminatory law creates. Consequently the suspicion raised can be re-
butted or put to rest by a rational rather than a compelling state interest.
See note 200 supra.
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ment to adduce countervailing evidence that the legislation
serves proper goals.210 This approach avoids in general the other
major problems of invalidating statutes on the sole basis of
legislative history. The Court avoids striking down a statute
which serves good purposes simply because the Court believes
that the legislators had the wrong goals in mind. Nor could a
law once stricken simply be reenacted with a "laundered" legisla-
tive history.
As should be clear, this rules-and-presumptions test does not
rest on what could be called a "finding" of actual, historical legis-
lative purpose. It remains to ask therefore whether the charac-
terization of this test in terms of "purpose" adds anything to a
simple determination whether the effects of the statute are good
or bad, quite apart from any "purpose" or goals the legislature
might have had in mind in enacting the statute. Arguablkj, refer-
ence to "purpose" is merely a rhetorical flourish appended to a
balancing test.
For example, it might be argued that in a typical first
amendment case all the purpose test does is to balance the bur-
den on the protected interest against an allegedly necessary ob-
jective. Assume a law that requires all applicants for member-
ship in the bar to state whether they have ever been members of
the Communist Party. In applying its purpose test to such a law,
the Court may simply be weighing the burden on first amend-
ment interests against the danger to the state which would result
from the "less burdensome alternative" of determining "moral
character" without the help of such a required revelation.211
To call the existing law "penal" or "invidious" if the balance tips
in favor of first amendment rights is arguably of merely rhetori-
cal value. Could not the result be stated solely in terms of ef-
fect-that a burden on first amendment rights will be tolerated
only if that burden is necessary to some valid and compelling
state interest?
This explanation oversimplifies what the Court actually
does in cases of first amendment balancing. First of all, the
210. For development of this theory by Professor Ely see note 200
supra. Brest, supra note 184, also argues that circumstantial evidence,
as well as legislative history or overt statements of administrators, may
signify an improper motivation which in turn should compel the state
to justify the statute by demonstrating that it serves some "compelling"
state interest. Id. at 118.
211. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond,
401 U.S. 154 (1971).
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extent to which the Court will conclude that a given law
is "necessary" to some compelling state interest, or that a less-
burdensome-alternative should be adopted instead, seems to vary
with the extent to which the Court thinks the enactment suspi-
cious in its purpose. In the first amendment area, such suspicion
may explain in part why the Court is more critical of attempts
to regulate political than commercial speech,212 or of libel laws
applied to speech directed at public figures as opposed to private
figures.2 13 The distinction, I submit, lies not so much in the fact
that one kind of speech is necessarily more or less valuable than
another, but in the fact that regulation of speech is more likely
to be purposefully and deliberately hostile in one area as opposed
to the other.
Similarly in the equal protection area, a law which forbids
the lease of advertising space on trucks, but not the posting of
advertising on a company's own trucks, is effectively presumed
to draw a permissible distinction between the two.21 4  Where
a distinction is based on race or alienage or illegitimacy, however,
the Court critically examines the law for over- or under-inclu-
siveness and searches for less burdensome alternatives. If the
equal protection clause is interpreted simply to ban laws which
have no justification, it seems difficult to explain this difference
in treatment. The legislature is theoretically capable of passing
arbitrary laws that achieve no worthwhile effects, in almost
any area of regulation and with regard to almost any group of
people. The simplest and most straightforward explanation of
the reason for strict scrutiny, surely, is that arbitrary burdens
have historically been imposed with some frequency upon certain
groups, not as a result of accident or oversight, but as a result
of purpose and animus. Indeed, the Court has recognized as
much.215  Much the same explanation-that legislatures and
officials have frequently sought purposely to suppress unpopular
expression-helps to explain why strict scrutiny applies in first
amendment cases as well.
212. See Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The problems
with arguing that the distinction exists because commercial speech is
"valueless" appear in Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 429 (1971).
213. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
214. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
215. See the discussion of factors influencing the Court's determina-
tion that a classification is "suspect" in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684-88 (1973).
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In addition, therefore, to helping explain why strict scrutiny
applies in some cases but not others, reference to purpose can
be helpful in explaining why a law which is necessary to some
"compelling" state interest can overcome first amendment rights
without a further balancing of that compelling interest against
the first amendment interest. The balancing test itself fails to
explain this phenomenon. Why, for example, should the interest
of a bar association,2 16 legislature,217 or grand jury218 in gathering
information necessarily serve to overcome first amendment
interests in free association, assuming that a given law is essen-
tial to the gathering of that information? Why should the inter-
est in compensating libel victims ever override the right to free
speech? 219 These are the questions that Justices Douglas and
Black, the first amendment "absolutists," have asked with no bet-
ter answer than that the Court's balancing has determined that
the compelling interests in question were in fact more compelling
than first amendment interests.220 This unexplained and inex-
plicable balancing has also been attacked by various commenta-
tors who would not necessarily reach Justices Black's and Doug-
las's results.2 21
Reference to purpose can help to explain this phenomenon.
If the Court in fact believes that laws should be stricken only
if they have a "bad" purpose, then laws should be upheld where
convincing demonstration of a neutral purpose makes it impossi-
ble to conclude that the purpose is "bad." This view could be
defended in terms of the Court's institutional role. Congress
and the state legislatures are the initial judges of the consti-
tutionality of legislation. So long as these bodies do not pur-
posely attempt to penalize protected interests or groups, the
Court might well desire to avoid the intuitive and imponderable
judgment that a state interest that is valid nonetheless fails to
216. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401
U.S. 154 (1971).
217. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
218. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
219. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967), the majority, per Chief
Justice Warren, declared it inappropriate for the Court ever to balance
first amendment interests against other proper legislative interests, and
stated that the Court would uphold laws narrowly drafted to serve such
proper interests despite their impact on speech.
220. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 355 (1974) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959)
(Black, J., dissenting).
221. See Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor
Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1963).
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prevail over freedom of speech and assembly. Absent purposeful
interference with first amendment freedoms, the Court may wish
to trust the wisdom and good faith of the people's representa-
tives.
Viewing constitutional adjudication in terms of the Court's
policing of legislative purpose obviously does not preclude recog-
nition of a balancing approach, or of the fact that balancing is
involved in the very determination of legislative purpose. To
be sure, if the Court is to decide whether state investigation of
communists constitutes a less burdensome alternative means to
achieving a given purpose than requiring persons to divulge their
own past communist affiliations, the Court must weigh the cost
to the state involved in adopting the alternative. A law is
"necessary" to some compelling state interest depending on the
outcome of this balancing. But because this balancing in-
volves more specific factors and narrower value choices, the
Court avoids the cosmic and uncertain judgements entailed in
balancing such imponderables as free speech and national secu-
rity.
5. Application of the First Amendment and Equal Protection
Tests to the Issue of "Punishment"
It is possible to apply the test of purpose developed in the
first amendment and equal protection areas in determining
whether punishment is the "dominant purpose" of legislation.
22 2
Instead of searching out a purpose to burden protected interests
or .groups, as it does with regard to the first two areas, the Court
would instead search out a dominant purpose of retribution or
deterrence. Setting aside for the moment the question whether
this approach would be proper and desirable, let us first examine
how such a test might work.
The first amendment and equal protection test of purpose
begins with identification of a certain type of classification or
burden regarding a given class or interest, which triggers the
presumption of improper motive. An inquiry into punitive pur-
pose requires some threshold test which would identify what
might be termed a prima facie purpose to punish.
222. Professor Charney, supra note 7, has suggested a similar
method of testing punitive purpose, although he uses it to conclude, con-
trary to the view expressed in this Article, that a finding of punitive
purpose automatically renders the sanction "criminal" for all constitu-
tional purposes.
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Although it did not use it, the plurality in Mendoza-Martinez
offered a set of considerations which may supply such a test.
This set of considerations is as follows:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable to
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry and may often
point in differing directions.223
It is worthwhile to examine briefly just why these various tests
"often point in differing directions" and then to question whether
they may be reassembled into a workable test.
The first factor, whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint, is virtually meaningless except to deter-
mine whether a burden exists. Any burden can be viewed as
an affirmative disability or restraint 224-the obligation to pay
taxes on the one hand or criminal fines on the other; confinement
in a hospital for treatment or in a prison for punishment; depri-
vation of a driver's license for reasons of recrimination or
blindness. The question whether the sanction involves an affir-
mative disability or restraint is better simplified to whether there
is a sanction at all-or in H.L.A. Hart's terms, whether there
is "pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant."
However important such a question may be to a complete
definition of punishment, in the context of adjudication it always
exists. For assuming that punishment can exist without a sanc-
tion (and I can think of no case falling outside Hart's definition),
such punishment would certainly not be of any practical or legal
concern.
223. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1965) (foot-
notes omitted).
224. Like many other terms involved in this Article, "affirmative
disability or restraint" lacks any formal definition by the Court and in-
vites further discussion that is beyond the scope of this Article. Briefly,
however, I would assert that the term "affirmative" means nothing ex-
cept perhaps the notion that the government has acted to create a bur-
den or restraint that would not otherwise exist; that is, that the govern-
ment has imposed a sanction.
The terms "disability" and "restraint" both suggest a limitation on
private rights. Absent a distinction between negative restraints and pos-
itive compulsions (such as that to pay a fine), which would serve no
apparent purpose in this context, such a limitation on private rights
seems to add nothing to the concept of "purposive burden" or "sanction."
19761
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Whether a sanction has historically been regarded as punish-
ment likewise advances our inquiry very little, except perhaps
with regard to such outmoded sanctions as whipping or pillory-
ing, which serve no evident purpose other than punishment in
the sense of retribution and deterrence. But for most purposes,
the sanction in question can serve and historically has served
both penal and nonpenal purposes. Incarceration, deportation,
and exactions of money may all be punishments in certain con-
texts but not in others. Again, all this test really does is ask
whether the sanction can be used as punishment. The answer
in nearly every case is that it can, and that its punitive status
depends on the purpose of its author or enforcer. But the test
is not itself purposive.
The same problem inheres in the Court's fourth test, whether
the sanction's operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence. Again, any sanction which
is truly burdensome or severe will produce aversion in the person
to whom it is applied and therefore may act as a deterrent and
satisfy the need for revenge. The only exception, I presume, is
a nonaversive sanction, like the briar patch for B'rer Rabbit. I
recognize that the words retribution and deterrence here imply
that the sanction is meant to reach purposive conduct and to af-
fect moral culpability, 25 but these implications are more di-
rectly reached by other tests that the Court suggests.
These three tests, then, are not helpful simply because they
do not address the purposive nature of punishment. They ask
whether a given sanction could be used for punitive purposes,
and the answer is almost universally "yes," for almost any sanc-
tion can be punitive and there are a very few which probably
serve no other purpose at all.
The rest of the Court's tests are closer to the mark. If we
combine the third and fifth tests-whether the sanction comes
into play only on a showing of scienter and whether the behavior
to which the sanction is applied is already a crime-we find the
seeds of an important concept, namely, that a primary function
of punishment is to burden purposive conduct which the state
225. Deterrence I understand generally as a purposive ordering of
conscious choices by means of the threat of sanctions. See H. PACKER,
supra note 12, at 39-48. Retribution has been seen as a moral imperative
that wrongful actions should be burdened or redressed. The underlying
notion of moral culpability reflects the assumption that an individual can
choose whether to participate in unlawful conduct. See id. at 71-79;
H.L.A. HART, supra note 12, at 113-35; Hart, The Aims of the CriminaI
Law, 23 LAW & CoNTEWVIP. P.oB, 401, 408-11 (1958),
[Vol. 60:379
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES
desires not to occur. The deterrent aspect of punishment de-
pends on the idea that people can be discouraged from commit-
ting a proscribed act by the prospect of a resulting sanction. Like-
wise, the retributive aspect of punishment depends at least on
a notion of offense, and normally also on the notion of purposive
offense or culpability.
226
What the Court has done here is to suggest that where the
sanction attaches by reason of a purposive, forbidden act, there
may very well be a punitive purpose underlying the sanction.22 7
I think that this observation is useful. Before pursuing it, how-
ever, it is worthwhile to observe its limitations. In the first place
there are punitive sanctions which involve purposive acts but not
scienter. Strict liability crimes are one example.228 So are for-
feitures of goods used to commit illegal acts, where the owner
is innocent not only of intent to commit the offense, but even
of knowledge that the offense did or would occur.22 9 The sig-
nificance of punishment in both cases, however, is that it bur-
dens not the offense of committing the proscribed act, but
the offense of not taking adequate pains to guard against
it. Perhaps it can be argued here that the law presumes scienter
in strict liability situations, in that the punished party knew that
he could have taken steps which he did not take in order to pre-
226. See note 225 supra.
227. Hart, of course, suggests that the general limitation of punish-
ment to purposive acts is required not by the nature of the goals of pun-
ishment (Hart's "General Justifying Aims"), be they retribution and
deterrence or others, but by concepts of fairness to individuals. H.L.A.
HART, supra note 12, at 11-24. Packer attempts to demonstrate that the
same notions of individual fairness are also reflected in the goals or Jus-
tifying Aims of retribution and deterrence. H. PAcKM, supra note 12,
at 65-66. In either case, the limitation serves to characterize the way
in which punishment normally applies.
228. "Strict liability" is a term capable of two meanings which I
hope not to confuse. As set forth below, the Court tends to view for-
feitures of property used to commit illegal acts as a kind of strict liabil-
ity, so that the forfeiture is valid even if the property owner did not
know of the illegal use by someone else and was not in any way directly
responsible. See text accompanying note 296 infra. Nonetheless, the
Court has suggested that a modicum of responsibility or fault must
exist: if the owner has done everything reasonably possible to guard
against the illegal use, the forfeiture may be avoidable. Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974).
A second kind of strict liability is that which is imposed when the
person punished not only lacked mens rea but also could not reasonably
have avoided the event that prompts the punishment. See H.L.A. HART,
supra note 12, at 136. I use the term here in its first sense.
229. See United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890); Dobbins's Dis-
tillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878).
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vent the occurrence of the proscribed event.2 30  So modified,
the Court's definition is acceptable.
The Court also unnecessarily limits the notion of proscribed
acts, or offenses, when it refers only to whether the behavior
triggering the sanction is already criminal. The limitation re-
sults no doubt from the Court's erroneous assumption in Men-
doza-Martinez that the existence of punishment denotes the ex-
istence of criminal punishment.231  But the essence of punish-
ment lies in its purpose to deter or avenge the commission of
proscribed acts, and there is nothing to prevent the legislature
from seeking to accomplish this without affixing a criminal label.
Various civil penalties attach to conduct which is not also crim-
inal.2 32  The more difficult question, which arises occasionally
though infrequently, is whether the sanction is in fact "prohib-
ited behavior," that is, whether the legislature desires to prohibit
it, or merely to tax or regulate it. This judgment is itself a sub-
sidiary one of legislative purpose, which the Court has resolved
in the past by standard methods of statutory construction. 233
These two tests, scienter and criminal conduct, combined,
then, point toward the somewhat more refined question whether
a given sanction is limited to conduct which is purposive and
proscribed. If such a limitation is found, it may well signify a
purpose of retribution or deterrence or both.
The Court's other two tests in Mendoza-Martinez-whether
there may be some alternative purpose for the sanction and
whether the burden fits that purpose or is excessive-both relate
to the simple question whether the burden could serve any pur-
pose other than retribution and/or deterrence. This is essentially
the same question the Court poses in applying its strict scrutiny
test in the areas of equal protection and first amendment over-
breadth analysis: does the burden further some compelling state
230. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 12, at 152-57; Fletcher, The
Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 401, 426 (1971) ("ET]here are good reasons to regard negligence
as culpable, to regard it therefore as a form of meni rea, and to subject
negligent conduct to criminal sanctions."); Wasserstrom, Strict Liability
in the Criminal Law, 12 STN. L. Rnv. 731 (1960). But see J. HALL, GEN-
ERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRnimIAL LAw 133 (2d ed. 1960); O.W. HOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON LAw 50-59, 61, 81-82, 107-109 (M. Howe ed. 1963); Seavey,
Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. Ray. 1, 4-5 (1927).
231. See text accompanying notes 68-72 supra.
232. E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1460 (1970) (entering the United States without
stopping at a border checkpoint).
233. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S.
30 (1958).
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interest, and could that interest instead be served by some less
burdensome alternative? Alternatively, is the law either over-
or under-inclusive in reference to the claimed purpose?
There appears therefore to be no reason why the same test
which determines whether constitutionally recognized groups
and interests have been discriminated against, or "penalized" in
the secondary sense of that word set forth above, cannot be ap-
plied to determine whether any other group or interest has been
penalized in the primary sense of that term. The functional na-
ture of punishment as we have discussed it is the deterrence and
avenging of forbidden conduct. Just as constitutionally forbid-
den penalties or discrimination are presumed when burdens are
placed upon constitutionally specified groups or interests, so pun-
ishment can be presumed when a burden is placed upon persons
who commit forbidden acts. The question that follows is also
the same: if the government contends that the purpose of this
burden is something other than punishment, can the government
demonstrate that that purpose was not capable of fulfillment in
a way that would not have placed special burdens on persons
who commit forbidden acts? And lastly, these two steps may
merge: the question whether special burdens have in fact been
placed on persons committing forbidden acts may depend on
whether the alternative purpose was capable of broader or nar-
rower application; that is, on whether the law is over- or under-
inclusive with respect to the alternative purpose.
We have shown that the strict scrutiny test of the first
amendment and equal protection clause can be applied to the
question of punishment. Whether it should be applied is of
course a separate question. Arguably there is no reason why
strict scrutiny should apply to punishment at all. The reason
why the Court so carefully scrutinizes legislation in the other
areas is that the presence of an improper purpose constitutes a
direct violation of important, constitutionally protected rights.
Consequently, because purpose or legislative intent can never be
discovered precisely, the Court requires an affirmative demon-
stration of a valid intent as a check against improper attempts
or purposes by the legislative majority. In effect, it establishes
a "safety zone" of sorts around the protected group or interest
to guard against the possibility of invidious purpose. Arguably,
punitive laws, unlike laws in these other two areas, are not sus-
pect and do not invade highly protected rights. There is obvi-
ously nothing wrong with placing special burdens on lawbreak-
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ers, whereas there clearly is with placing special burdens on
minority ethnic groups or persons making unpopular speeches.
In response to this argument, it can be asserted that constitu-
tionally protected individual rights are in fact involved in the
determination of punishment, as the first part of this Article has
attempted to demonstrate. To be sure, these rights are mostly
procedural, and they affect the way in which punishment is im-
posed rather than the right of the state to impose it at all: the
right not to have punishment imposed retroactively, or by com-
pelled testimony against self-interest, or (in the case of criminal
punishment) by more than one proceeding for the same charge,
or without enhanced procedural trial safeguards. But the fact
that these safeguards are procedural does not make them any
less important. And when the legislature passes a law that
appears to be punitive according to the standards more fully de-
scribed below, and the government then asserts that certain pro-
cedural safeguards are to be denied, it seems appropriate to scru-
tinize the nonpunitive effects of the legislation carefully before
concluding that constitutional procedural safeguards are unnec-
essary.
One further caveat is probably warranted at this point. By
suggesting that the same kinds of analysis developed in the equal
protection and first amendment areas can be applied to deter-
mine the existence of penalties, I do not mean that analysis in
those areas necessarily provides consistent answers or totally sat-
isfying results. Difficult questions arise in the first amendment
area concerning whether a statute is directed at the regulation
of expression or of neutral conduct, 234 and if the former, what
kinds of less burdensome alternatives should have been adopted.
There is obviously an element of balancing and value choice in-
volved in these judgments. 235 Likewise, in the equal protection
area, dissatisfaction with the traditional "two-tier" formula of
minimal and strict scrutiny has given rise to advocacy on the
234. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (declining
any very serious search for a less burdensome alternative, apparently
on the ground that the apparent purpose of the law was to regulate
conduct and not communication). See generally Ely, Flag Desecration:
A Case Study in the Rules of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 IH-_v. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
235. But cf. Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First
Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 428, 442-44 (1967) (pointing out that the
kind of balancing involved in purpose analysis is a great deal more lim-
ited in scope than a general balancing test sometimes allegedly employed
by the Court elsewhere).
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Court of "sliding scales" and "irrebuttable presumption" tests,
which themselves have been criticized 236 and partially disa-
vowed.23 7 This Article cannot hope to treat, much less resolve,
these controversies. But what it can do is to suggest that the
law of punishment is not sui generis, as it has traditionally been
treated, but raises problems which scholarship has dealt with
elsewhere.
6. Applying the Test to Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez238 itself serves to illustrate
the way in which legislative history can be avoided in determin-
ing legislative purpose. In that case, federal law provided for
expatriation, or divestiture of citizenship, of persons found to
have remained outside the United States in order to evade the
draft. The triggering mechanism clearly comes into play: a
sanction or burden is made applicable solely to those persons who
commit a forbidden act. Moreover, examination of the alterna-
tive, nonpunitive explanation advanced by the Government in
Mendoza-Martinez supports the conclusion that the law did not
narrowly seek to accomplish nonpunitive purposes.
The nonpunitive rationale advanced was that failure to ex-
patriate draft evaders remaining abroad would seriously injure
troop morale. Justice Stewart, dissenting, pointed out that
Congress could reasonably have concluded that the existence of
such a group, who voluntarily and demonstrably put aside their
United States citizenship "for the duration", could have an ex-
tremely adverse effect upon the morale and thus the war effort
not only of the armed forces, but of the millions enlisted in the
defense of their nation on the civilian front.239
It does not appear that Justice Stewart implied by this state-
ment that loss of citizenship was nonpunitive because voluntarily
brought about; that would no more be accurate than to say that
a criminal sentence is nonpunitive because the crime was volun-
tarily committed. Nor do I understand Justice Stewart to have
argued that the draft evaders in question had shown themselves
236. With regard to the Court's various standards, see generally
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreward: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv.
Civ. RiGHTs-Cv. Lis. L. REV. 269 (1975); Note, The Irrebuttable Pre-
sumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1534 (1974).
237. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine).
238. 372 U.S. 144 (1965).
239. Id. at 210 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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to be unfit for citizenship so that they could no longer be trusted
with its responsibilities. That argument would have justified ex-
patriation on the ground of prevention, just as removal of driv-
ers' or professional licenses is justified as preventing future harm
by incapacitating the dangerous driver or professional.240
Instead, Justice Stewart argued that expatriation was neces-
sary because of its impact on morale and the war effort. Con-
strued in its least favorable light, this argument was simply that
expatriation was necessary to deter others from draft evasion.
So viewed, the rationale for the sanction would remain purely
punitive. Somewhat more favorably viewed, the argument may
have been that, quite apart from i's impact on draft evasion, the
sanction was necessary to abate feelings of unfairness in the loyal
public. It is by no means clear, however, that this argument
would constitute an alternative, nonpunitive explanation of the
sanction, for it more readily fits the theory that the effects of
punishment were necessary and desirable than that the law was
nonpunitive. Troop morale would be harmed because certain
persons were "getting away with something" by going unpun-
ished. Retribution would restore a sense of fairness. The impo-
sition of the sanction would deter others from leaving the country
to avoid the draft. And since normal kinds of punitive sanctions
are unavailable against persons who reside outside the country
and cannot be reached by extradition procedures, the punitive
sanction of expatriation was the next best solution.
To be effective, an alternative explanation of a sanction must
be couched in terms that retribution and deterrence alone do not
fulfill, and the alternative explanation advanced in Mend oza-
Martinez does not qualify. One could try to improve the argu-
ment by suggesting that the governmental purpose was to equal-
ize burdens so that persons not serving in the armed forces would
not be privileged by comparison with soldiers and others required
to make inordinate sacrifices for the nation. This principle of
alternative burdens is not itself punitive in nature, for it looks
not to the question whether lawbreakers are adequately pun-
ished, but to the broader question whether all citizens are equally
treated.241
Under close examination, however, such an argument would
be impossible to maintain. First, the interest in making certain
240. But cf. text accompanying notes 310-25.
241. Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 H]nv. L. Rv.
327, 349 (1969).
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that all members of the community bear equal burdens would
presumably have required the imposition of burdens not merely
on lawbreakers but on all persons who did not have to make
war-related sacrifices. No evidence that such a policy was under-
taken appears. Second, there appears to have been no attempt
by the Government to equate the degree of the burden with that
experienced by draftees. Finally, the sanction was under-inclu-
sive: there appears to have been no reason to limit it to those
draft evaders who left the country, except for the lack of any
alternative means by which to punish them.
Mendoza-Martinez thus constitutes a case where the Court
might well have held the law arbitrary and capricious for any
purpose other than punishment, almost without resort to the
concept of less burdensome alternatives. (Indeed, Justice Bren-
nan, concurring, found the law arbitrary even as a punitive exer-
cise.) It is ironic that the leading authority for resorting to legis-
lative history in order to determine legislative motivation to
punish had so little need to do so.
7. Identifying Punitive Laws for Constitutional Purposes
Most statutes are not so easily classed as punitive as was
that in Mendoza-Martinez. For purposes of discussion, the dis-
tinction between punitive and nonpunitive laws can be analyzed
according to the various justifying purposes that have been ad-
vanced to rebut the contention that laws are punitive. These
purposes can be generally treated as taxation, compensation, pre-
vention (or regulation), and treatment.
a. Punishment and taxation
The question whether a law constitutes a penalty or a tax
measure has arisen in the context of the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination, 242 the due process right to a hear-
ing,243 the now-atrophied rule that the federal taxing power
may not be used to regulate in areas subject to the states' police
power,244 and the right of innocent owners of illegally used
242. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (overruling
United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953)). It should be noted that
the notion of penalty here involves the word's secondary sense: a
dominant purpose of deterrence or retribution not toward those violating
legal norms, but toward those exercising a legal right, namely, that not
to incriminate oneself.
243. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
244. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); United States
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property to avoid forfeiture of the property under a "penal" as
opposed to a taxing act.245 For various reasons, the lively de-
bate over the tax/penalty distinction has largely disappeared for
constitutional purposes. The Court has generally been content
to let Congress determine the limits of its powers under the com-
merce and taxing provisions of the Constitution, so that the tenth
amendment issue is seldom litigated. 246 For purposes of the
v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S.
27 (1904).
245. United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321
(1926). The Court resolved the argument there by holding that the act
constituted a tax rather than a penalty. More recently, however, the
Court has recognized the right of the Government to forfeit the property
of innocent owners even when the enactment is described by the Court
as "punitive" or "deterrent," at least absent a showing that the owner
took all steps reasonably possible to prevent the illegal use. See text
accompanying note 294 infra.
246. In a variety of cases decided during the first part of this century
the Court held that if a tax constituted a "penalty" in the secondary
meaning of that term, it served to regulate and therefore lay outside the
taxing power. See, e.g., United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287
(1935); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Bailey v. Drexel Furn. Co.(Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922). The problem with this rea-
soning lies in the fact that whenever a special tax burden, like any other
burden, is placed only upon a limited activity, a "penalty," in the sense
of a burden serving to deter that activity, may be said to result to that
group. Whether the burden is actually referred to as a penalty normally
depends on the existence of any valid explanation or justification for the
burden. (The fact that revenue is raised does not necessarily serve as
a justification for the disproportionate nature of a tax placed upon one
group.)
Normally, of course, differences in relative tax burdens are not
called penalties because the differences are viewed as permissible, either
because they serve some justifiable policy of economic regulation or be-
cause some degree of arbitrariness is inevitable in a complicated tax
scheme. Only where the relative tax burden falls on a protected class
is a penalty normally said to result. Thus a tax upon persons exercising
certain rights of free speech might be called a penalty on first amend-
ment rights. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) ("We
hold that when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred
by a State's general taxing program due process demands that the speech
be unencumbered until the State comes forward with sufficient proof tojustify its inhibition.").
The Court's tax opinions recognized this pattern, at first implicitly,
then explicitly. In several early cases the Court upheld as nonpenal
taxes on colored oleomargarine, McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27(1904), on state-issued bank notes, Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 533 (1870), on dispensation of narcotic drugs, United States v.
Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), and on sawed-off shotguns, Sonzinsky v.
United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937). Although the Court failed to articu-
late any consistent rationale for distinguishing these taxes from others
that it has stricken as "penal," the holdings were justifiable. The Veazie
Bank decision is explicable in terms of the congressional power to coin
money in article L, section 8, clause 5. The others served to keep in-
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fifth amendment, strict scrutiny has traditionally been available
to test whether purported taxes actually serve primarily to co-
erce, or, in the word's secondary sense, to "penalize" the exer-
cise of the right against self-incrimination.247 And due process
is generally recognized to compel a hearing before property is
taken, regardless of whether the taking constitutes a penalty.248
Nonetheless, the distinction between tax and penalty has
continued to be relevant for rules such as that which permits
taxes, but not penalties, to be assessed before a hearing and thus
imposes on the taxpayer the burden of disproving the Commis-
sioner's assessment at an administrative hearing.249 The dis-
tinction is also relevant where the taxpayer claims that Boyd
affords him a right against self-incrimination in any penalty pro-
ceeding, apart from the possibility of future criminal prosecution.
Such a claim would arguably affect both the burden of proof
in such proceedings and the government's ability to subpoena
taxpayer records or compel testimony. The distinction between
tax and penalty is also relevant to federal income tax rules such
as that permitting state taxes but not state penalties to be de-
ducted from income for federal tax purposes. 250
The case of Helvering v. Mitchell,25' discussed earlier, pro-
trinsically dangerous or deceptive commodities out of the marketplace,
a purpose recognized in commerce clause cases such as Champion v.
Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903), and McDermott v. Wis-
consin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913), as a legitimate one for the federal govern-
ment.
This implicit recognition of certain proper regulatory purposes whose
presence precluded the finding of a penalty broadened after 1937 into
an explicit recognition that Congress and not the Court must generally
determine the propriety of purposes underlying tax discriminations as
well as regulations of interstate commerce, at least where states' rights
and not individual rights are concerned. In United States v. Kahriger,
345 US. 22, 31 (1953) (footnote omitted), the Court stated that "[u]n-
less there are [penalty] provisions, extraneous to any tax need, courts
are without authority to limit the exercise of the taxing power." In re-
cent years, it is only where tax laws or the reporting provisions con-
nected therewith serve no significant purpose other than to burden indi-
vidual rights, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, that the
Court has seen fit to find a tax penal, again in the secondary sense of
that term. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
247. See note 116 supra.
248. See generally Note, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process
of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89. Hearing rights are triggered by the depriva-
tion of liberty or property, whether or not for penal purposes.
249. For cases establishing the distinction in burden of proof, see H.
BALTER, TAx FRDui Am EvAsIoN §§ 10.4-5 to 10.4-7 (3d ed. 1963).
250. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
251. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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vides a context for illustration. The assessment that the Court
there held to be nonpunitive was 50 percent of any tax deficiency
resulting from tax fraud, in addition, of course, to the deficiency
itself. In order to hold that the assessment was not criminal
for double jeopardy purposes, the Court unnecessarily held that
the sanction was not "intended as punishment" but was remedial
in nature, "as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and
to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investi-
gation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud.
'252
With deference, I doubt that the Court would have taken
the view it did had it been asked whether such an assessment
could have been retroactively enacted, rather than whether
double jeopardy prohibited the assessment. Nor, perhaps, should
it have, for although the Court addressed only what should have
been an irrelevant issue, its decision that the assessment was not
punitive seems dubious.
The triggering mechanism for a finding of punitive purpose
was clearly present: the sanction, the 50 percent additional as-
sessment, applied only to those persons guilty of the forbidden
act of tax evasion. The next question, therefore, was not merely
whether some alternative purpose might exist (the question that
the Court asked) but whether the alternative purpose could have
been served more narrowly and in a way that did not burden
only those persons committing forbidden acts.
To the extent that the law was designed to reimburse the
Government for the loss resulting from fraud, its purpose could
have been more narrowly accomplished by simply collecting the
amount of the tax deficiency itself, whether actual or esti-
mated.253 Therefore this purpose does not explain the 50 per-
cent addition.
Another explanation, which also appears in other cases, 254
is that the additional assessment served to reimburse the Govern-
ment for the expenses of collecting delinquent taxes.2 65 Still
another is that it served to recover lost taxes on illegal profits
252. Id. at 398-99, 401.
253. The government is permitted to estimate income in cases where
the taxpayer's records are inadequate. Cf. Ixwr. REv. CODE OP 1954, §§ 446
(b), 6001.
254. See text accompanying notes 266-72 infra.
255. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
687 n.26 (1974); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S.
232, 237 (1972) (per curiam).
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(on the theory that such profits normally are not reported and,
because risky, are larger than those in legal businesses) .256
The two latter justifications are plausible, and under an ap-
proach based on the psychological model of legislative motiva-
tion, the Court might have difficulty rejecting either if it ful-
filled its duty to presume constitutionality. Under a less-bur-
densome-alternative approach, however, the Government would
be hard put to explain why, with regard to the final justifica-
tion above, the statute could not have been more narrowly
drafted to authorize the Internal Revenue Service to estimate
the amount of concealed income by a formula based on the net
worth of the taxpayer, as is done elsewhere in the Internal Reve-
nue Code.257
With regard to the first of these latter two justifications, the
imposition of the costs of law enforcement would fall uniquely on
lawbreakers and not on a larger segment of the general public.
Moreover, compensation to the state could justify assessment of
staggering sums of money against individual lawbreakers if the
annual law enforcement budget of the state were prorated among
the criminals convicted there each year. On its face, such an
imposition is hard to distinguish from fines and money penalties
that are labeled punitive, for both assessments are large and are
placed solely on law violators. Indeed, the Court has rejected a
claim that imposition of court costs upon an acquitted criminal
defendant was permissible because the statute was not punitive,
where the imposition hinged on some finding of misconduct by
the defendant.5 8
256. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 297 (1935) (Car-
dozo, J., dissenting):
Congress may reasonably have believed that, in view of the
attendant risks, a business carried on illegally and furtively is
likely to yield larger profits than one transacted openly by law-
abiding men. Not repression, but payment commensurate with
the gains is thus the animating motive.... Congress may also
have believed that the furtive nature of the business would in-
crease the difficulty and expense of the process of tax collection.
The Treasury should have reimbursement for this drain on its
resources. Apart from either of these beliefs, Congress may
have held the view that an excise should be so distributed as
to work a minimum of hardship; that an illegal and furtive busi-
ness, irrespective of the wrongdoing of its proprietor, is a
breeder of crimes and a refuge of criminals; and that in any
wisely ordered polity, in any sound system of taxation, men en-
gaged in such a calling will be made to contribute more heavily
to the necessities of the treasury than men engaged in a calling
that is beneficient and lawful.
257. See note 253 supra.
258. Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
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For these reasons, a compensatory purpose should perhaps
be recognized only if that purpose affirmatively appears on the
face of the law and some formula is provided to estimate the
sum of compensation due by reference to actual state costs. Re-
quirements that persons placed in the county jail pay room and
board there might constitute an example of a compensatory law
serving to recoup the costs of law enforcement. However, the
tax in Helvering v. Mitchell involved no such affirmative indica-
tion of legislative purpose.
The tax in Helvering v. Mitchll appears, therefore, to have
been punitive. This fact, of course, does not mean that the Court
should always reach that conclusion with regard to taxes on for-
bidden activities. In the first place, before the strict scrutiny
test comes into play, there must be a special tax imposing a "dis-
proportionate burden" on the forbidden activity.25 9 Moreover,
a special tax on illegal activities may well be justified if the Gov-
ernment can adequately document the existence of large, secret
profits. Even then, however, the Government would need
to show why it could not employ its usual method of estimating
income not subject to strict verification and thus avoid singling
out the illegal activity for special procedural treatment probably
more burdensome to the taxpayer.2 0
Furthermore, there are many instances when the Court
should accept statutory indicia that Congress intended a tax
rather than a penalty, simply because of the constitutional con-
text in which the question arises. The argument that federal
actions under the police power, as opposed to the taxing power,
violate states' rights under the tenth amendment has passed
largely, though perhaps not entirely, into disuse.261 In areas
where that amendment is indeed moribund, the Court should
realistically indulge the presumption that Congress acted within
its powers and decline to scrutinize the constitutionality of the
assessment.
To determine that the incremental tax described in Helver-
ing v. Mitchell was a penalty is not, therefore, drastically to
259. See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (single tax on
illegal activities is legitimate, but reporting requirement serves to penal-
ize right not to incriminate oneself); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968) (same); United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S.
321 (1926) (distinguishing "double taxes" from "single taxes").
260. See note 253 supra.
261. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The tenth
amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered."); cf. Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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revise existing constitutional law. The fact that such pen-
alties are punitive does not, as the Mitchell Court wrongly as-
sumed, render them criminal. Consequently, such penalties can
be levied by administrative processes262 without the complica-
tions that attend criminal prosecutions. But by recognizing the
Mitchell "tax" as a penalty, the Court could bring some consist-
ency to its description of punishment.
b. Punishment and compensation
The distinction between punishment and compensation has
special relevance to the fifth amendment's taking clause, but it
is also relevant to claims under the self-incrimination clause, the
ex post facto clause, and perhaps to the right to jury trial.2 3
An occasional case has held that where a government suit for
a monetary recovery is not restricted, as it would be in a private
party's suit for compensatory damages, to a proven amount of
simple damages, it is punitive rather than compensatory.264 Com-
mentary has also taken this position. 265  On the other hand,
the great weight of authority holds that the recovery of a flat
sum for each offense without proof of damages to the govern-
ment, or the recovery of damages in a multiple amount of demon-
strated damages, does not indicate a lack of compensatory intent.
The leading case for this proposition is Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States,260 where a statute assessed monetary sanctions of two
times the actual damages plus $2000 per offense against persons
who fraudulently claimed veterans' preferences to purchase army
surplus equipment. It is ironic that this case contains the
leading discussion of the punishment/compensation distinction,
for it involved a claim of double jeopardy, and money sanctions
labeled "civil," however punitive, are highly unlikely to be treated
as "criminal" in nature, as is required for double jeopardy to
attach. The Court offered the following rationale for holding
the recoveries there to be nonpunitive:
262. See text accompanying notes 351-52 infra.
263. The definition of punishment in the context of the jury trial
guarantee is discussed in text accompanying notes 341-57 infra.
264. See United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126 (8th Cir. 1893) (fact
that United States could have sued for single damages under normal civil
procedures indicates that suit for double damages and forfeiture is puni-
tive).
265. See Charney, supra note 7, at 509. Charney, however, draws
the unwarranted conclusion that damage actions not so limited should
be called criminal.
266. 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
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Liquidated damages are a well-known remedy, and in fact Con-
gress has utilized this form of recovery in numerous situations.
Liquidated-damage provisions, when reasonable, are not to
be regarded as penalties ... and are therefore civil in nature.26 7
The difficulty with this explanation is that it is almost uni-
versally available, for governmental damages are generally so in-
definite, and when definite so vast, that the liquidated-damages
theory serves to define nearly any monetary exaction as merely
compensatory. 268 Rex Trailer itself provides a good example
of this fact. The defendant company fraudulently used veterans'
preferences to buy Army surplus trucks. The Government, after
obtaining a criminal conviction and a $25,000 fine, sued separately
for statutory recoveries of $2000 for each of five offenses. The
Court rejected the company's double jeopardy claim, not on the
ground that the penalty was not criminal, but on the ground that
no penalty was involved because the statutory purpose was com-
pensatory, not punitive. The Court observed:
It is obvious that injury to the Government resulted from the
Rex Trailer Company's fraudulent purchase of trucks. It pre-
cluded bona fide sales to veterans, decreased the number of
motor vehicles available to Government agencies, and tended to
promote undesirable speculation. The damages resulting from
this injury may be difficult or impossible to ascertain, but it is
the function of liquidated damages to provide a measure of re-
covery in such circumstances. 269
This language indiscriminately lumps together the Govern-
ment's role as protector of individual veterans, its role as guard-
ian of the economy, and its arguably proprietary role as seller
and user of trucks. Doubtless, where the government sues in
a purely proprietary role-for example, as party to a breached
contract or as owner of damaged property-the damages recov-
ered are compensatory in the traditional legal sense. Moreover,
in various contexts the government has sued on behalf of individ-
ual citizens to recoup for them collectively damages suffered by
reason of the defendant's actions.2 70  On the other hand, as a
267. Id. at 151.
268. This same problem affects the rationale that assessment of law
enforcement costs against lawbreakers constitutes a compensatory rather
than penal measure. See text accompanying notes 253-56 supra. Giacco
v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966), provides some support for the
proposition that the Court would decline to view as compensatory the
imposition of even definite governmental. costs or damages on offenders,
but would treat the imposition as punitive.
269. 350 U.S. at 153-54.
270. Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938); North Dakota v. Minne-
sota, 263 U.S. 361 (1923); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76
(1883).
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lower court stated in a suit for treble damages where it rejected
a government claim that the action was not punitive because the
price violations in question caused harm to individual citizens,
it may be said that in the prosecution of any public offense
the Government sues on behalf of the public at large. Almost
any crime or offense which involves money or property affects
the national economy, and both the public and the Government
in its sovereign capacity benefit directly or indirectly from the
punishment of the offender. So far as recoupment by the Gov-
ernment of its own damages caused by inflation is concerned,
unless it purchases goods in excess of ceiling prices from the of-
fender himself, I think the violation of the act by an individual
has too remote an effect on the price of commodities purchased
by the Government to be considered a basis for civil damages.2 71
This language points out that recoveries under the police
power are not equivalent to recoveries of compensatory damages.
If compensation is to have meaning, the government must not
be permitted to argue that whenever persons or private property
are harmed, the government's recovery is either on behalf of the
harmed individuals or on behalf of its own interests as protector
of the economy. Under a less-burdensome-alternative concept,
the government should have to demonstrate that it has not sin-
gled out a narrow class of lawbreakers from whom to seek com-
pensation, for such singling-out appears punitive. If indeed the
motive is compensation, the government should proceed under
rules which, analogously to those governing damage suits by pri-
vate parties, demonstrate a close relationship between loss suf-
fered and compensation sought.27 2
As a corollary to the principle that the government must
show actual loss, the government might be required to demon-
strate a property right, as opposed to a police power interest,
which it seeks to defend by suit. Governmental property inter-
ests have already been defined to some extent in litigation arising
in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for purposes of
determining when a state sues for compensatory damages, as
opposed to when it sues for punitive (police power) purposes.278
271. Bowles v. Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
272. Cf. Charney, supra note 7, at 509.
273. The Court will entertain only the compensatory action. If a
state seeks to recover its "own" damages from another state, the contro-
versy is one "between two or more States" within the Court's article III,
§ 2 jurisdiction. If, however, the state seeks to recover damages suffered
by its individual citizens, the suit is one "commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State" and there-
fore falls outside the judicial power of the United States by virtue of
the eleventh amendment.
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Applying this body of authority, we may say that where the
government sues (1) on behalf of specific individuals, to collect
as guardian specific damages suffered by them,27 4 or (2) as
paens patriae, to collect damages to certain property interests
that the government alone can own or protect on behalf of its
citizens, 275 or (3) in a proprietary capacity, for harm done to
specific property that the government owns as a private party
owns property, 276 the suit can be regarded as compensatory.
These distinctions are not airtight, but they do have certain
established meanings. To hold that the government's suit is on
behalf of specific individuals, the Supreme Court has in the past
demanded proof that the recovery will be passed on to those per-
sons.2 7 7 There seems to be no reason why this should not be
the controlling requirement for present purposes where the gov-
ernment seeks to establish a compensatory purpose on a guardi-
anship theory. Lower courts have further held that where the
government does intend to pass a recovery on to private citizens,
it acts in the same capacity as does a private, representative
plaintiff in a class action, and that class action procedural re-
quirements should therefore apply.27 8 Again, this requirement
seems sensible and should be adopted.
Where the government sues not on behalf of individual plain-
tiffs, but as parens patriae on behalf of the economy or environ-
mental assets such as earth, air, and. water, rules have again been
developed in other areas to define the limits of governmental
standing. Although the government has standing to sue for
damages to the general economy for such wrongs as anti-trust
violations, the Court has held that a recovery would duplicate
private recoveries for the same harm, with the clear implication
that the duplicate recovery would be punitive.2 7 9 It may be
274. See cases cited in note 270 supra.
275. See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355
(1908); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); cf. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 266 (1972).
276. Cf. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-63 n.14 (1972).
Thus, suits by the government for harm to its property or for breach
of contract rely on common-law concepts of tort and contract applicable
to private plaintiffs. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-108 (1972)
(federal common law based on general tort concepts applies where state
sues to protect its natural environment).
277. See cases cited in note 270 supra.
278. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972); Cali-
fornia v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973).
279. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261-62 (1972).
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that such macro-economic harms as inflation are separable from
any individual financial losses suffered by private persons and
that the government does have exclusive standing to sue for
these.280 Moreover, the government has consistently been held
to have exclusive standing to collect damages for harm done to
the environment through pollution.281
Finally, when the government sues in a proprietary capacity,
its recovery should be governed by the same rules that govern
recovery by private individuals. Recoveries that exceed demon-
strated actual damages are labeled punitive in private law, and
there seems to be no reason not to label them punitive for public
law purposes when the government sues to collect them. Of
course, properly computed liquidated damages are excepted from
the general rule that compensatory damages must be demon-
strated with specificity, but, again, private law standards should
apply for measuring the validity of liquidated damages.
Let us apply these ideas to the Rex Trailer case, where the
Court held that monetary penalties were compensatory and not
punitive. The holding was unnecessary under the view that
double jeopardy would not attach even if the recovery did consti-
tute a penalty, since it was not criminal in nature. But the Court
did reach the question of punitive versus compensatory purpose,
and its answer seems open to attack. Under a strict scrutiny test,
the government must demonstrate that the law could not have
been more narrowly drafted to achieve its compensatory aim.
Contrary to the Court's assertion, private tort law does not in-
clude a concept of liquidated damages; such damages appear in
the law of contract and even then are usually limited to a rea-
sonable approximation of actual damages that cannot be proved
with exactitude. 282 And although statutes may "liquidate" pri-
vate recoveries for loss of wages, the label does not necessarily
indicate that no punitive damages are included.2 83
280. Cf,. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
281. See New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1921); Hud-
son County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1908); Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
282. See generally 5 A. Cownn% CoNTRAcTs § 1057 (1964).
283. Thus the federal Fair Labor Standards Act provides for "liqui-
dated" damages equal to and in addition to the unpaid minimum or over-
time wages due to a covered employee. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b) (1970). The
fact that those damages may be forgiven by the court upon a showing
that the employer's violation was in good faith, id. § 260, together with
the lack of any specification in the Act of the kinds of actual damages
being liquidated, strongly suggests that these "liquidated" damages in
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In Rex Trailer, there was no indication that the Govern-
ment's actual damages were not susceptible of measurement, nor
any suggestion of the exact nature or magnitude of harm to the
Government's proprietary interests. Nor was there a demonstra-
tion that the Government was suing as guardian of wronged vet-
erans, intending to pass the recovery on to them. And finally,
there was no allusion to a parens patriae interest in the suit.
Perhaps proof of one or more of these various indicia of a
compensatory suit could have been adduced. But where the stat-
ute sets a fixed sum of $2000 per offense as the recovery, allow-
ing no demonstration of actual damages, Congress has fairly ef-
fectively blocked the opportunity to prove the kinds of damages
that normally render a private recovery compensatory rather
fact serve a punitive function. Because these damages are recoverable
by a private party, however, there is no "penalty" of the sort described
in this Article.
Compensation and Private Punitive Damages. The constitutional
nature of penalties collectible by private parties rather than the gov-
ernment bears some discussion. They have been held not to fall
within the meaning of "foreign penal laws." Huntington v. Attrill, 146
U.S. 657, 676 (1892). Yet fairly clearly treble-damage actions are au-
thorized by Congress on a "private attorney general" theory-that per-
mitting private suits permits police power enforcement of the law with-
out the need for governmental prosecution. To a greater or lesser extent,
therefore, the private plaintiff in such cases sues "on behalf of" the gov-
ernment and for punitive, police power reasons.
The Court's interpretation of the rule against enforcement of foreign
penal laws not to include private penalties is difficult to defend, if only
because the rule against enforcement of foreign civil penalties by the
foreign sovereign itself is difficult to defend. See text accompanying
notes 140-41 supra. The distinction could far more logically be drawn
between civil and criminal actions. And there seems no very good policy
reason to distinguish governmental collection of punitive damages from
private collection of punitive damages.
Similarly, the retroactive enactment of a private treble-damage rem-
edy might violate the ex post facto clause, on the theory that punitive
damages serve only to discourage prohibited conduct and could affect
conduct previous to the law's enactment. See text accompanying notes
142-49 supra.
On the other hand, there is no indication that the broadly interpreted
Boyd privilege from discovery of harmful testimony or business records
in civil penalty cases is likely to be extended to private punitive damage
actions. This can best be explained by the fact that the Boyd notion
that the government cannot force testimony that will result in civil pun-
ishment, as opposed to future criminal prosecution, itself finds only un-
certain constitutional support.
Finally, it seems logical that private punitive damages, like govern-
mental civil penalties, should be applicable only in cases involving at
least some degree of fault. For a treatment of the question, largely deal-
ing, however, with those constitutional provisions that apply only to
truly criminal proceedings, see text accompanying note 309 supra; Note,
Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. Cur. L.
REv. 408 (1967).
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than punitive. In sum, the Government appears to have sued in
Rex Trailer under the police power, in order to enforce the law
by means of penalties.
c. Punishment and regulation
Perhaps it is most difficult to distinguish between a punitive
and a nonpunitive civil law when the law in question purports
to regulate. Alternative terms for "regulate," used by the Court
and commentators, include "prevent" 28 4 and "incapacitate." 28 5
These terms primarily refer to laws that serve a preventive func-
tion by disabling the defendant from doing harm to the public.
Laws that take drivers' licenses away from persons involved in
serious accidents serve as an illustration. One purpose served
by the deprivation is to prevent a presumably unsafe driver from
further endangering the public. Forfeitures of property used to
commit illegal acts supply another example: by removing the
property from the owner's control, the government prevents its
use in future forbidden activity.
As with the distinction between punishment and taxation or
compensation, the distinction between punishment and regula-
tion may involve the entire range of constitutional provisions dis-
cussed earlier. In cases involving such infamous sanctions as in-
carceration or disqualification from all public employment, these
provisions include criminal safeguards. Most of the sanctions
discussed, however, such as forfeitures and money sanctions, do
not qualify as infamous punishments. As to these sanctions, the
various results of concluding that they are punitive would be
to permit invocation of the Boyd privilege from self-incrimina-
tion, to bar their retroactive application under the ex post facto
clause, to refuse their enforcement at the behest of a foreign sov-
ereign, to uphold them against a claim of taking without just
compensation, and perhaps, as suggested below, to deny a seventh
amendment claim to trial by jury.
(1) Forfeitures
The Court has been ambivalent about whether forfeitures
are punitive, and they serve as a good example for discussing
the distinction between punitive and regulatory laws. Two dis-
parate lines of reasoning appear in the case law and indeed some-
284. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
285. H. PACKER, supra note 12, at 48-53.
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times within the same case. One line emphasizes that forfeitures
are in rem and therefore directed at the property and not the
person of its owner, so that they are necessarily remedial and
not punitive.28 6  The second line emphasizes that forfeitures
do serve a punitive and deterrent function, despite their in rem
procedural nature.28 7
The venerable history of civil, in rem forfeiture proceedings
against property used to commit illegal acts originates in the Bib-
lical and medieval tradition of deodand, a sacrificial offering to
God of an object that has caused death or physical harm.288
The Court has frequently observed -that such actions are not per-
sonal or criminal in nature because they are directed at the prop-
erty itself, for its own "offense." In Various Items of Personal
Property v. United States289 the Court rejected a plea of double
jeopardy in a forfeiture action succeeding a criminal conviction
and arising from the same facts. The Court stated simply:
A forfeiture proceeding ... is in ren. It is the property which
is proceeded against, and, by resort -to a legal fiction, held guilty
and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate
and insentient. In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer
in person who is proceeded against, convicted and punished.
The forfeiture is no part of the punishment for. the criminal of-
fense.290
Similar logic has been used to explain the fact that the govern-
ment may forfeit the interest of art innocent mortgagee, lessor,
or secured creditor in property used unlawfully: because the
action was in rem, the only question at bar was the illegal
use of the property itself.291 The property owner was techni-
286. See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286
U.S. 49 (1932); United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S.
321 (1926); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505
(1921); United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890); Dobbins's Distillery
v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
1 (1827).
287. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663 (1974); United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S.
715 (1971); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693
(1965); Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
288. See O.W. HoLwMs, Ja., THE CommoN LAW 23-24 (M. Howe ed.
1963); Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and The Western Notion of Sov-
ereignty, 46 TEmp. L.Q. 169, 180-96 (1973).
289. 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
290. Id. at 581.
291. See, e.g., United States v. One .936 Model Ford Coach, 307 U.S.
219 (1939); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); United States v.
Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S.
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cally not even a party to the suit, and consequently his guilt
or innocence was irrelevant to the outcome: "It is the illegal
use that is the material consideration, it is that which works the
forfeiture, the guilt or innocence of its owner being accidental.12 92
Although the Court has recently reaffirmed the vitality of
these decisions, it recognized in the same opinion the contradic-
tory principle that forfeitures, at least of property that is not
itself contraband, are punitive. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co.2 93 the Court observed in dictum that where
property was taken from an owner without his consent and il-
legally used, or was illegally used although the owner had done
everything reasonably possible to prevent such use, "it would be
difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes
and was not unduly oppressive." This statement implies due
process limitations on the use of forfeitures. Elsewhere in the
opinion the Court referred explicitly to the "punitive and deter-
rent" purposes 294 forfeiture serves in persuading owners of
property to use "greater care" in permitting its use by others.2 95
At other times, dating from its earliest history, the Court has
held forfeitures justified on the ground that when the owner en-
trusts his property to other persons he assumes the risk of its
misuse and of its consequent forfeiture. 296 In these cases, then,
the Court has viewed forfeiture as reflecting at the very least a
kind of strict liability, to which the owner should not be subject
when he has made all possible efforts to avoid misuse of the
property. That this strict liability is considered personal rather
than purely in rem, and at least in some circumstances, punitive,
is reflected in the Boyd decision and subsequent cases holding
395 (1878); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210
(1844).
292. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 513
(1921).
293. 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974).
294. Id. at 686.
295. Id. at 688.
296. See, e.g., Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401
(1878) (citing United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210
(1844)):
Cases often arise where the property of the owner is for-
feited on account of the fraud, neglect, or misconduct of those
entrusted with its possession, care, and custody, even when the
owner is otherwise without fault.
[I]t has always been held in such cases that the acts of
the master and crew [of a ship] bind the interest of the owner
of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty, and that in sending
the ship to sea under their charge he impliedly submits to what-
ever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by
means of their unlawful or wanton misconduct.
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that an owner of property subject to forfeiture may claim the
protections of the fourth amendment and the fifth amendment's
self-incrimination clause. 97
These two lines of reasoning, o]1 the one hand that forfeitures
affect only the property itself, and on the other hand that they
punish and deter owners, may be partially reconciled by looking
to the kinds of property being forfeited. The Court has recog-
nized a category of property "malum in se," consisting of contra-
band whose possession by any private citizen is unlawful. 298
Examples are narcotic drugs,2 99 counterfeit money,300 and un-
registered sawed-off shotguns.301 It may be argued, rather con-
ceptually, that forfeiture of such items does not punish or deter
because they are never legally owned and, consequently, no dep-
rivation of a legal property interest is involved in their forfei-
ture.3 02
But however logically satisfying such a formal distinction
might be, there are many cases where the property forfeited
was not contraband, yet where forfeitures have been held not
to affect personal interests and not to punish the owner.30 3
The element of strict liability may provide the best reconcili-
ation of the two general approaches to forfeitures.3 0 4  Because
liability is strict in forfeiture cases, the guilt or innocence of the
owner is irrelevant except to the limited extent that he may
avoid forfeiture by raising the defense that he did everything
reasonably possible to guard against misuse of his property. At
the same time, and because of this possible defense, forfeiture
297. See text accompanying notes 110-24 supra.
298. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693,
699-700 (1965); Note, Forfeiture of Property Used in Illegal Acts, 38
NomE DAmE LAWyEn 727 (1963).
299. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951).
300. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715
(1971).
301. See United States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 346 F. Supp. 613(C.D. Cal. 1972).
302. Cf. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699(1965).
303. United States v. One 1936 Model Ford Coach, 307 U.S. 219(1939) (automobile); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395(1878) (real property); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 210 (1844) (ship).
304. For a discussion of strict liability with respect to a money pen-
alty, see Elting v. North German Lloyd, 287 U.S. 324, 326-28 (1932); Chi-
cago, B. & Q. Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559 (1911). Cf. Lloyd Sa-
baudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932); Oceanic Steam Nay. Co.
v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
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by strict liability clearly does serve to deter and, in some sense
of the word, to punish.
How, then, should forfeitures be classified for purposes of
the punitive-regulatory distinction? It seems clear that for-
feiture of contraband items can be justified as regulatory rather
than punitive even apart from the formal "property interest"
idea. Forfeiture of such items does not depend on their use to
commit an illegal act, so that the sanction of forfeiture does not
apply uniquely to lawbreakers. 30 5 The state's interest in keep-
ing dangerous items out of the hands of the public is properly
fulfilled by forbidding their use by all persons, whether or not
those persons have committed offenses, and whether or not the
forbidden items have been used to commit offenses.
This rationale is not available for forfeitures of noncontra-
band property used to commit forbidden acts, for the property
deprivation is imposed solely by reason of an offense against legal
norms. The question then becomes whether the taking can none-
theless be justified as merely regulatory. Where the property
has been used as an integral and important part of a professional
criminal enterprise and would be difficult or impossible for the
criminals to replace, its taking may have the reasonable regula-
tory effect of keeping its prior owners out of business. The for-
feiture of trucks used by a smuggling operation would presum-
ably fulfill this purpose, at least on the assumption that the
owners would sooner or later go free and be able to use the trucks
again. Even then, however, the preventive effect could be
served more narrowly by forbidding convicted felons from own-
ing particular vehicles or firearms and thus forcing the sale of
those items, rather than requiring forfeiture of them. There is
also considerable difference between a smuggler's truck and an
aging family car in which a youngster has been apprehended
with a small amount of marijuana.3 0 6 First, the vhicle has not
been used in a criminal "enterprise" in a way that would lead one
to believe that future criminal acts will be furthered by its re-
tention. Second, forfeiture of the vehicle does not really prevent
the owner from acquiring another vehicle to carry on his busi-
ness, for cars are not extraordinarily expensive or difficult to
acquire. The deterrent effect of the forfeiture is essentially the
305. Only those burdens that attach uniquely to the commission of
forbidden acts serve to trigger strict scrutiny. See text accompanying
notes 160-61 supra. Here, possession is prohibited regardless of whether
forbidden acts have been committed in the past.
306. See, e.g., In re One 1965 Ford Mustang, 105 Ariz. 293, 463 P.2d
827 (1970).
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same as that of a money fine enforced by sale of the car or other
assets: the individual has fewer assets to commit to the criminal
enterprise in the future.
Consequently, determinations that forfeitures of goods used
to commit illegal acts are regulatory rather than punitive should
normally be based on proof that the goods are so peculiarly
suited for criminal activities that, like burglar's tools, stills, or
nets used in illegal fishing,307 they are dangerous for any mem-
ber of the public to possess. Absent such a showing, the preven-
tive purpose of the deprivation could be accomplished by a nar-
rower and more effective method, namely, by depriving the
offending party of the right to use similar property, such as a
vehicle, within the jurisdiction enacting the deprivation. To sug-
gest that forfeiture of a yacht308 really serves the purpose of
preventing (as opposed to deterring) either its users or owners
from using marijuana, simply because some marijuana was once
found on the boat, is absurd. If the desire to prevent the trans-
portation of marijuana is uppermost in the legislative mind, the
offending party might better be banned from owning or leasing
any vehicle. The inefficacy of this or any other method of pre-
venting the transportation of drugs suggests that only deterrence
(and therefore punishment) is effective against such transporta-
tion. Deterrence is the only purpose that appears to be served
by the forfeiture law in question.
In concluding the discussion of forfeitures, it may be appro-
priate to dwell for a moment on the due process requirement
that an owner not be punished if he demonstrates that he did
everything possible to prevent the misuse of his property. The
Court has not spelled out with any exactitude the degree of fault
that the government must demonstrate in order to avoid the due
process objection. Just what is involved in taking "reasonable
steps" to avoid misuse of the property is unclear. Where a stat-
ute has provided for a reasonable care defense, reasonable care
has apparently consisted of inquiring into the criminal record
and reputation of lessees, mortgagors, buyers of goods subject to
security interests, and other persons likely to use the property.30 9
The value of this process must be questioned. In the first place,
prior criminal records do not necessarily serve as accurate pre-
dictors of behavior. Second, serious reliance on them would
307. Cf. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
308. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974).
309. See United States v. One 1936 Model Ford Coach, 307 U.S. 219
(1939).
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cause a restriction of credit for all ex-convicts, and it is at least
dubious that such a result would serve to prevent rather than
enhance criminal activity. Third, "reputation" is a nebulous
standard and perhaps an even poorer predictor of future activity
than is past criminal record. And fourth, even if it could be
assumed that a perfunctory series of questions on a lease or loan
form would be truthfully answered by persons likely to misuse
property, the use of a straw man to serve as the nominal lessee
or borrower would easily circumvent the inquiry.
For all these reasons, the property owner can hardly be said
in any very realistic way to be at "fault" in leasing or holding
a security interest in property without going through the motions
of a character examination. In reality, such a requirement does
not measure fault, but instead renders the property owner a
guarantor or surety for the property user. And where the for-
feiture performs no real function of prevention or incapacitation,
it is difficult to see this requirement of a guarantee of the be-
havior of the user as anything but arbitrary and hence violative
of due process.
A much more realistic standard of fault for forfeitures would
involve some showing that the property owner either knew or
had reason to know that the property would probably be used
to commit a crime, or at least that the owner failed to prevent
the crime by taking steps more realistically effective than a
character inquiry. The failure to act in such a case could be
deemed negligent, and punitive liability for negligence is a far
more acceptable concept in our law than is strict liability of the
kind discussed previously. It is doubtful that the Court is ready
to change the standard of fault required in forfeiture cases, but
until it does the standard has very weak support indeed.
(2) Denials or deprivations of personal rights and privileges
Distinguishing regulatory laws from penalties is also difficult
in the area of delicensing proceedings initiated because of past
crimes or other misdeeds. As with forfeitures and money sanc-
tions, the conclusion that suspensions and disqualifications are
punitive does not normally lead to the conclusion that they are
unconstitutional, for a civil punishment in addition to a criminal
punishment is normally permissible for the same offense.3 10 The
constitutional implications of a finding of punishment would nor-
310. Because double jeopardy applies only to multiple criminal, not
civil, punishments. See note 43 supra.
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mally be limited to the ex post facto clause, since the taking
clause and the seventh amendment right to jury trial apply to
money cases only. The Boyd privilege from self-incrimination
would also turn on the distinction. Finally, in cases of public
employment disqualification, punitive intent might signal an in-
famous crime and the right to sixth amendment and double jeop-
ardy protections.
An example of the problem of -distinguishing punitive from
nonpunitive disqualifications is the suspension of a driver's
license by reason of an accident caused by careless and negligent
driving. If the state or a party desied to argue that such a sus-
pension was not punitive, it would do so on the ground that
licenses are denied to various kinds of persons who are unfit to
drive, and that persons convicted of careless and negligent driv-
ing constitute one subclass of the unfit.311 So viewed, the sanc-
tion is not limited to persons convicted of forbidden acts, but
applies to unfit persons generally, and strict scrutiny does not
apply.
Whether this view is correct and acceptable depends on
whether a legislature could rationally find that causation of
a serious accident indicates a higher degree of proclivity for acci-
dents,3 12 and whether a less burdensome alternative exists in
the form of individual determinations of proclivity, as opposed
to blanket suspensions applicable to all persons involved in acci-
dents. 13 The root question here, as in many recent equal pro-
311. Cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637 (1971), where state statutory requirements of a bond and pro-
spective liability insurance depended upon the fault of consequent poten-
tial liability of the uninsured motorist involved in the accident.
312. Query whether such documentation can be produced. See gen-
erally D. KLEnx & J. WAmLEm, CAusATioN, CULPABmry & DETERnmNc r N
I-IGHwAy CRAsHEs 95-97 (1970).
313. The question whether determinations should be individualized
underlies the Court's relatively recent and controversial use of the "ir-
rebuttable presumption" standard to hold unconstitutional laws that do
not provide for hearings regarding the individual abilities or character-
istics of someone who falls within a burdened class. See generally Tribe,
Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. Cry. RIGHTs-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 269 (1975).
Significantly, the Court indicated in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(1975), that the doctrine may be confined to the examination of regula-
tions that impinge upon some "constitutionally protected status"--the
very situation where both first amendment and equal protection doctrines
have traditionally involved active scrutiny for less burdensome alterna-
tives, including individualized review rather than presumptive classifica-
tions applicable regardless of individual differences. If the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine is thus viewed as one means of determining
whether a purpose to penalize constitutionally protected interests or
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tection cases, is the extent to which the Court will permit the
legislature to disadvantage an individual on the basis of statistics
or evidence that applies to a group but not necessarily to the
individual member. On several occasions in recent years the
Court has styled such legislative findings irrebuttable presump-
tions and has stricken them. 314 I do not intend to address the
desirability of these holdings, but only to point out that the prob-
lem of defining punishment in the present context is directly
analogous to these equal protection problems.
Perhaps statistics can verify a higher degree of accident-
probability for persons once at fault in serious accidents, and,
likewise, the evidence might show that individual determina-
tions of dangerousness are impossible. But, absent statistical
evidence that suspension can in fact reduce the driver's danger-
ousness when he returns to the road, it remains questionable
whether a temporary suspension does not belie the desire to pre-
vent harm.315 Persons with inadequate eyesight are not, after
all, given temporary suspensions; they are disqualified from driv-
ing unless their eyesight improves. And it seems doubtful that
a person's poor driving habits necessarily improve during a pe-
riod of suspension, unless as a result of enhanced fear of future
suspension. Such an improvement, of course, results from deter-
rence and hence punishment.
The significant difference in this context between the deter-
mination of punitive purpose, on the one hand, and equal pro-
tection analysis, on the other, is that under most circumstances
the government is not constitutionally prohibited from taking a
driver's license for punitive reasons. So long as the underlying
conduct-careless and negligent driving-was itself properly sub-
ject to punishment, few objections could be raised. A retroactive
taking, of course, would give rise to a constitutional objection
based on the action's punitive nature. The government's ability
to compel testimony in the delicensure proceeding might also be
affected.
Similar analytical considerations apply in determining
groups is present, Salfi may be seen to stand for the logical proposition
that this inquiry need not be made unless the law involved uniquely
burdens some such interest or group.
314. See Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Su-
preme Court, 87 HAmV. L. REV. 1534 (1974).
315. Cf. H. PACKER, supra note 12, at 55 (implying that the willing-
ness to release a criminal without proof of rehabilitation belies rehabili-
tation as the justifying aim of confinement and indicates retribution or
deterrence instead).
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whether delicensures of professionals and disqualifications from
public employment based on convictions for crimes of moral tur-
pitude constitute punishment or regulation. The Supreme
Court's position on the issue is presently unclear. As in other
areas involving constitutional provisions which apply only to con-
stitutionally "criminal" prosecutions, the Court has emphasized
that disbarment is not a punitive sanction in order to avoid hold-
ing that the fifth and sixth amendment rights to indictment and
jury trial apply in disbarment proceedings.8 16 On the other
hand, the Court has described disbanrment proceedings as "puni-
tive" in other constitutional contexts where such a finding was
probably unnecessary. Thus the Court has stated in the course
of holding that due process compels notice of charges in disbar-
ment proceedings that "[d] isbarment ... is a punishment or pen-
alty imposed on the lawyer" and that "[t]hese are adversary pro-
ceedings of a quasi-criminal nature.' 3 17 These statements are
dictum, for presumably due process would require notice of
charges whenever important personal or property rights are at
stake, whether or not the proceeding is punitive.318 Yet in another
context as well the Court has suggested that disbarments are
punitive in nature. The Court has on one occasion reversed
an order of disbarment on grounds that the disbarment was "un-
necessarily severe" in light of the fact that the attorney had also
served a six-month sentence for contempt of court.319 The im-
plication of the Court's language, underscored by the arguments
of Justice Reed, dissenting, is that the disbarment was viewed
by the Court as punitive rather than remedial. Moreover, the
delicensure of lawyers and clergymen who supported the Confed-
eracy without having violated any oath of office was held puni-
tive and violative of the ex post facto clause.820 These disquali-
fications were deemed to be based on behavior that was irrelevant
to future employability and therefore, presumably, violative of
due process requirements as well as the ex post facto clause.
All of the Court's language in these cases which suggests
that disbarments are punitive proceedings either involves consti-
tutional provisions which do not hinge on punishment, or else
316. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1883) (disciplinary proceed-
ings are "not for the purpose of punishment" but are designed to protect
the public).
317. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550, 551 (1968).
318. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
319. Sacher v. Association of the Bax, 347 U.S. 388, 389 (1954) (per
curiam).
320. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
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involves arbitrary disbarments which would void for lack of due
process. None of these cases indicate whether the Court would
consider disbarment punitive in a case where, for example,
a defendant claimed the Boyd privilege not to testify in a disbar-
ment proceeding even after an award of immunity from criminal
prosecution, on the ground that the disbarment proceeding was it-
self punitive. Lower courts have rejected this argument, and
the Supreme Court's opinions at least suggest that public employ-
ees can be fired for refusing to testify against their own interest
after a grant of immunity, whether because the discharge is not
punitive or because the Boyd privilege does not so broadly obtain
even in punitive proceedings.3 2 1
Analytically, the question whether disbarments are punitive
again depends on the presence or absence of valid regulatory pur-
poses for the sanction. The view that such sanctions are merely
preventive rests on the assumptions that those to whom they
are applied are more likely than others to be untrustworthy in
the future and that even if such a statistical correlation is un-
available, the public assumes it and would, absent the sanctions,
lose trust in licensed professionals and public servants. Again,
the claim is advanced that the government has not singled out
lawbreakers for special burdens; that conviction for crimes of
moral turpitude is but one of a number of indicia of incompetence
or unfitness that may result in delicensure or dismissal. And
again the critical question should then be whether such convic-
tions can properly be viewed as indicia of unfitness. With cer-
tain crimes, such as murder committed in passion rather than
with premeditation, it might be very difficult to demonstrate sta-
tistically that criminals have a greater likelihood of disserving
the public professionally than has any other group. And if pre-
cise draftsmanship is required, limitation of the sanction to those
convicted of certain crimes giving rise to more demonstrable
probabilities of future misbehavior, such as fraud or embezzle-
ment, might be in order.
On the other hand, it can be argued that regardless of
whether a greater likelihood of future criminal action can be sta-
tistically predicted as a result of past actions, people as a matter
of course judge each other's "moral character" on the basis of past
321. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968); cf. Uni-
formed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280
(1968). State court cases holding the self-incrimination privilege un-
available in disbarment proceedings after grants of immunity are col-
lected in Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 1145 (1975).
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acts. Judges might well accede to this commonsense approach
even without-or in spite of-statistical evidence. Even if a
judge did not himself think that a conviction foreshadowed
future untrustworthiness, he might view the delicensure as
a nonpunitive means of preserving public confidence in the pro-
fession. Even if it could be demonstrated that professional bad
faith is more likely to characterize the convicted murderer, for
instance, than anyone else, popular belief in his untrustworthi-
ness-the appearance of evil as opposed to its actuality-might
itself justify the disqualification. People who lack faith in public
servants or licensed professionals are likely, to their own detri-
ment, not to seek or rely on their assistance. Moreover, the em-
ployment of a notorious lawbreaker in a position of public trust
and service to the law may reduce public respect for the law
itself. Unlike the problem of troop morale in Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez,222 the problem of public respect for law and its
servants arises not only from the public's desire not to see law-
breakers "getting away with something," but also from their fear
that they themselves will be disserved by such persons.
Which way the Supreme Court would decide this question
is not clear from its past opinions. The fourteenth amendment
itself imposed a disability to hold public office upon persons who,
having sworn to uphold the Constitution, had given aid or com-
fort to the Confederacy.323 If this language is to be read consist-
ently with the Supreme Court cases explicating application of
the ex post facto clause,3 24 such disabilities must be regarded
as having been remedial and not punitive. If so, a strong argu-
ment is created that all public disabilities based upon breach of
public trust should be considered remedial rather than punitive.
Certain aspects of the procedures used to impeach presidents and
other federal officials make those removals from office also
appear remedial rather than punitive.3 25
322. 372 U.S. 144 (1965).
323. Section 3 of the fourteenth amendment states:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress,
or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by
a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
324. See text accompanying notes 142-49 supra.
325. Art. I, § 3, cl. 7, states that a party who is impeached is still
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The degree of statistical support that the Court will require
for legislative judgments of unfitness for public trust, or the way
in which the Court will assess such judgments in the absence
of statistical evidence, remains unclear. It is also unclear to what
extent determinations of unfitness may be made not on an indi-
vidual basis but on the basis of "irrebuttable presumptions" that
all persons who have violated certain norms are unfit.
(3) Expatriation and deportation
A third line of cases raising questions of regulation and pun-
ishment is that involving deportation and expatriation. Among
these cases is Mendoza-Martinez, which was discussed earlier.
Deportation of persons convicted of crimes of moral turpi-
tude, unlike expatriation, has been held nonpunitive.32 6 Unlike
removal of citizenship from natural-born citizens, deportation of
aliens (or initial denial of entry to them) occurs for various rea-
sons related to their economic status, work skills, and personal
desirability or lack thereof. The Court has frequently resorted to
a kind of right-privilege distinction (now generally abandoned in
constitutional adjudication) in holding that aliens have no "right"
to remain in the country.32 7 Underlying this language, however,
is a recognition that Congress has wide discretion to remove
aliens or deny them entry, and that it often uses that discretion to
remove them for reasons other than the commission of undesir-
able acts. So viewed, the burden of deportation is not placed
uniquely on offenders, but on persons who show themselves to be
undesirable for a variety of reasons which include lawbreaking.
This limited recognition of the right-privilege distinction does
not, of course, imply that deportation or the loss of other "priv-
ileges" can be based on acts which are constitutionally protected
or bear no relevance to a proper purpose. Indeed, where the
"subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to
Law." From this it can be reasoned that the removal itself is at least
not criminal in nature, for otherwise the two trials would violate the
modern notion of double jeopardy. If one assumes that disqualification
from public office would be infamous if it were punishment, one can
further assert that impeachment is a remedial, not a punitive sanction.
See STArr or Tm IiPEAcHmENT INQuInY, HousE Commnlv. ON THE JUDIcIARY,
93D CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON CONSTITUTioNAL GRouNDs FOR PRESIDEN-
TAL IMPEACHMENT 22-27 (Comm. Print 1974).
326. See, e.g., Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carlson, 353 U.S. 685
(1957); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522 (1954).
327. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 8G, 98 (1958).
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deprivation can be shown to penalize (in the secondary sense of
that term) the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, it has
traditionally been held unconstitutional.3 2
The case of Flemming v. Nestor32 9 illustrates another aspect
of the Court's approach to determining regulation versus punish-
ment of aliens. There a deported alien challenged the Govern-
ment's denial to him of social security benefits as a violation of
due process, the ex post facto prohibition, the right to jury trial
in article Ir, and the sixth amendment. The benefits were
denied only to aliens deported because of membership in the
Communist Party; not to those deported for other reasons. The
Court held that social security benefits do not constitute an
accrued property right, but limited the relevance of this holding
to the due process issue and to the conclusion that the punish-
ment, if any, was not infamous for purposes of the constitutional
safeguards for criminal prosecutions. The Court concluded that
the statute was nonpunitive because it was aimed at preventing
benefits from being spent abroad rather than in this country.
This conclusion is highly dubious in light of congressional refusal
to limit social security benefits to persons deported for reasons
other than Communist Party affiliation, but the Court chose to
ignore the implications of this under-inclusion-implications that
have led to opposite results in other cases.330
(4) Civil contempt
The final group of laws raising the regulatory-punitive issue
consists of those designed to "coerce" present or future conduct,
such as those providing sanctions for civil contempt. In
the context of a decision that there is no right to a jury trial
in civil contempt proceedings, 33 1 the Court has held that such
sanctions are not punitive.
There certainly is a distinction between coercive sanctions
and punitive sanctions in general in that coercive sanctions can
be avoided, even after imposition, by compliance with some
stated condition, such as one contained in a court order. Thus,
in the case of civil contempt, the individual is said to hold the
keys to his own jail cell. This fact explains why the Court does
not consider imprisonment for civil contempt to be an infamous
punishment for purposes of the sixth amendment. The sentence
328. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinc-
tion in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. Riiv. 1439 (1968).
329. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
330. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See also text
accompanying notes 202-08 supra.331. Shilitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
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can be avoided at any time, and short-term imprisonments have
traditionally not given rise to all constitutional protections.
This is not to say, however, that coercive sanctions may not
be considered punitive for other constitutional purposes. The
use of torture as a coercive sanction would doubtless qualify as
cruel and unusual punishment. Coercive sanctions might also
be considered functionally punitive under the rule regarding en-
forcement of foreign penal laws. A court is not constrained by
considerations of "full faith and credit" to enforce by means of its
contempt power injunctions issued by foreign courts. 332 Whether
any other constitutional provisions might apply to coercive sanc-
tions is difficult to predict.
d. Punishment and treatment
The debate over the distinction between treatment and pun-
ishment has occurred primarily in the area of civil commitment
of the mentally ill.833 Yet in a sense the debate is misplaced.
Those cases that have treated confinement ostensibly for treat-
ment as cruel and unusual punishment 334 have confused arbi-
trary incarceration with punishment. The decisions rely gener-
ally on Robinson v. CaZifornia,83 5 which held imprisonment of
a narcotics addict to constitute a burden on a status rather than
an act, and hence to be cruel and unusual punishment. The pre-
ferable way of stating the conclusion of Robinson is that the im-
prisonment does not constitute punishment, in the sense of a bur-
den calculated to deter or revenge a violation of legal norms,
for the very reason that it does burden a status rather than a
voluntary act; but rather that the imprisonment is purposeless
and hence. violative of due process. Alternatively, it might be
argued that the affixation of the criminal label in Robinson was
itself punitive, and hence cruel and unusual because arbitrary.
Civil commitment statutes do not generically include any
reference to specifically prohibited conduct or acts; the focus in-
stead is on the status or mental health of the individual.3 36 Be-
cause of this fact, retribution and deterrence are not effectively
332. See generally Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HTv.
L. Rzv. 994, 1042-44 (1965).
333. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the
Mentally II1, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1259-64, 1330-33 (1974).
334. See Martarella v. Kelly, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
United States v. Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705, 708-09 (N.D. Cal. 1971); United
States v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Welsch v. Likins, 373
F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
335. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
336. See generally Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of
the Mentally 1l, 87 HARv. L. R v. 1190, 1201-07 (1974).
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served. If arbitrary confinement is to be attacked, it should be
as a denial of due process of law, not as cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.
There are instances, of course, where confinement is osten-
sibly prescribed for treatment purposes, but solely for those per-
sons who have violated particular norms. For example, the sex-
offender statute involved in the case of Specht v. Patterson33 7
provided that after conviction of a sex offense, a person could
be given an indeterminate sentence uider the Sex Offender Act
if found to be dangerous and mentally ill. Arguably, this statute
was designed to serve the purpose of prevention, by removing
the offender from society, and, perhaps, that of treatment as well.
Nonetheless, the Court seems to have been correct in holding the
statute in the case at bar to be punitive and therefore, because
the case involved the infamous punishment of imprisonment, also
criminal. Where an ostensible treatment applies only to persons
who have committed criminal or other forbidden acts, a demon-
stration of some preventive purpose proves nothing, for all crimi-
nal sentences serve to prevent crime (at least crime committed
outside the prison) during the period of incarceration, and also
aim to fulfill the purposes of treatment and rehabilitation. Had
the legislature desired to avoid the implication of punishment
in the Sex Offender Act, an alternative was available, namely,
a requirement of review for possible initiation of civil commit-
ment proceedings at the time the criminal sentence expired.338
To the extent that prevention and treatment were the goals rath-
er than punishment, common procedures might have been
adopted for offenders and nonoffenders alike. Thus the Act is
distinguishable from a commitment statute listing as a ground
of commitment the commission of certain sex offenses. If it
could be demonstrated that commission of such offenses necessar-
ily indicates future dangerousness to the public, at least as a mat-
ter of statistical probability, commission of an offense would sim-
ply become a signal of the need for preventive measures, much
as in the case of the revoked driver's license or that of disbarment
for fraud.83 9 Here, however, the indeterminate sentence pro-
cedure constituted a different and more burdensome procedure
than that involved in civil commitment. It required judicial ap-
proval for release and employed the label "sentence" rather than
"commitment." Indeed, the label alone would arguably be
enough conclusively to indicate a legislative intent to punish.
337. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
338. Cf. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
339. $ee text accompanying notes 310-24 supra.
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VI. POSTSCRIPT: THE PROCEDURAL ATTRIBUTES
OF CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDINGS
This Article has been primarily concerned with the distinc-
tion between civil and criminal punishment and with the distinc-
tion between punishment and nonpunishment. In the process
of this investigation, the Article has attempted to sort out the
constitutional protections that apply only to criminal punish-
ments from those that apply to punishments generally.
Some of the constitutional and statutory attributes of non-
criminal punishment are less certain than the constitutional ap-
plications discussed previously. The applicability of procedural
requirements such as the seventh amendment right to jury trial,
the enforceability of the provision for remission and mitigation of
penalties that is contained in some statutes, and the placement of
the burden of proof in penalty proceedings, for example, still
remain somewhat uncertain. This last section of the Article
attempts to outline the scope of these uncertainties, but does not
necessarily undertake to resolve them. Hopefully, the para-
meters of the arguments in each of these areas will at least be
pointed out.
A. THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL UNDER THE SEVENTH AmENDMENT
The sixth amendment right to trial by jury seems clearly
inapplicable in civil penalty and forfeiture proceedings,340 and
the corresponding right under the seventh amendment remains
something of a bone of contention.341 The proponents of ex-
panded use of civil penalties argue against application of the sev-
enth amendment, pointing to streamlined agency procedures as
a primary advantage over the use of criminal sanctions.
342
History provides some guidance in this area, at least with
regard to the jury trial right in strictly judicial proceedings not
involving agency assessment of penalties. The Court has indi-
cated that it views maritime forfeiture proceedings as maintain-
able, at the government's option, either in the common-law
courts, where a jury was traditionally available,3 43 or in admir-
340. See United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir.
1974).
341. For a recent analysis, see Note, Right to Jury Trial under Sec-
tion 5(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act-Building "Iron Power"
in the Seventh Amendment, 59 MINN. L. Rsv. 715, 729-49 (1975).
342. See Goldschmid, supra note 6, at 30-34.
343. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 140, 152, 153 (1943):
"[S] eizures, in England, for violation of the laws of revenue,
trade or navigation, were tried by a jury in the Court of Ex-
chequer, according to the course of the common law .... "
[quoting 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 374 (12th ed. 1873)].
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alty, where it was not.3 44 Seizures on land were uniformly ad-
judicated with a jury.345 As for suits for monetary penalties, the
Court has asserted without elaboration that the defendant is "of
course" entitled to a trial by jury.' 6
However, the right to jury trial seems to disappear when
the legislature (or at least Congress) commits the matter to
agency determination.,3 47 The Court has on various occasions
recognized that administrative agencies rather than courts may
constitutionally be entrusted with determining whether a pen-
alty or forfeiture has been incurred,348 and has implied that no
judicial review will lie other than equitable enforcement of the
agency order or appellate review for abuse of discretion. 49 The
clearest demonstration of this position has been in cases involv-
ing immigration, an area where congressional power has been
described as plenary and constitutional restraints are minimal.350
The Court has never held or said that the admiralty jurisdic-
tion in a forfeiture case is exclusive, and it has repeatedly de-
clared that, in cases of forfeiture of articles seized on land for
violation of federal statutes, the district courts proceed as courts
of common law according to the course of the Exchequer on in-
formations in rem with trial by jury.
344. "[Earlier Supreme Court decisions] held that when the seizure
occurred on navigable waters the cause was maritime and hence triable
without a jury in the federal courts." Id. at 152 (citing section 9 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 77).
345. See note 343 supra. See also C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S.
133, 153 (1943), and cases there cited.
346. Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909). See also
United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1914) (quoting Hepner).
347. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974). The notes in
the remainder of this section on the right to jury trial draw heavily on
the scholarship of Professor Goldschmid, supra note 6, at 38-44.
348. See Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909);
Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1932):
By the words of the statute the Secretary's is the only voice au-
thorized to express the will of the United States with respect
to the imposition of the fines; the judgment of a court may not
be substituted for the discretion which, under the statute, he
alone may exercise. In conferring that authority upon an ad-
ministrative officer, Congress did not transcend constitutional
limitations.
[Due process of law does not require that the courts,
rather than administrative officers, be charged, in any case, with
determining the facts upon which the imposition of such a fine
depends. It follows that as the fines are not invalid, however
imposed, because unreasonable or confiscatory in amount, which
is conceded, Congress may choose the administrative rather than
the judicial method of imposing them.
349. See cases cited in note 348 supra.
350. See note 348 supra. See also Elting v. North German Lloyd,
287 U.S. 324, 328 (1932). With regard lo the plenary powers of Congress
over immigration, see notes 326-27 supra. It has been observed, however,
that in other areas where constitutional restraints normally apply, such
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Nonetheless, the Court has also upheld agency imposition of pen-
alties in such areas as taxation 35 1 and wage stabilization,3 52
where constitutional restraints operate with full force. There
has been no suggestion that the administrative imposition of pen-
alties need be subject to judicial retrial before a jury because
of the seventh amendment. 53
The argument that such delegation to agencies violates the
right to jury trial has depended on the view that money penalty
and forfeiture proceedings are common-law actions for debt.354
The better view seems to be that Congress can vary the nature
of the proceeding as it sees fit by providing either judicial adjudi-
cation of the penalty, which resembles a common-law action for
debt, or an agency proceeding followed by judicial enforcement,
which more nearly resembles a proceeding in equity than an ac-
tion at law.3 5
as interstate commerce, congressional power has also been described as
"plenary." 1 K. DAvis, AD N-sTRATivn LAW TREATISE § 2.13, at 136
(1958); Goldschmid, supra note 6, at 39 n.220.
351. In Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339
(1909), a case imposing penalties on a steamship company for carrying
illegal immigrants, the Court indicated the broad scope of congressional
power to authorize administrative imposition of such penalties:
In accord with this settled judicial construction the legisla-
tion of Congress from the beginning, not only as to tariff but
as to internal revenue, taxation and other subjects, has pro-
ceeded on the conception that it was within the competency of
Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its
control, to impose appropriate obligations and sanction their en-
forcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive of-
ficers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity
of invoking the judicial power.
As Professor Goldschmid points out, the opinion in Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391 (1938), upheld the authority of the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice to impose a civil penalty for tax evasion (although the Court itself
called the imposition "remedial," not punitive). See Goldschmid, supra
note 6, at 39-40. See also Olshausen v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 23 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 820 (1960); Walker v. United States, 240 F.2d
601 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 939 (1957).
352. N.A. Woodworth Co. v. Kavanaugh, 102 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mich.
1952), ajfd, 202 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1953) (per curiam).
353. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1937); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL or ADImiINisTrnATIvE AcTION 91 (abr.
ed. 1965). A recent en bane decision of the Third Circuit upheld
the power of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
to impose monetary penalties without de novo judicial review and sev-
enth amendment right of jury trial. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1200, 1215 (3d Cir. 1975) (en
banc) (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)).
354. See Note, supra note 341, at 733.
355. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); cf. Pernell v. South-
all Realty Co., 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974) (dictum) ("the Seventh
Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings,
where jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of ad-
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If this view prevails, then the determination of the right to
jury trial depends on a search for congressional purpose. If Con-
gress intended plenary judicial trial of an agency complaint re-
questing that a penalty be imposed, then jury trial would be con-
stitutionally available by analogy to the Exchequer proceedings
cited above.3 56 If, on the other hand, Congress intended to sub-
mit imposition of the penalty to agency determination, the pro-
ceeding to enforce the agency's order would involve no right of
jury trial.357
B. REmissIoN AND MITIGATION OF ]?ENALTIES AND FORFEITURES
For many years the courts have treated agency or executive
remissions and mitigations of penalties and forfeitures as acts
of grace, much like a pardon, and hence entirely discretionary
and beyond judicial review.358 The Court has suggested, how-
ever, that agencies may not penalize an innocent owner of prop-
ministrative discretion"); 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
2.12, at 131 (1958). And in Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214, 219
(1893), the Court stated:
It was certainly competent for Congress to create this board
of general appraisers... and not only invest them with author-
ity to examine and decide upon the valuation of imported goods,
.but to declare that their decision "shall be final and con-
clusive as to the dutiable value of such merchandise against all
parties interested therein."
The Court held that the collector of the port could then automatically
levy an additional sum, albeit called a penalty, on the basis of the board's
appraisal.
356. See note 343 supra.
357. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 439 (2d Cir.
1974) (Oakes, J., dissenting); cf. Oshausen v. Commissioner, 27" F.2d
23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 820 (1960). There is, however, an
additional due process problem in penalty cases where no stay is pro-
vided pending appeal from the agency to the courts. The resulting
cumulation of damages may effectively discourage appeal. See Note,
Due Process and Employee Safety: Conflict in OSHA Enforcement Pro-
cedures, 84 YALE L.J. 1380, 1382-88 (1.975).
358. See, e.g., United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972); United States v. One 1961
Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964); Jary Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 254 F. Supp. 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). In One 1961 Cadillac the court
stated:
The purpose of the remission statutes was to grant executive
power to relieve against the harshness of forfeitures. The exer-
cise of the power, however, was committed to the discretion of
the executive so that he could temper justice with mercy or
leniency. Remitting the forfeiture, however, constituted an act
of grace. The courts have not been granted jurisdiction to con-
trol the action of the executive, even where it is alleged, as here,
in general conclusory language, that discretion has been abused.
337 F.2d at 733. See generally Gellhorn, Administrative Prescription and
Imposition of Penalties, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 265, 279-83. But see Elting
v. North German Lloyd, 287 U.S. 324, 328 (1932) (duty to remit a penalty
if the person subject to it could not have avoided the violation).
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erty used to commit illegal acts, where the owner took all rea-
sonably possible steps to guard against the illegal use.3 59 In
addition to imposing this due process limitation on forfeitures
and penalties, the Court has implied that where a statutory pro-
vision for mitigation and remission exists, the agency charged
with its exercise may be required to apply it to persons who were
totally without wrongful intent.360
The standard of review consequently appears to be moving
toward the "abuse of agency discretion" model that obtains else-
where in administrative law, with the agency forbidden not to
remit or mitigate sanctions in situations where the statute con-
structively intends remission or mitigation. Although this result
has been avoided by courts that have held that remission and
359. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90
(1974); Elting v. North German Lloyd, 287 U.S. 324, 328 (1932); see
United States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 346 F. Supp. 613 (C.D. Cal. 1972);
United States v. One Bally Sun Valley Pinball Machine, 340 F. Supp.
307 (W.D. La. 1972); In re One 1965 Ford Mustang, 105 Ariz. 293, 463
P.2d 827 (1970).
360. In United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715,
721-22 (1971), the Court stated:
An express statutory provision permits the innocent owner to
prove to the Secretary of the Treasury that the "forfeiture was
incurred without willful negligence or without any intention on
the part of the petitioner ... to violate the law...." 19 U.S.C.§ 1618. Upon this showing, the Secretary is authorized to return
the seized property "upon such terms and conditions as he deems
reasonable and just." It is not to be presumed that the Secre-
tary will not conscientiously fulfill this trust, and the courts
have intervened when the innocent petitioner's protests have
gone unheeded. United States v. Edwards, 368 F.2d 722 (CA4
1966); Cotonificio Bustese, S.A. v. Morgenthau, 74 App. D.C. 13,
121 F.2d 884 (1941) (Rutledge, J.). When the forfeiture statutes
are viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended
to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly in-
volved in a criminal enterprise.
The Court reached this conclusion en route to concluding that, as in
Boyd, the statute was designed to burden criminal conduct and hence
was "quasi-criminal" for purposes of the fourth and fifth amendments.
It seems more reasonable to say that forfeiture laws are penal in a strict-
liability sense, regardless of the criminal intent of the property owner,
and that the Boyd rule applies to penal actions generally, whether or
not they involve criminal laws. See text accompanying notes 110-24
supra. The difficulty with the Court's approach in Coin & Currency is
that, by straining to limit the statute to criminal conduct, the Court im-
pliedly removed the strict liability that the statute was fairly clearly de-
signed to create. The resulting confusion is demonstrated in lower court
cases that have denied liability absent a showing of criminal intent under
statutes providing for remission and mitigation. See, e.g., United States
v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 346 F. Supp. 613 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Suhomlin
v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 650 (D. Md. 1972); cf. McKeehan v. United
States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971). A corrective footnote appears il
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 n.27
(1974).
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mitigation are matters entirely "committed to agency discretion"
under the Administrative Procedure Act or other statutes,361
these decisions perhaps fail to consider both the constitutional
limitations and statutory policy that prevent the forfeiture of
property belonging to totally innocent owners.
C. DUE PRocEss HEARING REQUIREmENTS IN PENALTY AND
FoFETURE PROCEEDINGS
In the early case of Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Strana-
han,3 62 the Court stated that the Secretary of Commerce and
Labor need not grant a hearing on -the question whether a steam-
ship company brought an alien with a communicable disease to
this country. This language was disavowed as dictum by the
Court in a later case dealing with the same statute.36 There
now seems little doubt that, like all other governmental depriva-
tions of property, agency penalty and forfeiture proceedings must
provide an opportunity to be heard.86 4 The more difficult prob-
lems are defining the issues on which hearings are required, al-
locating the burden of proof on those issues, and determining
whether bonds can be required to secure such hearings.
Various federal statutes provide that in order to subject
property to forfeiture the Government need only show probable
cause to believe that the property should be forfeited, and that
the claimant must then prove the negative.3 5 Such a proce-
dure is commonplace and constitutionally acceptable in proceed-
ings where taxpayers challenge the assessment of tax deficien-
cies,366 and early in the Court's history Chief Justice Marshall
upheld such a procedure as applied to the forfeiture of illegally
imported goods.3 67 In the 1874 case of Chaffee v. United States, 308
however, the Court held unconstitutional a lower court's jury in-
struction that the failure of a defendant in a money penalty case
to adduce proof within his exclusive possession could be consid-
361. See, e.g., United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile Automobile, 256
F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Gramling, 180 F.2d 498 (5th
Cir. 1950); United States v. One 1957 Buick Roadmaster, 167 F. Supp.
597 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
362. 214 U.S. 320, 340-43 (1909).
363. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 336-37 (1932).
364. See generally Note, Forfeiture Proceedings-In Need of Due
Process, 3 FoSDHAm URB. L.J. 347 (1975).
365. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1970) (customs).
366. See, e.g., Crocker First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 183 F.2d
149, 151 (9th Cir. 1950); United States v. Peabody Co., 104 F.2d 267, 269
(6th Cir. 1929); Schwarz v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Wis.
1956).
367. Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).
368. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 516 (1874).
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ered as evidence against him, as in other civil cases. The Court
based its decision on the now-discredited assumption that the
government must generally prove forfeiture cases beyond a
reasonable doubt 69 -a precursor no doubt of the language of
Boyd-and it distinguished cases where the statute explicitly
cast the burden of proof on the claimant after a showing of
probable cause.sr °
Whether the Chaffee court should so easily have put these
cases aside, however, seems doubtful. Even a narrow reading
of Boyd 371 would indicate that an individual cannot be com-
pelled by means of a threat of forfeiture of his property to give
testimony that might result in his prosecution in a future crim-
inal case.ars A number of lower courts have used such reason-
ing to conclude that placement of the burden of proof on the
property owner is unconstitutional.373 And if Boyd is read more
369. See note 45 supra.
370. 85 U.S. at 545-46.
371. See text accompanying notes 111-16 supra.
372. In Boyd, a forfeiture proceeding, the Court held unconstitutional
a subpoena of business records backed with the threat of contempt.
Since Boyd the Court has made it clear that the threat of forfeiture itself,
apart from enforcement of subpoenas by contempt, unconstitutionally
burdens the exercise of the fifth amendment right. See United States
v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); One 1958 Ply-
mouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). See also Suhomlin
v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 650 (D. Md. 1972).
373. See McClendon v. Rosetti, 460 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1972):
The burden of proof in any civil action is expressly put on the
claimant... [to prove lawful title and possession].... [T]he
burden exists even if there is insufficient evidence for an indict-
ment .... It seems plain enough that absent evidence of un-
lawful conduct, criminal sanctions may not be imposed. . ., nor
property forfeited. . ., even though in the case of property for-
feiture the burden of proof on the government seeking it is only
by a preponderance of the evidence.
See also lannelli v. Long, 333 F. Supp. 407, 410 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd,
487 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040 (1973) (equating en-
forcement of tax lien with a forfeiture):
In order to prevail in a suit for refund, the burden of establish-
ing the correct tax due is upon the taxpayer. The Iannellis,
therefore, would be required to prove facts about their opera-
tions and income which might directly incriminate them both
in the pending federal court suit and perhaps also in a state
court action.
To the plaintiffs, therefore, the choice seems to be simple.
They either waive their right to be silent under the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution in connection with the criminal
case or they must forfeit all of their property down to and in-
cluding the furniture in their home.
Moreover, in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), the Court held
that a state could not place on an individual the burden of proving that
he had not engaged in prohibited speech, because of the chilling effect
and "margin of error" that such placement of the burden entailed. Al-
though the burden of proof in Speser affected a preferred first amend-
19761
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liberally, to indicate that testimony cannot be compelled in a for-
feiture proceeding regardless of whether it may be used in a sepa-
rate criminal action,37 4 then placement of the burden of proof
on the property owner is still more suspect.
Several lower court cases have avoided this problem by con-
struing "probable cause" to mean something more nearly ap-
proaching "prima facie proof."375 Such a reading of the statu-
tory standard would probably pass constitutional muster under
the "preponderance-of-the-evidence" standard, which normally
applies in penalty and forfeiture cases where the government
bears the burden under the terms of the relevant statute.376
The form and availability of hearings also raise problems in
penalty and forfeiture cases. Federal forfeiture statutes fre-
quently permit the government agency to seize property without
a warrant and hold it without demonstration of probable cause
until the agency determines whether to remit or mitigate the
forfeiture and any incidental money penalties. 77 A hearing
ment right (unlike penalty and forfeiture cases), the Court relied on
Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922), the tax penalty case that invali-
dated the use of summary collection procedures, 357 U.S. at 525, thus
indicating that ordinary tax procedures are not always constitutionally
permissible. It remains unclear whether the Court would be willing to
reverse the analogy and hold that penalty cases are like first amendment
cases for purposes of the Speiser rule that the burden of proof must be
borne by the government.
374. See text accompanying note 124 supra.
375. See, e.g., Olshausen v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 23, 28 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 820 (1960):
Where one fact (willful neglect) is a logical conclusion from an-
other (failure to file), there is no constitutional infirmity in pre-
suming the second fact from the first, thus putting the burden
of proof on the protestant .... An almost impossible burden
would be placed on the government if it had to prove willful
neglect by evidence in addition to a taxpayer's failure to file,
whereas the taxpayer can easily explain his failure if good cause
therefor existed. The allocation of the burden of proof .. is,
therefore, founded in good common sense and fair play.But see United States v. One 1949 Pontiac Sedan, 194 F.2d 756 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952); Jacknan v. United States, 56 F.2d 358(1st Cir. 1932); United States v. Davidson, 50 F.2d 517 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 660 (1931); United States v. 1,197 Sacks of Intox. Liquor,
38 F.2d 822 (D. Conn. 1930).
376. See Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237 (1877);
Utley Wholesale Co. v. United States, 308 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1962);
D'Agostino v. United States, 261 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 953 (1959).
377. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1595a, 1608 (1970). No administrative
hearing is provided for in the statute, and in practice none is generally
granted.
Although the claimant may force the government to institute a judi-
cial forfeiture proceeding if he files a bond with the agency, consider-
able time can elapse before the government files suit and a judicial hear-
ing is obtained.
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may then be obtained, but in certain cases a bond must be posted
to cover court costs. These procedures may create insuperable
barriers for indigents unable to afford a bond.
The Court has properly justified the denial of preseizure
hearings in forfeiture cases on the grounds that seizure is neces-
sary to establish in rem jurisdiction, that seizure is necessary to
prevent the property's removal, and that the decision to seize
is made by state officials rather than private parties.378 The
Court has not described the attributes of the postseizure hearing,
however. In view of the serious inconvenience that may result
from the seizure of an automobile or ship and all its contents,
it seems imperative that some form of hearing before an impar-
tial officer should be afforded as soon as practical after the sei-
zure occurs. Federal statutes that do not afford such an oppor-
tunity seem vulnerable to constitutional attack.
The bond requirement also raises constitutional difficulties.
In cases where the bond is addressed to the court, federal law,
at least, provides relief for indigents under the forma pauperis
statute.3 79 However, where the statute requires a bond ad-
dressed to the relevant agency in order to require the agency
(rather than the claimant) to initiate a forfeiture proceeding, the
forma pauperis statute appears to afford no relief. In such cir-
cumstances at least one lower court interpreting state law has
held that the procedure denies indigents due process of law.3 80
This conclusion seems clearly warranted under both criminal and
civil cases affording court access to indigents who cannot pay
378. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-
80 (1974).
379. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970). In Colacicco v. United States, 143 F.2d
410 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 763 (1944), the Court raised but did
not decide the question whether the forma pauperis statute would elim-
inate the requirement of a cost bond for one who could not afford the
bond.
380. Fell v. Armour, 355 F. Supp. 1319, 1333 (M.D. Tenn. 1972):
The $250 cost bond of the Act allows one sufficiently afflu-
ent to obtain a hearing whereby he may seek recovery of his
vehicle and avoid the harsh penalty of forfeiture. Those owners
of seized vehicles who cannot afford the cost bond have their
rights to seek recovery of the vehicle and thereby avoid the
harsh penalty of forfeiture extinguished by their personal pov-
erty. As to these indigent owners, the effect of the $250 cost
bond requirement is to grant to the seizing police officer the ef-
fective right to extinguish all property interests. As to those
too poor to afford a hearing, this exercise of raw power can only
lead to arbitrary state action in that no neutral hearing officer
or judicial official will have the opportunity to review the evi-
dence and determine the propriety of the forfeiture or the claim
for recovery. Thus, the indigent owner may be deprived of
property without due process of law in that the deprivation may
occur without any process whatsoever.
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normal costs.8 81
VII. CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article has been to sort out descriptively
what the Court does in applying the Constitution to penalties
that are not labeled "criminal," and to provide some sort of ana-
lytic framework that might make decisions in this area more pre-
dictable, consistent, and articulate. The Article does not purport
to provide definitive answers about the constitutional outcomes
that should obtain in particular cases, but instead offers an over-
view and a framework of analysis. Nor is it meant to suggest
that the overview provided here is necessarily the only one which
the Court could responsibly use. One might perhaps retain the
description of penalties and forfeitures as "quasi-criminal" and
still explain in functional terms why certain provisions of the
Constitution, such as the self-incrimination clause, are "broader"
than other provisions, such as the sixth amendment. One might
also, for example, formulate a view of "punishment" that avoids
reference to purpose altogether and instead employs a balancing
test.
If space permitted, certain issues raised by this Article would
clearly warrant more extended consideration. The question
whether reference to "purpose" in the first amendment cases con-
tributes more to analysis there than. does the balancing language
currently employed is an intriguing issue whose full exploration
is beyond the scope of this Article. At a less general level, the
questions raised in the last section of this Article about the pro-
cedural attributes of civil penalty proceedings are only adum-
brated. They in particular deserve more extended analysis.
Nonetheless, it is hoped that this effort will at least serve
to stimulate more detailed examination of these and other issues
upon which the Article touches. If the use of civil penalties pro-
liferates, as it seems likely to, the need to explain and justify
their constitutional treatment will become increasingly critical.
This Article may at least serve to facilitate that task.
381. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (emphasizing the
fundamental nature of the interest at stake (marriage) and the judicial
monopoly over the grant of divorce). But see United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973) (no waiver of fees in federal voluntary bankruptcy
cases). Also reaching the conclusion that the bond requirement in for-
feiture cases is unconstitutional is Note, Forfeiture Proceedings-In Need
of Due Process, 3 FoRDHAm URs. L.J. 347, 355-57 (1975), which further
points out that certain federal statutes may be defective in failing to pro-
vide for notice of seizure to owners of property worth less than $2500.
Id. at 353-55.
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